10 Mont. 304 | Mont. | 1891
Respondent contends that the last sentence of section 59 fixes the place of trial in Cascade County, and retains it therein, while appellant insists upon his right to the change.
It is necessary to determine whether the action is in contract or in tort. For, if in contract, it seems that the face of the
Counsel have argued the construction of the last sentence of section 59, in connection with the previous portion of that section. But it is not necessary, in this decision, to construe those provisions. It may be assumed, for the purposes of the case, as now before us, that the plaintiff has the right to have an action for tort tried in the county where it was committed, notwithstanding the residence of defendant in another county, and his service therein.
In this complaint two causes of action are joined. In one it appears, by the complaint, that the tort was committed in Cascade County. In the other it does not so appear. Therefore, as far as this court is informed by the record, defendant has the right (§ 59) to have the second cause of action tried in Lewis and Clarke County, the county of his residence and of service upon him; and this right is not modified by the fact
In consideration of the facts before the District Court, we are of opinion that defendant’s demand for a change of venue should have been granted. It has been so held in Williams v. Keller, 6 Nev. 141, and Watkins v. Degener, 63 Cal. 500. The statutes of those States are similar to section 59, except that the last sentence is omitted. As that last sentence is in no way before us for construction, these cases last cited are in point, and we are satisfied with their reasoning.
It is therefore ordered that the order appealed from be reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court, with directions to make an order transferring the case to Lewis and Clarke County.