YOO
CHARGE:
Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(4) [
An order entered by the special inquiry officer on July 23, 1963 directs the respondent‘s deportation to the Republic of Korea on the charge that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry and sentenced to confinement therefor for a year or more, to wit, first degree murder (
The record relates to a native and citizen of the Republic of Korea, male, unmarried, 23 years of age, who was admitted to the United States for permanent residence through the port of Seattle, Washington on July 7, 1956. The evidence establishes and the respondent admits that he was convicted in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Miami, Florida, of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on April 18, 1963. The respondent also admits that in July of 1959 he went on a sight-seeing trip to Mexico for approximately four hours accompanied by his father and another person.
The case has been certified for an interpretation of the term “entry” in light of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1000, June 17, 1963. The Supreme
The evidence with regard to the nature of respondent‘s short visit to Mexico was fully developed by the trial attorney. The respondent testified “... we entered Mexico just visiting a different country, sightseeing, sir.” When questioned as to whether he knew that he was leaving the United States and entering Mexico, the respondent replied “... the only answer I can give you ... in entering a different country. No, I didn‘t have the intention in my mind at that time.” (pp. 13 & 14) The respondent subsequently testified that he knew that he was entering a foreign country when he visited in Mexico (p. 16); that he had an “identification card” which said “I was allowed either in Mexico or Canada, possibly three months with this card” (p. 12); and that he went through inspection when he entered and departed from Mexico (p. 15).
The special inquiry officer, referring to the factors enumerated by the Supreme Court as indicative of an “intent” to depart in a meaningful manner, concedes that the length of the respondent‘s absence in Mexico was short (four hours); that the purpose of the respondent‘s visit to Mexico was legitimate, namely, not contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws and that it was an innocent, casual and brief excursion from the United States. The special inquiry
Contrary to the special inquiry officer, we are unable to distinguish respondent‘s case from the Supreme Court holding in Rosenberg v. Fleuti (supra). Knowledge of the fact that a travel document is required for presentation to an inspecting immigration officer upon return to the United States is not the sine qua non of the Supreme Court‘s reference to travel document requirements as indicative of an “intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien‘s permanent residence.” When the Supreme Court in stating the several factors relevant to a meaningful departure said “whether the alien has to procure any travel documents in order to make this trip” they meant that the procurement of the document is the key to an “intent” to depart “meaningfully” because the Supreme Court expressed it “the need to obtain such items might well cause the alien to consider more fully the implications involved in his leaving the country.” (Emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, under the regulations then prevailing3 Fleuti was required to present his alien registration receipt card (Form I–151) to effect a reentry when he returned from Mexico in August of 1956 and we presume he had one in his possession for this purpose. As in the case of this respondent Fleuti did not have “to procure any travel documents in order to make his trip” to Mexico (10 L. ed. 2d at p. 1009).
This respondent had had an alien registration card since his initial entry for permanent residence in 1956. He did not have to make a formal application for a travel document authorizing his reentry following a border crossing into Mexico because under
Order: The order entered by the special inquiry officer on July 23, 1963 directing the alien‘s deportation to the Republic of Korea on the charge stated in the order to show cause dated April 25, 1963 is hereby withdrawn.
It is further ordered that the proceeding under the said order to show cause be and the same is hereby terminated.