YONIS IVAN DEL CID ARGUETA, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 18-2514
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
August 18, 2020
PUBLISHED
CAPITAL AREA IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS COALITION, Amicus Supporting Petitioner.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Argued: September 18, 2019
Petition denied by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Richardson joined.
ARGUED: Donald Louis Schlemmer, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Timothy G. Hayes, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Kate B. Yi, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Joseph H. Hunt,
Yonis Del Cid Argueta is a citizen of El Salvador and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Argueta from the United States based on two drug convictions from 2015 and 2016. Argueta conceded removability but sought discretionary cancellation of removal under
Argueta then petitioned our Court for review of the BIA’s order, arguing that he could not be “render[ed] . . . inadmissible” for purposes of
A noncitizen who has been authorized under federal immigration law to live permanently in the United States is a lawful permanent resident. See
Argueta received lawful permanent resident status on November 27, 2006. On February 22, 2013, Argueta was arrested in Virginia for possession of marijuana. He pleaded guilty and received deferred adjudication, a sentence of probation and a fine, and temporary suspension of his driver’s license. Argueta’s run-ins with the law continued, and on October 4, 2017, DHS charged him with removability based on two convictions for possession of marijuana in 2015 and 2016. See
The IJ determined that Argueta was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had not resided in the United States continuously for seven years after his November 2006 admission. Specifically, the IJ held that Argueta’s February 2013 drug offense triggered the stop-time rule because it was an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and it rendered Argueta inadmissible under that section. See
Argueta appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. He argued, among other things, that his 2013 offense could not render him inadmissible because he was already admitted as a lawful permanent resident and was present in the United States and therefore was not seeking admission. The BIA dismissed the appeal. Relying on its own precedent and decisions from other circuits, the BIA held that a noncitizen need not be seeking admission for a conviction to render him inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule.
Argueta petitioned this Court for review. We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal pursuant to
II.
The stop-time rule halts a noncitizen’s accumulation of continuous residence in the United States for cancellation-of-removal purposes on the date when the noncitizen “commit[s] an offense referred to in [S]ection 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders [him] inadmissible to the United States under [S]ection 1182(a)(2) . . . or removable from the
Argueta contends that his offense cannot render him inadmissible under Section 1182(a)(2) because, as a lawful permanent resident currently present in the United States, he has already been admitted to this country and is not seeking admission under any exception to the general rule that a lawful permanent resident “shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States.”
After oral argument in this case, however, the Supreme Court considered and rejected Argueta’s position. In Barton, the Court held that “[a] lawfully admitted noncitizen who was convicted of a crime [listed in Section 1182(a)(2)(A)] during his initial seven years of residence is ‘inadmissible’ and for that reason is ineligible for cancellation of removal.” Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1452. Similar to Argueta here, the petitioner in Barton argued that a noncitizen is not rendered inadmissible until he is actually adjudicated as such and denied admission to the United States, and a lawfully admitted noncitizen usually cannot be removed from the country on the basis of inadmissibility—in other words, “how can a lawfully admitted noncitizen be found inadmissible when he has already been lawfully admitted?” Id. at 1451. The Court, however, rejected this argument as “disregard[ing] the statutory text, which employs the term ‘inadmissibility’ as a status that can result from, for example, a noncitizen’s (including a lawfully admitted noncitizen’s) commission of certain offenses listed in § 1182(a)(2).” Id.
As the Supreme Court explained, Congress has made that status—inadmissibility based on conviction of a Section 1182(a)(2) offense—“relevant in several statutory contexts that apply to lawfully admitted noncitizens,” such as adjustment to permanent resident status, termination of temporary resident status, protection from removal because of temporary protected status, and cancellation of removal. Id. at 1452 (citing
Barton disposes of Argueta’s petition. A lawfully admitted noncitizen need not be seeking admission to the United States to be “render[ed] . . . inadmissible . . . under [S]ection 1182(a)(2)” for purposes of the stop-time rule.
DENIED.