TERRENCE LEE YOHNER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendant and Respondent.
No. D065985
Fourth Dist., Div. One.
May 22, 2015.
COUNSEL
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Colton, Theodore M. Cropley, Seth M. Friedman and Kimberly Donohue, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
AARON, J.—
I.
INTRODUCTION
Terrence Lee Yohner filed this action in an attempt to prevent the California Department of Justice (the Department) from listing his name and information concerning a sexual offense that he committed, on its Megan‘s Law Internet Web site.1 Yohner suffered a conviction for committing a lewd act on his stepgranddaughter in violation of
On appeal, Yohner claims that the trial court erred in interpreting the exclusion provided in
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2009, Yohner was convicted of one count of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, in violation of
In 2013, Yohner successfully completed probation and applied for an exclusion from the Department‘s Web site. The Department denied the application, reasoning in part: “According to page 2 of the ‘Probation Officer‘s Report’ that you submitted, the defendant is the victim‘s stepgrandparent. Specifically, page 2 of the Probation Officer‘s Report states, ‘Between June 2006 and June 2007 the 61-year-old defendant repeatedly molested his then-8-year-old step granddaughter during overnight visits in his home.’ Because
Yohner filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting that the trial court direct the Department to exclude him from the Web site. In a memorandum in support of his petition, Yohner contended that the word “grandparent” in
Yohner argued that, in the alternative, to interpret the statute as not applying to stepgrandparents would be unconstitutional. In support of this contention, Yohner asserted that “grandparents and step-grandparents are similarly situated within the family hierarchy,” and that because they “are equally as likely as their biological counterparts to forge a close relationship with the child due to shared time and space, they must not be treated any differently by being denied exclusion under [
The Department filed a response in opposition to the petition. The Department argued that Yohner‘s contention that the term “grandparent” in
The Department also maintained that the statute was constitutional. In support of this contention, the Department argued that stepgrandparents and grandparents are not similarly situated in that a grandparent is “more likely to have ‘close family ties’ ” to a grandchild than is a stepgrandparent. (Citing Doe v. California Dept. of Justice (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1111 [93 Cal.Rptr.3d 736] (hereafter, G.G. Doe).) The Department further noted that in G.G. Doe, this court concluded that there was “no equal protection violation in limiting the exclusion3 to parents, stepparents, siblings and grandparents, as there is a rational basis for differentiating between them and more distant family members.” (173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112.) The Department argued, “[i]f the Legislature may rationally exclude blood relatives from
After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the petition. In its order, the court concluded that it was “prohibited from rewriting the statute to include ‘stepgrandparent.’ ” In addition, relying on G.G. Doe, the court rejected Yohner‘s contention that denying a stepgrandparent the benefit of the exclusion in
Yohner timely appeals.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. The term “grandparent” in
Yohner claims that the term “grandparent” in
1. Governing law
a. Megan‘s Law
“(e) (1) If a person has been convicted of the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offenses listed in this subdivision . . . that person may file an application with the Department of Justice, on a form approved by the department, for exclusion from the Internet Web site. . . .
“(2) This subdivision shall apply to the following offenses: [¶] . . . [¶]
“(D) (i) An offense for which the offender successfully completed probation, provided that the offender submits to the department a certified copy of a probation report, presentencing report, report prepared pursuant to
Section 288.1 , or other official court document that clearly demonstrates that the offender was the victim‘s parent, stepparent, sibling, or grandparent and that the crime did not involve either oral copulation or penetration of the vagina or rectum of either the victim or the offender by the penis of the other or by any foreign object.” (Italics added.)
b. Principles of statutory interpretation
In Doe v. Brown, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pages 417-418, this court outlined the following well-established rules of statutory interpretation:
” ‘In construing any statute, “[w]ell-established rules of statutory construction require us to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body
” ‘If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous or reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, we will “examine the context in which the language appears, adopting the construction that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes,” and we can “look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” ’ [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
” ’ “We must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
2. Application
Yohner argues that the word “grandparent” should be interpreted to include stepgrandparents, because, according to Black‘s Law Dictionary, “a ‘grandfather’ is the father of either of one‘s parents, and a ‘grandmother’ is the mother of either of one‘s parents.” (Citing Black‘s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 699.) Yet, a stepgrandparent is not the father or mother of a person‘s parents. For example, Yohner was not the father of the victim‘s mother—he was her stepfather. A stepfather is clearly not legally the same as a father. The court in In re Jodi B. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1322 [278 Cal.Rptr. 242] explained the relationship of a stepparent and stepchild as follows: “No such fundamental bond is recognized . . . in the stepparent-stepchild relationship. [¶] The status of stepparent arises solely as a result of the marriage of that person to the natural parent. [Citation.] A stepparent bears no legal obligation to contribute directly to the support of the child [citations], and upon the termination of the marriage the stepparent-stepchild relationship ceases.” (Id. at pp. 1328-1329.)
Yohner fails to cite a single case in which the term “parent” has been interpreted to include stepparents, or the term “grandparent” has been interpreted to include stepgrandparents. Moreover, the Legislature routinely distinguishes between parents and stepparents and between grandparents and
Indeed, the Legislature differentiated stepparents and parents in the statute at issue in this case,
Moreover, there certainly is no evidence of a clear legislative intent to include stepgrandparents within the scope of the exclusion in
“Section 290.46 originally allowed offenders to apply to the Department for exclusion from the Megan‘s Law Web site on proof they successfully
“Effective October 7, 2005, however, the Legislature amended
The G.G. Doe court stated that this history demonstrated an intent to “balance the interests of narrowing the exclusion to protect the public and protecting children victimized by their closest relatives.” (G.G. Doe, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112, italics added; see id. at p. 1111 [“It appears the Legislature intended to preserve close family ties when possible, and the privacy of child victims, by not posting personal information on the Web site about the victims’ closest relatives.“].) Interpreting the exclusion in
Yohner also notes that, when
The reason that the Legislature did not include a reference to “adoptive parent” in the amended version of
Finally, we reject Yohner‘s contention that to interpret “grandparent” in
Accordingly, we conclude that the term “grandparent” in
B.
Yohner claims that
1. Governing law
” ‘In reviewing an equal protection challenge, the courts generally apply one of two tests—the rational relationship test or the strict scrutiny test. [Citation.] The more stringent strict scrutiny test generally applies to cases involving “suspect classifications” or touching on “fundamental interests.” ’ ” (Fenn v. Sherriff (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1489 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 185].)
In G.G. Doe, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, the appellant, the uncle of a victim of a sexual offense, claimed that the Legislature‘s restriction of the exclusion in
In analyzing the appellant‘s equal protection claim, the G.G. Doe court outlined the following well-established law governing such claims:
” ‘Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee to all persons the “equal protection of the laws.” (
” ’ “When a showing is made that two similarly situated groups are treated disparately, the court must then determine whether the government has a
The G.G. Doe court applied this law in concluding that appellant, as the uncle of the victim, was not similarly situated to the relatives eligible for the exclusion, reasoning, “extended relatives such as aunts, uncles and cousins are not similarly situated to parents, stepparents, siblings and grandparents, because the latter group is more likely to live in the same home as a child victim of sexual abuse, and to have closer ties to the child.” (G.G. Doe, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111.) The G.G. Doe court also concluded that “the limitation of the exclusion is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective” (ibid.), namely, restricting the exclusion to those family members to a victim‘s closest relatives, since in those circumstances the offender is more likely to live with the victim and recidivism rates are likely to be low (id. at p. 1112).
2. Application
Citing Burt v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 273 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 373] (Burt), Yohner contends that
We also reject Yohner‘s contention that the statute fails to pass rational basis scrutiny. To begin with, stepgrandparents and grandparents are not similarly situated. A grandparent has a biological tie to the child, and the law has long recognized the distinction between those having biological ties to a child and those whose relationship is premised on marriage. (See In re Jodi B., supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 1329 [“We find it inconceivable that the Legislature intended that fundamental parenting rights attach to one who is not bound to the child either biologically or by securing the legally recognized status of parent and child through formal adoption.“].) Indeed, despite Yohner‘s rhetorical assertions that it would be “senseless” and would defy “common sense” for the Legislature to treat grandparents and stepgrandparents differently in this context, Yohner fails to present a single example in which the law treats grandparents and stepgrandparents identically. Because Yohner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that grandparents and stepgrandparents are similarly situated, his equal protection claim fails. (G.G. Doe, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111.)
Even assuming that grandparents and stepgrandparents were sufficiently similarly situated to warrant equal protection scrutiny, the Legislature‘s limitation of the exclusion to grandparents is clearly rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. The G.G. Doe court noted that in narrowing the exclusion in
Accordingly, we conclude that
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Haller, Acting P. J., and McDonald, J., concurred.
Appellant‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 12, 2015, S227412.