Yohanan v. DeClaireYohanan v. DeClaire
Donna deClaire Yohanan, appeals thе trial court‘s denial of her petition to set aside a final judgment of dissolution for fraud on the court. The petition alleged that appellee, George F. deClaire, misled the court by filing a fraudulent financial affidavit executed pursuant to
The parties were married in 1958 and divorced in 1977. The final judgment of dissolution incorporated by reference a property settlement agreement which, inter alia, limited the appellee‘s child support obligations to $100 per child per month. In 1980, аppellant filed a petition for increase of child support, citing an increase in both the children‘s needs and appellee‘s ability to pay. Appellant subsequently amended her petition to include an independent action to set aside the judgment of dissоlution for fraud on the court, pursuant to
After a final hearing on appellant‘s petition, thе trial court entered an order finding that in 1977 appellee fraudulently filed his financial affidavit because it failed to accurately rеflect the true facts of his assets and liabilities. Appellee underestimated his net income by approximately $1,775 per month and financial statements submitted to various banks demonstrated a much greater net worth than that shown by appellee‘s financial affidavit. Despite the trial court‘s disapproval of appellee‘s conduct, the trial judge refused to set aside the property settlement аgreement. The trial judge found that because appellant had prior to the filing of the dissolution co-signed a financial statement which reflected the appellee‘s net worth at approximately $500,000 above that stated in his financial affidavit she either knew or should have known of his true net worth. Appellant and her attorney testified that they thought appellee had told the truth in his financial affidavit. The triаl court held that appellant had waived her claim to set aside the property settlement agreement because she should have known his true net worth and did not timely contest the property settlement agreement within one year.
The trial court also found that сhanged circumstances justified an increase in the
Appellant argues that she had a right to rely on the truthfulness of the appellee‘s financial affidavit and that his fraudulent filing constituted fraud upon the court. We agree and reverse the trial court‘s refusal to set aside the property settlement agreement. In all other respects, we affirm the orders below.
It is clear that apрellant‘s independent action to set aside the property settlement agreement was untimely unless the fraud alleged constituted frаud upon the court.
“Fraud on the court” is a somewhat elusive concept. See 7 J. Moore Federal Practice, 1972, ¶¶ 60.33, 60.36, 60.37, and Toscano v. C.I.R., 9 Cir.1971, 441 F.2d 930, 933. If it is given a broad application so as to comprehend any type of misrepresentation by a witness or party which induced an incorrect factual determination by the trier of fact, judgments would be subject to frequent attack by independent actions, and the time for such attacks would be limited only by laches. The policy of the law which favors the termination of litigation suggests that such a broad application of the conсept is unwarranted. So too does the policy of
Rule 1.540(b), RCP , which promotes non-appellate attacks on a final judgment by motion in the original action — not independent actions.
Alexander v. First National Bank of Titusville, 275 So.2d 272, 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
Nevertheless, the public policy favoring the termination of litigation must yield in the present case to the public policy favoring the filing of accurate financial affidavits in dissolution actions. The Committee Note to
This opinion should serve notice to both litigants and counsel in dissolution proceedings that financial affidavits filed with the court pursuant to
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment, to vacate and set aside those portions of the final judgment of dissolution which incorporate the property settlement agreement, and to conduct further proceedings in accord with the principles set forth in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). In all other respects we affirm both the order containing judgment and the amended judgment.
GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.