520 A.2d 328 | D.C. | 1987
The Public Vehicle Branch of the District of Columbia Department of Transportation denied petitioner’s application for renewal of his taxicab driver’s license on the ground that he lacked good moral character, in that he was on probation after his second conviction of carrying a pistol without a license
I
Henry Yirenkyi has been a taxicab driver in the District of Columbia for approximately ten years. In April 1983, and again in July 1984, he was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license in his taxicab. After his first conviction, Mr. Yirenkyi was placed on probation for one year. Upon being convicted a second time, he was fined $1000 and sentenced to serve one year in jail. Execution of the jail sentence was suspended, however, and he was placed on probation for eighteen months.
The Public Vehicle Branch, considering the seriousness of these two convictions, the fact that Mr. Yirenkyi committed the very same offense twice in little more than a year, and the need to protect the public, denied his application for renewal of his hacker’s license. In its letter of denial the Branch cited applicable regulations, 15 DCMR §§ 1001.12 through 1001.15 (1986), which limit the eligibility of license applicants. Those regulations provide in pertinent part:
1001.12. The Director shall not issue any license under this chapter to any person who, in the judgment of the Director, is not of good moral character,[2] under the standards laid down in §§ 1001.13 through 1001.15.
1001.13. An applicant shall not be considered of good moral character if he or she is any of the following:
* * * * * *
(c) On parole or probation at the time of the filing of his or her application for a license, except as provided in § 1001.-14.
1001.14.Notwithstanding the provisions of § 1001.13, if the parole or probation arose out of a conviction for a crime other than those listed in § 1001.15,[3] the parolee’s or probationer’s application may be considered for approval by the Director if a letter from the appropriate parole or probation officer is submitted with the application stating that there is no objection to the issuance of a hacker’s license.
Mr. Yirenkyi appealed from this decision to the Hackers’ License Appeal Board, which unanimously affirmed the ruling of the Public Vehicle Branch. The Board concluded that the seriousness and frequency of the offenses of which he had been convicted, “coupled with the mission of the Branch, which is primarily to protect the public, who frequently ride in Appellant's taxicab,” constituted “sufficient cause” to deny the renewal of his license. The Board’s order also required him to turn in his hacker’s identification card. He petitioned the Board for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of new evidence. He then filed the instant petition for review, of which this court has jurisdiction under D.C. Code § l-1510(a) (1981).
II
15 DCMR § 1001.13(c) prohibits any person who is on parole or probation from obtaining a license to drive a taxicab in the District of Columbia. The only exception to that prohibition is found in 15 DCMR § 1001.14, which permits a probationer who has been convicted of a crime other than
The regulations at issue here implement the governing statute, D.C.Code § 47-2829(e) (1981), which limits the issuance of hackers’ licenses to persons of “good moral character.” Whatever that term may mean in other contexts,
The operation of taxicabs shall be conducted in accordance with the laws of the District and with due regard for the safety, comfort and convenience of passengers ... and for the safety of the general public. All reasonable efforts shall be made to promote safety at all times and under all conditions.
The Board in this case concluded that carrying a pistol without a license is a serious offense because of the danger it poses to the public. See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 402 A.2d 822, 825 (D.C.1979); United States v. Walker, 380 A.2d 1388, 1390-1391 (D.C.1977). That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that both of petitioner’s convictions of that offense were based on his possession of a pistol in his taxicab.
Hackers pursue their employment without close supervision and maintain direct and personal contact with the general public, which must necessarily rely upon the District’s certification of fitness. It is not unreasonable ... to view certain types of prior convictions of relatively recent occurrence as establishing a lack of moral integrity.
Debruhl v. District of Columbia Hackers’ License Appeal Board, supra note 4, 384 A.2d at 426.
The fact that petitioner was convicted twice of the same offense in a short period of time was also a matter of concern to the Board. “Evidence of past disregard for
Petitioner asserts that he possessed both guns with no wrongful intent, but only for protection because he had twice been robbed. Proof of intent to use the gun for an unlawful purpose, however, is not an element of the crime of carrying a pistol without a license. All that is required is a general intent to carry the pistol, not an intent to carry it without a license. McMillen v. United States, 407 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C.1979); see Brown v. United States, 379 A.2d 708, 710 n. 3 (D.C.1977) (“the proscribed act is that of generally intending to carry a pistol coupled with the fact that such pistol is carried unlicensed in the District of Columbia”); Mitchell v. United States, 302 A.2d 216, 217 (D.C.1973). What petitioner’s purpose may have been is essentially irrelevant.
Petitioner further alleges that when he purchased the first pistol, he “overlooked” and “misinterpreted” the registration papers, mistakenly believing that the gun salesman had registered his pistol at the time of purchase when the salesman checked his record with the police. What actually happened was that the salesman followed normal procedure by running his application through the police department to see if he had a prior criminal record. At the hearing before the Board petitioner testified that he thought the application form, which the salesman admonished him to keep with him at all times, was his gun permit. These assertions are all beside the point because petitioner “cannot effectively rely upon a contention that he was unaware of the law.” McMillen v. United States, supra, 407 A.2d at 605 (citation omitted).
Petitioner’s excuse for carrying the second gun, which he purchased after his first conviction, was that he thought that, under the “place of business” exception, a license was not required for those who kept a gun in their homes or places of business.
All of these assertions were out of place before the Board, just as they are out of place before this court. At most, they were possible defenses (but not good ones) to the criminal charges of carrying a pistol without a license in 1983 and 1984. They cannot be used, as petitioner seeks to use
Ill
Petitioner does not challenge either the validity of the regulations
Affirmed.
. D.C.Code § 22-3204 (1981).
2. The general licensing statute provides that no person may be licensed to operate a vehicle for hire unless he or she "is a person of good moral character and is qualified to operate such vehicle. ...” D.C.Code § 47-2829(e) (1981).
3. Section 1001.15 provides that "[a]n applicant shall not be considered of good moral character if he or she has been convicted of ... or is currently under an indictment for” any of a number of serious crimes, including murder, kidnapping, robbery, any sex offense, and any narcotic offense.
.See Allen v. District of Columbia Hackers’ License Appeal Board, 471 A.2d 271, 272 (D.C.1984); Debruhl v. District of Columbia Hackers’ License Appeal Board, 384 A.2d 421 (D.C.1978).
. Carrying a pistol without a license is not one of the offenses listed in section 1001.15.
. We need not decide in this case whether "good moral character” has a sufficiently precise meaning, independent of the limiting regulations, to withstand a vagueness challenge.
.Because taxicab drivers are common carriers, Stewart v. District of Columbia, 35 A.2d 247, 248 (D.C.1943), the highest duty of care is imposed upon them for the protection and safety of their passengers. Butler v. McCalip, 54 A.2d 644, 646 (D.C.1947); Bell Cab Co. v. Coppridge, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 337, 338, 158 F.2d 540, 541 (1946).
. D.C.Code § 22-3204 (1981) provides that "[n]o person shall ... carry either openly or concealed on or about his person, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, a pistol, without a license therefor issued as hereinafter provided ...” (emphasis added). We have held that this "place of business” exception applies only to those who have a "controlling, proprietary or possessory interest in the business premises in question.” Berkley v. United States, 370 A.2d 1331, 1333 (D.C.1977).
. In Debruhl v. District of Columbia Hackers’ License Appeal Board, supra note 4, we rejected a due process challenge to a predecessor regulation, materially identical to the present 15 DCMR § 1001.13(c). We held that denying a hacker’s license to a parolee was "rationally related to the legitimate objective of securing safe public transportation." 384 A.2d at 426; accord, Bradford v. D.C. Hackers’ License Appeal Board, 396 A.2d 988, 989 (D.C.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 949, 99 S.Ct. 2174, 60 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1979).