Yolanda Jaime BERRELEZ, Appellant v. MESQUITE LOGISTICS USA, INC., Appellee
No. 04-17-00235-CV
Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas
August 15, 2018
Honorable Ron Carr, Judge Presiding; Marialyn Barnard, Justice
From the 293rd Judicial District Court, Dimmit County, Texas. Trial Court No. 14-10-12408-DCV. Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice; Marialyn Barnard, Justice; Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice.
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 15, 2018
AFFIRMED
Appellant Yolanda Jaime Berrelez appeals from the trial court‘s order granting appellee Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc.‘s motion to dismiss based on Berrelez‘s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act“). On appeal, Berrelez contends she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because her claims are subject to the “personal animosity” exception in
BACKGROUND
Berrelez was employed by Mesquite Logistics as a housekeeper at Mesquite Lodge. According to Berrelez, Mesquite Lodge provides housing for oil field workers. Berrelez claims her duties as housekeeper included cleaning rooms, removing trash, and providing clean linens and bedding for the guests. One day, when Berrelez was on duty, a Mesquite Lodge guest, Manuel Hugo Mascorro, sexually assaulted her. Mascorro ultimately pled guilty to indecent exposure.
After the sexual assault, Mesquite Logistics, a subscriber to workers’ compensation under the Act, submitted a workers’ compensation claim to its insurance carrier. The carrier electronically filed an “Employer‘s First Report of Injury” with the Texas
Berrelez resigned from Mesquite Logistics and never contacted the insurance carrier. Rather, counsel for Berrelez sent a demand letter to Mesquite Logistics. Thereafter, Berrelez filed suit against Mesquite Logistics and Mascorro. As to Mesquite Logistics, Berrelez asserted a premises liability claim, alleging Mesquite Logistics “had actual or constructive knowledge that the premises were unsafe, that these conditions posed an unreasonable risk, and that it did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk of harm, and that such failure proximately caused injuries to Berrelez who was, then and there, an invitee on the premises.” Berrelez also asserted Mesquite Logistics committed numerous acts of gross negligence. As is pertinent to this appeal, Berrelez alleged in her live pleading that she was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault. She alleged her injuries were the result of an intentional act by Mascorro, who acted upon personal reasons that were not based on Berrelez‘s status as an employee of Mesquite Logistics.
Mesquite Logistics ultimately filed a motion to dismiss Berrelez‘s suit based on the
After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding Berrelez had not exhausted her administrative remedies under the Act and her claims were barred by the Act‘s exclusive remedy provision. Thereafter, the trial court severed Berrelez‘s claim against Mascorro, creating a final, appealable judgment with regard to the order of dismissal in favor of Mesquite Logistics. Berrelez then perfected this appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Berrelez contends the trial court erred in dismissing her suit against Mesquite Logistics. Relying on the “personal animosity” exception, she claims it was unnecessary for her to exhaust her administrative remedies because she was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault. Thus, she argues her claims are “exempted” from the Act. Mesquite disagrees, arguing that whether Berrelez was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault was an issue within the exclusive province of the DWC, mandating that she first exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
Standard of Review
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction, including the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, is a question of law. City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013); Rio Valley, LLC v. City of El Paso, 441 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.); see Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012); Tex. Dep‘t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Because the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we conduct a de novo review. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d at 442; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
When, as here, a motion to dismiss based on an absence of jurisdiction (a plea to the jurisdiction) challenges the pleadings, we must determine whether the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court‘s jurisdiction to hear the cause. See Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., No. 17-0105, 2018 WL 2749769, at *6 (Tex. June 8, 2018); Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc., 381 S.W.3d at 476 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27); City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 622 (same). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader‘s intent. Meyers, 2018 WL 2749769, at *6; Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc., 381 S.W.3d at 476; Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622. If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court‘s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Meyers, 2018 WL 2749769, at *6; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27 If, however, the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the
Application
In her First Amended Petition, Berrelez affirmatively pled she was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the attack. She argues she was not in the course and scope of her employment for purposes of the Act because the assault falls within the “personal animosity” exception in
When the Texas Legislature creates an administrative agency, it may grant that agency the initial authority to resolve disputes within the agency‘s regulatory domain. Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016) (citing Rhule, 417 S.W.3d at 442). “If the Legislature expressly or impliedly grants an agency sole authority to make an initial determination in such disputes, the agency has exclusive jurisdiction, and a party ‘must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking recourse through judicial review.‘” Id. If a party files suit in court before exhausting exclusive administrative remedies, the court must dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Id. (citing Essenburg v. Dallas Cnty., 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that “[A] plaintiff‘s failure to exhaust administrative remedies may deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction in the dispute.“)).
Requiring a party to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit does not deprive her of any legal rights. Id. Rather, “it honors the Legislature‘s intent that ‘the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute’ first ... and thereby ensure[s] an orderly procedure to enforce those rights.” Id. (citations omitted). The exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement permits the agency in question to apply its expertise and develop a factual record if a suit is later filed. Id. (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction: 1, 28 TEX. L. REV. 168, 169 (1949) (stating that “[p]remature judicial intervention may defeat the basic legislative intent that full use should be made of the agency‘s specialized understanding within the particular field.“)). Moreover, a party may obtain relief through the administrative process, avoiding the expense and delay of litigation. Id. (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006); McKart, 395 U.S. at 195). If the party is dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative process, she may then file suit and have the courts review the agency‘s decision. Id. at 544-45 (citing Tex. Water Commʼn v. Dellana, 849 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1993); Ronald L. Beal, TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5.5.5, at 5-34 (2015) (stating “The purpose of the [primary-jurisdiction] doctrine is to assure that the agency will not be bypassed on what is specifically committed to it; the district court will remain open after the agency has acted.“)).
The DWC has exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensability because the Act vests the power to determine whether a
In this case, the parties dispute whether Berrelez was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault. As set out above, the determination of whether an employee was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the alleged injury is a matter within the initial, exclusive jurisdiction of the DWC. See
Berrelez contends she was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault — and therefore not required to exhaust administrative remedies before the DWC — based on the personal animosity exception, arguing applicability of the exception removes her claims from the Act.
However, the exceptions listed in
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court did not err in dismissing Berrelez‘s claims based on her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Act. Berrelez‘s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, mandating dismissal of Berrelez‘s claims against Mesquite Logistics. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s order of dismissal.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice