145 Minn. 152 | Minn. | 1920
Both parties to this controversy are engaged in the taxicab business in the city of Minneapolis, this state. Plaintiff asserts in the complaint that, prior to its organization in 1918 under the laws of Arizona, the Yellow Cab Company, a Minnesota corporation, installed, owned and operated a large number of taxicabs of a high grade for hire; that it adopted and used, in connection with such service, a reasonable and low meter schedule of fares; that it placed and maintained a large number of taxi
The bodies of defendant’s taxicabs are in the same yellow color as those of plaintiff, the top, wheels, hood and fenders are black, and on the doors appears a monogram circular in form, with a dark background with the name “Independent Star” thereon.
■Colored cuts of the taxicabs used by both of the parties are in evidence. It is apparent therefrom that, in color and general appearance, they are so similar, when viewed from a short distance, as to give out the impression of belonging to one and the same class.
Plaintiff alleges that, in July, 1919, defendant, with the fraudulent purpose of interfering with plaintiff’s business, adopted and employed, and has' since continued to use and operate, a number of taxicabs and automobiles for hire in opposition to plaintiff’s business in the city of Minneapolis, which, in color, finish, design and general appearance, are identical with the yellow cabs used by plaintiff, thereby simulating its trade-name, deceiving the public and interfering with plaintiff’s business.
In his answer defendant denies the allegations of fraud and diversion of business contained in the complaint, but admits that plaintiff uses
After hearing upon an order to show .cause the trial court issued an order for a temporary injunction, commanding the defendant to refrain during the pendency of this action, or .until the further order of the court, first, from using the trade-mark device of plaintiff or any imitation or simulation thereof; second, from using upon automobiles operated by defendant for hire, the finish, design, color, appearance, style or dress of plaintiff’s taxicabs .or any imitation or simulation thereof; and third, from using any scheme, plan, device, pretense, shift or contrivan of any kind or nature, causing or tending to cause defendant’s taxicabs to be mistaken or substituted for plaintiff’s taxicabs or taxicab service. From this order defendant appeals.
The order appealed from, in form, is much broader than the case seems to require. But when considered as simply preventing defendant from using taxicabs painted similarly to those of the plaintiff, and in such manner as will amount to a fraudulent imitation and be likely to deceive patrons into the belief that his taxicabs and taxicab service are in fact the' same as those of the plaintiff, it loses much of its apparent harshness. With this view in mind the case becomes one of unfair competition in business by means of a simulated style of vehicle. It is well settled that a close imitation of one’s trade-name or means and style of transacting business, which is obviously calculated to deceive the public into a belief that the imitation is, in fact, the original, is a fraud, and, where it appears that damages will result from such imitation, relief will be afforded by injunction. Opperman v. Waterman, 94 Wis. 583, 69 N. W. 569;
The true doctrine in cases of this character seems to be as stated in the ease of Amoskeag Mnfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599, 607. “It is evident, however, that in order to convey a false impression to the mind of the public as to the true origin or manufacture of goods, it is not necessary that the imitation of an original trade-mark shall be exact or perfect. It may be limited and partial. It may embrace variations that a comparison with the original would instantly disclose, yet a resemblance may- still exist that was designed to mislead the public, and the effect intended may have been produced; nor can it be doubted that whenever this design is apparent, and this effect has followed, an injunction may rightfully be issued * * Whether it was the defendant’s design to induce the public to believe that his cab was the property of the plaintiff, and that the device and color which he had adopted with reference thereto were for the purpose of misleading the public, is a question of fact to be determined upon the trial. By this we do not mean to even intimate that the plaintiff is entitled to any exclusive property in color or in words, but under the showing made it became clearly a question for the court to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to protection against imitations designed to mislead the public and to deprive the plaintiff of its profits. New York Cab Co. v. Mooney, 15. Abbott’s New Cas. 152, 159; Yellow Cab Co. v. Cook’s T. & T. Co. 142 Minn. 120, 171 N. W. 269.
It follows that the issuance of a temporary injunction pendente lite was clearly within the- discretion of the trial court.
Affirmed.