150 Minn. 274 | Minn. | 1921
Plaintiffs are .rental agents, and, during the year previous to November 1, 1917, were employed by defendant to manage, let and collect the rents for an apartment building owned by her in Minneapolis. They were to receive 5 per cent out of the rents collected, for their sei'viees. Accounts were sent to defendant monthly with a check for the balance left, after deducting the commission and the operating expenses. With the account for October, 1917, the last month of their first contract, and a check of $228, the balance for that month, plaintiffs sent her a letter, highly commendatory of the efficient and economical management they had given and requesting a renewal of their engagement. In response, defendant came to their office and a new contract was signed by her, employing them for the year beginning November 1, 1917.
When the November account arrived it inclosed a remittance of $60 as the balance over commissions and operating expenses, and the balance remitted with the December account was less than $75. Defendant thereupon took the management of the building from plaintiffs. They brought this action to recover damages for the breach of the contract, and for moneys paid out in operating the building. Defendant answered, alleging that she was induced to sign the contract by means of false and fraudulent misrepresentations of plaintiffs that the building had been economically managed, and that all the bills for the preceding year had been paid, also that plaintiffs were to exercise due and reason
There is nothing to the claim that the municipal court did not have jurisdiction. The complaint states an action at law for breach of contract and the recovery of certain expenditures made for defendant under the contract. The total sum demanded was well within the amount which the court has power to give judgment for. The answer does not set forth a defense which requires affirmative relief from a court of equity before being available as such in an action at law. If it be established that this contract was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, or if it be shown that plaintiffs were remiss in the performance of their services, defendant would have just cause to terminate the contract and a perfect defense to any claim for damages for its alleged breach. There was no counterclaim and no facts stated in the answer calling for the exercise of equitable powers by any court.
The reply seems to have been served, but was not filed. The trial proceeded as if it had been duly filed. It is too late to make the point in this court that defendant should have judgment for want of reply.
The court found that, under the authority of defendant, plaintiffs had paid out $178.37 for coal and other supplies for the building. This finding is sustained by the evidence to such an extent that we are not warranted in disturbing it. Much is made of the fact that the first .agreement recited that, in consideration of their “renting and managing” the property, plaintiffs were to receive 5 per cent of the rent collected, whereas in the renewal the word “managing” is dropped. Hence it is claimed plaintiffs had no authority to buy coal or incur other op
Had the court accepted defendant’s testimony, good cause for her termination of the contract could well have been found, and that would have defeated plaintiffs’ recovery of damages for the unearned commissions. But plaintiffs denied that any false representations were made when the contract was renewed, and, while admitting that some poor coal was purchased in November and December, 1917, offered as an excuse that there was then a coal shortage and difficult to obtain coal of any kind. We'are not justified in holding the evidence insufficient to sustain the finding that defendant, “without just cause,” took the management of the building and the collection of the rents thereof away from plaintiffs.
Defendant questions the right to the damages for unearned commissions, on the ground that they are uncertain, contingent and remote. This claim is not sustained. The commission was based upon the rents collected from an apartment building. It was during a period when there was little probability of lack of tenants. The building had been operated for some time. The evidence of the rents collected for the 10 months preceding and the 10 months succeeding the breach, was definite, and showed clearly that the whole amount was certain to a marked degree. It is more so than the probable profits in Schumaker v. Heinemann, 99 Wis. 251, 74 N. W. 785; Pittsburg Gauge Co. v. Ashton Valve Co. 184 Pa. St. 36, 39 Atl. 223, and Wells v. National Life Assn. of Hartford, 99 Fed. 222, 39 C. C. A. 476, 53 L.R.A. 33, where damages were predicated upon testimony showing what the past business had been.
Defendant also raises the point that the damages awarded are excessive and not warranted by the proof. There is substance to the conten
For this reason the $132, awarded as damages for wrongfully terminating the employment, must be held excessive and not warranted by the testimony.
None of the other matters complained of require mention.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with direction to
Reversed and remanded with directions.