144 N.Y.S. 299 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1913
Lead Opinion
I concur in the affirmance of this order upon the ground that the ordinance in question is a valid regulation of the use of the streets in the city of New York and within the power conferred upon the board of aldermen by the charter of that city. By section 42 of the charter of the city of New York (Laws of 1901, chap. 466) it is provided that all the powers and duties which on December 31,1897, were conferred or charged upon the common council, or the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York, or the board of aldermen thereof, or the board of aldermen or common council of the various cities that united in the consolidation, shall be exercised and performed by the board of aldermen of the city of New York. Section 44
Amd. by Laws of 1905, chap. 629.— [Rep.
Amd. by Laws of 1910, chap. 262.—[Rep.
Dissenting Opinion
This is an action in equity to test the validity of an ordinance adopted by the board of aldermen of the city of New York regulating the business of operating public hacks in the city, and among other things establishing rates of fare which may be charged by public hack-men. The ordinance is a long and explicit one and contains a number of provisions which are objected to as unreasonable and incapable of enforcement. As to many of these objections no injunctive relief is necessary because they relate to matters of minor importance which may easily be separated from the ordinance without impairing its general effect, or, if found to be impracticable, are open to easy amendment. The point upon which the plaintiff, and the plaintiffs in other similar actions, dwell most strongly is the scale of charges prescribed by the ordinance, which, as the plaintiff contends, is placed so low as to render it impossible to conduct the business in such a manner as the public comfort and safety demand at a reasonable profit, and it is this point alone that I propose to consider. It is to be remarked at the outset that the injunction pendente lite for which plaintiff prays would by no means be determinative of the issues raised by the pleadings. Its whole office would be to hold matters in the statu quo they have been for many years until the question of the reasonableness of the ordinance could be determined upon the trial of the cause which can be had without serious delay. The only questions which seem to me to be important to be considered on this appeal are: First,