132 U.S. 174 | SCOTUS | 1889
YAZOO AND MISSISSIPPI VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
THOMAS.
Supreme Court of United States.
*183 Mr. James Fentress and Mr. W.P. Harris, (with whom was Mr. J.B. Harris on his brief,) for plaintiff in error, submitted on their briefs.
Mr. Marcellus Green, (with whom was Mr. S.S. Calhoon on the brief,) for defendants in error, submitted on his brief. Mr. T.M. Miller also filed a brief for the same.
*184 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi did not put its decision upon the ground that it was not competent under the state constitution for the State to contract with the company that the latter should not be subjected to taxation, but upon the ground that the exemption claimed could not be allowed. The taxes in question were assessed under the act of 1888, and if the charter of the company, which became a law on the 17th of February, 1882, inhibited such taxation, then this court has jurisdiction to re-examine the conclusion reached. Although by the terms of the act of 1888 the taxes therein referred to were not to be levied as against a railroad exempt by law or charter, yet the Supreme Court held that this company is not exempt, and is embraced within the act; so that if a contract of exemption is contained in the company's charter, then the obligation of that contract is impaired by the act of 1888, which must be considered, under the ruling of the Supreme Court, as intended to apply to the company. The result is the same, although the act of 1888 be regarded as simply putting in force revenue laws existing at the date of the company's charter, rather than itself imposing taxes, for if the contract existed those laws became inoperative, and would be reinstated by the act of 1888. The motion to dismiss the writ of error is therefore overruled.
By the eighth section of the company's charter it was declared "that said company, its stock, its railroads and appurtenances, and all its property in this State necessary or incident to the full exercise of all the powers herein granted not to include compresses and oil mills shall be exempt from taxation for a term of twenty years from the completion of said railroad to the Mississippi River, but not to extend beyond twenty-five years from the date of the approval of this act; and when the period of exemption herein prescribed shall have expired, the property of said railroad may be taxed at the same rate as other property in this State." If the provision had terminated with the words "Mississippi River" it *185 would not be open to argument in this court that the exemption claimed did not commence until the river was reached.
In Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railway Company v. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665, it was held that a provision in a railroad charter by which "the capital stock of said company shall be exempt from taxation, and its road, fixtures, workshops, warehouses, vehicles of transportation and other appurtenances, shall be exempt from taxation for ten years after the completion of said road within the limits of this State," did not exempt the road, fixtures and appurtenances from taxation before such completion. It was argued there, as it is here, that the legislature, while exempting the railroad from taxation for ten years after its completion, could not have intended to subject it to taxation before its completion, and when its earnings were little or nothing; on the other hand, it was argued there, as it is here, that one reason for defining the exemption of the railroad and its appurtenances from taxation, as "for ten years after the completion of said road," without including any time before its completion, was to secure a prompt execution of the work and to prevent the corporation from defeating the principal object of the grant, and prolonging its own immunity from taxation by postponing or omitting the completion of a portion of the road; but this court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Gray: "Each of these arguments rests too much on inference and conjecture to afford a safe ground of decision where the words of the statute creating the exemption are plain, definite and unambiguous." It appeared there, as it does here, that the taxing officers of the State had omitted in previous years to assess the property, but it was held that such omission could not "control the duty imposed by law upon their successors, or the power of the legislature, or the legal construction of the statute under which the exemption is claimed." And the court took occasion to reiterate the well-settled rule that exemptions from taxation are regarded as in derogation of the sovereign authority and of common right, and, therefore, not to be extended beyond the exact and express requirements of the language used, construed strictissimi juris.
*186 Tested by that rule, did the addition of the words "but not to extend beyond twenty-five years from the date of the approval of this act," operate to create an exemption of twenty-five years from the date of the act subject to being reduced to less than that if the road were completed to the river before the lapse of five years, but for twenty years at all events; or did it operate to reduce the term of the twenty years' exemption by so much as the completion of the road to the river took over five years? Upon the one view there would be a loss of exemption through rapidity of construction; in the other view, a gain, or, rather, the prevention of a loss. Does it appear by clear and unambiguous language that the State intended to surrender the right of taxation for twenty-five years? If the surrender admits of a reasonable construction consistent with the reservation of the power for a portion of the longer period, then for that portion it cannot be held to have been surrendered. Is not the construction that the exemption was to be for a term of twenty years, subject to a diminution of that term if the river were not reached in five years, as reasonable as the opposite construction; and if the latter construction be adopted, would it not be extending the exemption beyond what the language of the concession clearly requires? Can an exemption expressly limited to a term of twenty years after the accomplishment of a designated work, but not to extend beyond twenty-five years from a certain date, be read as an exemption for twenty-five years, but not to extend beyond twenty years from the completion of that work? It seems to us, notwithstanding the able and ingenious arguments of appellant's counsel, that these questions answer themselves, and that the exemption claimed cannot be sustained.
By the general law of the State of Mississippi in force at the time the charter of appellant was granted, it was provided that no railroad company should be subject to taxation while the same was in process of construction, but if any part of any road should be completed so as to be used for profit, the part so used should be taxed, although the whole road might not be finished. It is admitted that the taxes here were levied in respect to parts of the road which were in operation.
*187 The second section of its charter empowered the corporation to build and construct, and thereafter use, operate, own, and enjoy a railroad or railroads into, along, and across that part of the State lying between the Mississippi River and the Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad, "one of said lines, or a branch therefrom, to reach the Mississippi River at or near a point opposite Arkansas City if practicable, so as to connect such point on the east bank of the Mississippi River with some point or points on the line of the Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad;" and by section seven it was empowered to "build, construct, maintain, and operate of itself, or with others, in or out of this State, a ferry across, or a tunnel under, or a bridge over, the Mississippi River, at any point within this State where its railroads, branches, laterals or spurs may reach said river;" and to acquire lands, etc., for landings, wharves, inclines, etc., and to establish said landings, wharves, inclines, etc., as might be necessary or convenient in transporting freights, passengers, etc., upon and across said Mississippi River. In our opinion it cannot be doubted that a principal object of the grant to the company was the building of a line across the State from the Chicago Railroad to the Mississippi River, and that the point of contact was to be opposite Arkansas City, if that were practicable. Five years was contemplated as sufficient to complete the road to the river, so that the twenty years' exemption should commence.
By the thirteenth section it was provided that the legislature might declare the charter forfeited, if twenty miles were not constructed and in operation within three years from the passage of the act. This indicates that the legislature did not assume that the line might probably be extended to the river in less than five years, and were not thereby induced to insert the twenty years as a limitation on the twenty-five. No reason is perceived for limiting the exemption to begin with the completion of the railroad to the Mississippi River, if it were intended that the exemption should be for more than twenty years at all events, commencing with the approval of the act.
The question when the property may be taxed is answered *188 by ascertaining when the period of the specified exemption begins, for until then the general law provided that while the road could not be taxed during the process of construction, such parts as were finished and in operation could be, though they might be for a time exempt under the charter after the line was completed to the Mississippi River. When the Mississippi River was reached then the period of exemption would begin; but how long it would continue would depend upon the length of time to elapse before the end of twenty-five years from the approval of the charter. And this disposes of the argument that it is immaterial whether the period of exemption is twenty or twenty-five years, because it is agreed that the property could not be taxed until the period of exemption, whatever that is, shall have expired, for that ignores the real inquiry, which is as to when the exemption commences.
Again, the preamble to the act is referred to by counsel, as sustaining their construction, because it is therein declared that the work is one of "great public importance," and "to be encouraged by legislative sanction and liberality," and that "the physical difficulties of constructing and maintaining railroads to, across, along or within either the Mississippi, Sunflower, Deer Creek or Yazoo bottoms or basins, or the other alluvial lands herein referred to, are such that no private company has so far been able to establish a railroad and branches developing said basins and alluvial lands, and connecting them with the railroad system of the country." But as the preamble is no part of the act, and cannot enlarge or confer powers, nor control the words of the act, unless they are doubtful or ambiguous, the necessity of resorting to it to assist in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the legislature is in itself fatal to the claim set up. Indeed, what is therein stated appears to us to be quite as referable to the remarkably extensive powers granted as to the assignment of reasons for exemption from taxation.
It is true that it is stated in section eight, that, in order to encourage the investment of capital in the enterprise, and "to make certain in advance of such investment, and as inducement *189 and consideration therefor, the taxes and burdens which this State will and will not impose thereon," the exemption is thereby declared. Yet if, notwithstanding that statement, the matter were left uncertain, that would not allow the court to make it certain by construction, and to remove ambiguity upon the presumption of a legislative intent contrary to the fixed presumption where the rights of the public are involved. In short, there can be no uncertainty in the result when the language used is construed, as it must be, in accordance with thoroughly settled principles. After stating the exemption in controversy, section eight concludes as follows: "And when the period of exemption herein prescribed shall have expired, the property of said railroad may be taxed at the same rate as other property in this State. All of said taxes to which the property of said company may be subject in this State, whether for county or State, shall be collected by the treasurer of this State and paid into the state treasury, to be dealt with as the legislature may direct; but said company shall be exempt from taxation by cities and towns."
Since upon the expiration of the period of exemption, it would have followed that the property of the company would be subject to taxation at the same rate as other property, it may be that the object of the final clause was to create a scheme of taxation peculiar to the road. Upon the comprehensiveness and validity of such scheme we do not undertake to pass. It was not to take effect until the exemption expired, and the terms in which it was couched do not render the commencement of the exemption other than the Supreme Court held it to be.
The case is clearly controlled by our decision in Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railway Company v. Dennis, supra, and the judgment must therefore be
Affirmed.