Appellant challenges his conviction for child molestation on several grounds.
The victim, the twelve-year-old daughter of the woman appellant had lived with for two years, testified that one day while her mother was at work appellant fondled and sucked on her breasts and licked and inserted his finger into her vagina. Immediately after the second incident of this nature, the victim went to a friend’s house and told her friend and her friend’s mother what had happened. The friend’s mother noticed a bruised area on the victim’s breast and called the county sheriff’s department. The responding officer took the victim to the hospital, where a nurse also noticed the bruise on her breast and a doctor noted a redness in her vaginal area. When the responding officer and another officer went to arrest appellant, they found him with his bags packed, and although the victim’s mother denied it at trial, the officer testified that she said at the time of the arrest that appellant was getting ready to leave town. Appellant testified and denied having any sexual contact with the victim, and presented evidence indicating that the victim was having emotional problems at the time *13 of the alleged incident. Appellant also introduced evidence that the victim had accused several other males of sexual misconduct toward her on several other occasions.
1. Appellant first contends that the victim’s testimony must be disregarded because she lied under oath, and that without her testimony the evidence against him is insufficient to support the verdict. OCGA § 24-9-85 (b) provides that “[i]f a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence.” Outside the presence of the jury but under oath, the victim was asked about three separate occasions on which she allegedly accused three different males of engaging in improper sexual conduct toward her. She denied making any of the accusations. The victim’s mother then testified, still outside the presence of the jury, that the victim had made such accusations on three prior occasions and that one of the accusations was made to a caseworker from the Department of Family & Children’s Services (“DFACS”). At that time, the trial court determined that the daughter was at least as credible as the mother and ruled that evidence of the previous accusations would not be admitted because appellant had not shown a reasonable probability that prior false accusations had been made. See
Smith v. State,
“ ‘In order to make [OCGA § 24-9-85 (b)] applicable “it must appear, among other things, that the witness admits, on the trial, that he wilfully and knowingly swore falsely, or the testimony must be such as to render the purpose to falsify manifest.” [Cit.]’ ”
Warnock v. State,
2. In his second enumeration of error, appellant argues that the trial court improperly restricted the scope of his cross-examination of the victim. Using a diary the victim kept during the period of the molestation, appellant’s counsel successfully impeached the victim on a number of points. In particular, he was able to force the victim to admit that she skipped school and lied to her mother about it, and that she thought lying to her mother was “pretty funny.” He then asked the victim, “What else have you lied to your mother about?” The State objected, and the objection was sustained. This exchange occurred before the DFACS report confirming the mother’s testimony about prior allegations was produced and before the court decided to allow testimony regarding the victim’s prior allegations of sexual misconduct. After the court ruled the testimony about allegations made by the victim to her mother and others admissible, appellant was permitted to recall the victim for additional cross-examination and was able to thoroughly explore what the victim told her mother about what other males had done to her. Appellant makes no showing of any other incidents of lying he wished to bring out but could not, or of how he was harmed. See
Walls v. State,
3. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask the victim’s mother whether she had believed her daughter’s earlier allegation that she was molested by her natural father. Contrary to appellant’s argument, this question did not elicit opinion evidence inadmissible under OCGA § 24-9-65 because it did not ask for the mother’s opinion as to the existence of a fact but instead asked the mother whether she believed a particular thing her daughter told her at a particular time. Nor did this question constitute impermissible bolstering of the victim’s credibility, because it did not solicit the mother’s opinion regarding the truthfulness of the victim’s testimony in this case. Compare
Guest v. State,
4. Appellant’s contention that the trial court improperly restricted the scope of his closing argument is also without merit.
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“ ‘[T]he range of comment which is proper in a case is in the discretion of the trial judge, and unless it can be shown that such discretion has manifestly been abused and some positive injury done, we will not interfere. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]”
Towns v. State,
Judgment affirmed.