55 So. 42 | Miss. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court.
On this record the only question we are required to determine is whether or not the trial court should have instructed the jury that they might assess punitive damages. If the facts did not warrant the submission of this question to the jury, the case must he reversed, as it is manifest that the jury awarded more than actual damage. Should the trial court have authorized the jury to consider the question of punitive damages ? Since this is the only question which we are required to determine at this time, all testimony relating to the physical condition of Mrs. Hardie at the date she was carried beyond
The facts are wanting in every element which would warrant the court in instructing the jury that punitive damages might be assessed. A railroad company is not liable for punitive damages for a mere failure to perform its contractual duty. This is expressly held in the case of Railroad Company v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 456, 42 Am. Rep. 373, and in many cases cited in the reprint of this case to be found in bóok 29, page 189, Reprint of Mississippi Reports. A railroad company which has violated its duty can be assessed with punitive damages only where there has been some intentional wrong, -insult, abuse, harshness, or where there has been such gross neglect of duty as to evince reckless indifference of the rights of others. This has been the consistent holding of this
Shortly after the train started from Areola, the station at which Mrs. Hardie should have gotten off, she discovered that she had passed her station and undertook to have the porter stop the train, and a few minutes afterwards appealed to the conductor, demanding that he stop the train and take her back to Areola. At this time the train had gone some hundred yards or more from the station at Areola and was under full headway. The testimony shows that the conductor was polite and courteous, and that the employees of both the railroad and sleeping car company were courteous and polite; but
It is evident the company is liable for whatever actual damage Mrs. Hardie may have sustained by reason of the failure to perform its duty, but there is no liability for punitive damages. We are unable to distinguish this case from the case of Miss. & Tenn. R. R. Co. v. Gill, 66 Miss. 39, 5 South. 393.
Beversed and remanded.
delivered the opinion of the court in response to the suggestion of error.
On the 12th day of March, 1909, Mrs. Hardie became a passenger on the line of railway owned by appellant. She boarded a regular passenger train at Clarksdale, bound for Areola. The train on which she was traveling was due to arrive at Areola at 3:25 p. m. and did arrive at that time, but on account of the negligence of the employees of the train Mrs. Hardie was carried beyond Areola to Rolling Fork, and returned on the next train without expense to herself, reaching Areola about 6 p. m. Omitting in this preface to state the circumstances of aggravation relied on as constituting the basis for the assessment of punitive damages, it is sufficient to state that she suffered a delay of about two hours and thirty-five minutes. She brought suit against appellant, alleging, among other things, that as soon as it was discovered that she had been negligently carried by her station, the porter of the car seized the bell cord, and caused the train to stop about a quarter of a mile below the depot, whereupon she demanded that her train be backed to the station and she be allowed to get off, and the declaration alleges that this the employees “willfully, maliciously, oppressively, and arbitrarily declined to do.” She recovered a judgment against appellant for five thousand dollars, and from this judgment an appeal was prosecuted and the cause reversed, and this court, after mature consideration of the whole case, was of the opinion that no view of the case warranted the trial court in authorizing the jury to impose punitive damage. This case is again before us on suggestion of error, filed by counsel for appellee, to the original opinion. Before discussing the case in detail, a few general observations may not be amiss.
It appears that when Mrs. ilardie took passage on the train, she went into a Pullman car attached to same, and became a passenger on that. The suit was. begun originally against both the Yazoo & Mississippi Yalley Railroad Company and the Pullman Company. When all testimony had been taken a motion was made by the Pullman Company to peremptorily instruct the jury in its favor. The court granted the instruction, and dismissed the suit as to the Pullman Company. It is insisted by appellants that this was reversible error. We cannot assent to this. Both companies may be liable for the negligence either jointly or separately, but neither is in any position to complain that the other is not sued, or that being jointly sued the plaintiff dismisses as to one. If the trial court was in error as to the peremptory instruction given to the Pullman Company, dismissing the suit as to it, the railroad company is in no position to complain because it neither adds to nor lessens its liability to plaintiff. Nelson v. I. C. R. R. Co., 53 South. 619.
Another general observation we desire to make is that the declaration filed mainly relies for the right to impose punitive damages upon a supposed duty that the railroad owes a passenger to back the train to the station where it negligently-failed to put the passenger off, when it is discovered that such passenger has been negligently carried by. This supposed duty we shall discuss further on in this opinion. The purpose in mentioning it now being to call attention to the fact that the declaration is based on the above idea.
Counsel filing the suggestion of.error seemed deeply impressed with the belief that this court has committed
What is the case? Until the controversy is understood there can he no intelligent comprehension of the rules of law that control it. Counsel for appellee convince themselves that the court has erred, both as to the facts and the law, and they convince the court that the predicate of their suit, as made by both the declaration and the proof, is one on which punitive damage could rarely, if ever, be allowed as against a carrier, and certainly not under the facts of this case. Counsel convince the court that they have misconceived the true principle of law controlling the decisions which they cite, and attempt to apply these authorities to the facts of a case wholly outside of the principles declared by the decisions. The only question in this case, is as to whether or not the trial court should have told the jury they were warranted in assessing punitive damage. Counsel filing the suggestion of error state that the original opinion misconceived the facts. We shall discuss this statement of counsel further on in the opinion; suffice it here to say that counsel give much importance to facts which have no bearing on the question before the court. In so far as the facts are material to the question involved, we set them out below.
As to some of the facts there can be no controversy. Appellee’s proofs show that Mrs. Hardie became a passenger on the Yazoo & Mississippi Yalley Railroad, paying for passage from Clarksdale to Areola. When she boarded the train at Clarksdale there was a Pullman car attached, and in order to take advantage of the additional comforts of the Pullman she went into it, paying all fares. Mrs. Hardie was a delicate woman, and had been visiting her sister, Mrs. Davis, at Clarksdale. Pier purpose is going to Areola was to arrange for the leaving of her child with a friend, Mrs. IParriston, in contemplation of a possible necessity for her to go to a hospital
From the testimony of Mrs. Hardie it thus appears that the train had then left the station and was on its journey to the next station, else there would have been no occasion on her' part to demand that her train be backed. Mr. Hardie testifies that he was at the depot to meet his wife, and when the train arrived, supposing her to he in the ladies’ coach, he went there in search of her. When about half way through the coach, he says, the train started, having stopped for only a few seconds. He says he then realized that his wife was not in that coach, and concluded that she had taken the Pullman in the rear of the ladies’ coach. When Hardie got off the
Such damage is allowed in cases of malice, willfulness, insult, fraud, oppression, gross negligence, and the like. Railroad v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 456. 42 Am. Rep. 373; Railroad Co. v. Jarrett, 59 Miss. 470; Forsee v. A. G. S. R. R, Co., 63 Miss. 66, 56 Am. Rep. 801; Wilson v. N. O. & N. E. R. R. Co., 63 Miss. 352; V. & M. R. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 63 Miss. 413; Railroad Co. v. Gill, 66 Miss. 39, 5 South. 393; Railroad Co. v. Fite, 67 Miss. 373, 7 South. 223; Railroad Co. v. Moore, 79 Miss. 766, 31 South. 436; Dorrah v. Railroad Company, 65 Miss. 14, 3 South. 36, 7 Am. St. Rep. 629. Keeping before us this general rule, we can better understand whether the facts of a particular case falls within it.
Instructions 2, 3, and 4 given for the plaintiff, tell the jury substantially that if they believe from the evidence that after the train passed the station defendant arbitrarily, willfully, or out of spite, refused, without reasonable cause, to back the train on which plaintiff was a passenger, to Areola, then in addition to compensatory damage the jury might assess punitive damage. Under the facts of this case no such instructions should have been
The employees of the carrier may be said to be the trustees of the rights of every passenger on the train. In considering the right of one, all others are not to be forgotten. Each passenger has a right to reasonably expect that the train will be run on schedule time; each' passenger may make his business arrangements predicated of that idea. The safe handling of the train may depend upon its schedule. Men of multiplied callings, going from town to town, arrange their journeys on the schedules; they make their business engagements with reference to. the schedules; arrangements as to mails are based on train schedules; plans for the reception of perishable freight;' arrangements for the last sad rites of funerals; anxious passengers hurrying to sick -relatives —all these may depend upon the maintenance of the schedule. Shall these considerations of public importance all be brushed aside at the instance of one passenger whom the carrier has negligently carried by his proper destination? If this court should hold with the contention of counsel for appellee, and say that punitive damages may be inflicted in this case, it gives its assent to a legal conclusion which seems to us illogical and unjust. In such case, the infliction of punitive damages would impede and not promote the public good; it would
In the case of St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 69 Ark. 81, 61 S. W. 163, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that where a passenger had been negligently carried beyond his station, the carrier was not bound to take such passenger back to the station, the court saying that: “For the purpose of avoiding collisions, and of orderly and regular transportation, and of serving the public to the best advantage, trains should run on schedule time. The conveying passengers back to stations at which they should have left the train and failed to get off may, in some instances, defeat this purpose, and lead to disastrous consequences. A rule or regulation requiring railroad companies to do so would not only be unjust, but would be unwise, and against the interest of the public. ’ ’ ~We can evolve no logic nor find any authority to conflict with the rule declared in the Lewis case, supra, though, counsel cite the Hurst case, 36 Miss. 660, 74 Am. Dec. 785; Kendrick case, 40 Miss. 374, 90 Am. Dec. 332; Higgins case, 64 Miss. 80, 8 South. 176; and the Lowry case, 79 Miss. 431, 30 South. 634, announcing a rule different from the Lewis case. The above authorities are ■easily distinguished from the Lewis case; in fact, the principle controlling them has no analogy to the principle involved in the case we are now considering. In each ■of the authorities cited above, there was some element of willfulness, discourtesy, or reckless disregard of duty amounting to more than a mere failure of duty. In not one of the above authorities is it held that the refusal to
We first consider the case of N. O. & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660, 74 Am. Dec. 785. What was that case? It appears that Hurst boarded the train at New Orleans for Quin’s Station. He told the conductor this, and after the train left Magnolia, the station next before reaching Quin’s, he again told the conductor and handed him his check. This was about two miles from the station at which Hurst wanted to get off. The conductor went into a rear car, and there remained until the tram was passing the station. At this time the conductor came forward in a hurry, and as he passed Hurst said to Mm, “Where in the devil are you carrying me to?” The conductor made no reply, and the train passed the station some four hundred yards. Hurst and the conductor met on the platform, whereupon in an impudent manner the conductor told Hurst that was Ms place to get off. Hurst protested against getting off at that point, and about that time the conductor had his trunk put off of the train, and told Hurst if he did not leave the train he would carry him to Summit. Hurst demanded that the train be backed, but the conductor, refused, and tins court held that the facts warranted the imposition of pumtive damage by the jury. In the Hurst case there was proof tending to show, negligence, willfulness, and insult. The train was not only run by the station, but there was evidence tending to show that it was capriciously done. Hurst’s trunk was put off, and' a threat made to carry him on to Summit if he did not get off. The court was right in the Hurst case, but the legal mind readily differentiates that case from the facts of this. In the case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374, 90 Am. Dec. 332, counsel’s contention is not sustained. In the above case it appears that Mrs. Kendrick was carried by her station, and put off at a water tank, a mile and a half beyond. It appears that her
The question involved in this case was not involved in the Higgins case in 64 Miss. 80, 8 South. 176. In the above case Higgins held a ticket from Vicksburg to Warrenton. He boarded a freight train and was carried three-fourths of a mile beyond the usual stopping place. He requested the conductor to back the train, and the conductor, in a harsh manner, refused to do so. Suit was brought against the carrier, alleging the willful and wrongful refusal to back the train, and Judge Campbell, speaking for the court, said that punitive damage was proper, stating that “the recovery of five hundred dollars is not an undue punishment for the wanton wrong done appellee by carrying Mm three-fourths of a mile beyond where he had a right to be stopped.” In the Higgins case there was not only a refusal to back, but •a willful and capricious violation of the carrier’s duty to stop at the station and allow Higgins to get off, as it was the duty of the carrier to do. Even in the above case, the court does not rest its opinion on any duty of the carrier to back, the refusal of which constituted such willfulness as to warrant the recovery of punitive damage, but the opinion rests on the wanton wrong done Higgins in carrying him by his station in the way it was done. But this case is widely different on its facts from the case now on trial, and let it be noted that the distinguished judge who wrote the opinion in the Higgins case was the same judge that wrote the opinion in the Gill case in 66 Miss. 39, 5 South. 393. to which we shall have occasion to speak later on. The judge rendering the opinion in the case of Railway L. & P. Co. v. Lowry, 79 Miss. 431, 30 South. 634, has already distinguished it
The case of Davis v. Railroad Co., 95 Miss. 541, 49 South. 179, is not in point. Davis was not carried by any station. He was made to get off ait a wrong station under such circumstances as, in the judgment of this court, constituted gross negligence. In the Davis case the court held the imposition of punitive damage proper. A casual glance at that case demonstrates its inapplicability to-the facts of this case. Counsel for appellee cite the case of Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Nolan, 134 Ala. 329, 32 South. 715; Alabama, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9, 9 South. 375, 30 Am. St. Rep. 17, and Samuels v. R. R. Co., 35 S. C. 493, 14 S. E. 943, 28 Am. St. Rep. 883. As to the last of the two above cited cases — that is to say the Sellers case in 93 Ala. 9, 9 South. 375, 30 Am. St. Rep. 17, and the Samuels case in 35 S. C. 493, 14 S. E. 943, 28 Am. St. Rep. 883 — they find their classification in the cases already discussed; that is to say, the Hurst case, the Higgins case, and others. They are ordinary cases of the reckless, capricious, or wanton carrying a passenger by his station and forcing such passenger to leave the train at an improper place. In the Nolan case, supra. plaintiff’s evidence showed that she boarded the car and paid the conductor her fare to Twenty-fifth street. When she paid the fare she told the conductor she desired to get off at Twenty-fifth street, and he said, “All right.” The train did not stop to let her off when it reached her destination, but the bell cord was pulled by a gentleman, thus attracting the attention .of the conductor. ;The con
Almost every case seeking .the recovery of punitive damage, like the prosecution for crime, must stand or fall on the facts surrounding the particular case. Even where a passenger train is run by a station without stopping at all, or giving the passenger an opportunity to get off, it is not in every ease that punitive damage may be imposed for the dereliction. In addition to running by and failing to stop, there must be some element of intentional or willful disregard of duty, or gross neglect; mere inadvertence is not sufficient. Dorrah v. Ill. Cent., 65 Miss. 14, 3 South. 36, 7 Am. St. Rep. 629; K. C. M. & B. R. R. v. Fite, 67 Miss. 373, 7 South. 223.
Counsel for appellee cite the case of Wilson v. R. R. Co., 63 Miss. 352; R. R. Co. v. Riley, 68 Miss. 765, 9 South. 443, 13 L. R. A. 38, 24 Am. St. Rep. 309; Howell v. Shannon, 80 Miss. 598, 31 South. 965, 92 Am. St. Rep. 609; R. R. Co. v. White, 82 Miss. 120, 33 South. 970; R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 83 Miss. 179, 35 South. 339; R. R.
Up to this time we have considered only the case cited by appellees, and relied upon by them as decisive of their contention. We have shown, we think, that these authorities have no application to the question in the case now under consideration. We will now discuss the authorities which, in our judgment, are controlling.
In the first place, in the case of Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Marlett, 78 Miss. 872, 29 South. 62, this court held that: A willful wrong that gives a cause of action for the imposition of exemplary damages, must be denoted by a wrongful act, done with a knowledge of its wrongfulness.” When, under the facts of this case, the conductor refused to back, he was guilty of no wrongful act, and no punitive damage should have been allowed. In the case of Chicago, St. Louis & N. O. R. R. Co. v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 456, 42 Am. Rep. 373, a passenger was carried by his proper station by reason of the negligence of the conductor. It does not appear that a demand was made hy the passenger for the backing of the train, but punitive damage was sued for, and the court held that
Let us parallel the cases and see if the rule in the Gill case can stand, and the case under consideration be affirmed. In the Gill case the employees of the carrier were guilty of negligence in letting the boarding passengers crowd on the train before the passengers to get
We doubt not but that, when logic shall have driven away partisan zeal, and counsel shall have had time to study their case in an earnest search for the true and just -rule that should control — the kind of search which controls this court in the decision of every ease, great or small — they will satisfy themselves of their error.
Suggestion of error is overruled. Overruled.