31 P. 1114 | Cal. | 1893
This is an action to quiet the plaintiff’s title to a parcel of land in the city of Los Angeles, and the complaint is in the usual form. The defendant, by his answer, denied all the averments of the complaint; denied that he had no right, title, or interest in or to the land; and alleged that he was the owner thereof in fee simple, and was such owner and entitled to the possession of the land when the action was commenced; alleged that he had been in the quiet and peaceable possession of the premises described, holding and claiming the same adversely to the plaintiff and all other persons, for more than five years before the commencement of the action, and that the plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the provisions of sections 1806 and 318 and 319 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He then set out the facts in a cross-complaint and asked that his title be quieted as against the plaintiff. After trial the court below found that the plaintiff “is now, and for a long time hitherto has been, the
In support of the appeal it is claimed that the findings as to the plaintiff’s ownership and right to the possession of the premises in controversy were mere conclusions of law, and therefore insufficient to justify the judgment. This claim cannot be sustained. Finding No. 1 was to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner in fee and entitled to the possession of the described parcel of land. This was a finding of the ultimate fact, and not of a conclusion of law, and was sufficient: Murphy v. Bennett, 68 Cal. 528, 9 Pac. 738; Daly v. Sorocco, 80 Cal. 367, 22 Pac. 211.
It is further claimed that the findings upon the issues raised by the plea of the statute of limitations were simply conclusions of law, and insufficient. The defendant pleaded the statute by alleging that the cause of action was barred by
It is also claimed that the finding that plaintiff was under the age of twenty-three years when the action was commenced was insufficient, because he might have been under the age of twenty-one 3^ears, and so incapacitated to commence the action. A sufficient answer to this claim is that defendant failed to raise the objection that plaintiff had not legal capacity to sue, by demurrer or answer, and it was therefore waived.
Finally, the point is made that the plaintiff had no right, legal or equitable, to have his title quieted as against the defendant, without first paying back to the defendant the money which the latter paid for the land at the guardian’s sale. We do not think the judgment can be reversed on this ground. No claim for repayment of any sum of money is set up in the answer or cross-complaint, and it nowhere appears in the record that any sum was ever paid by the defendant for the land. If he in fact paid for the land, and considered himself entitled to repayment, as a condition precedent to the quieting of the plaintiff’s title, the facts showing his equities should have been set up, and appropriate relief asked. On the whole, we see no merit in the appeal, and therefore advise that the judgment and order be affirmed.
We concur: Haynes, C.; Vanclief, C.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order are affirmed.