61 So. 547 | Miss. | 1913
delivered the opinion of the conrt.
J. E. Frazier brought suit against the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company to recover the value of a mule hilled by a locomotive on the company’s railroad line, and obtained judgment for the full amount claimed, one hundred and seventy-five dollars. Mr. Frazier made out his prima facie case by showing that the mule was hilled by the running of the railroad company’s locomotive. The railroad company then showed by the testimony of the engineer that at the time the mule was struck the engine was pulling a baggage car and two passenger coaches, and was running at the rate of about twenty miles an hour; that the engineer was in his proper place on the engine, and on the lookout; that the train was properly equipped with all necessary appliances, and was in good working order; that the mule jumped on the track from behind a bank at the end of a cut, between thirty and forty feet ahead of the engine; that immediately upon seeing the mule the engineer applied the air brakes, blew the whistle, and did all that could be done to stop the train and prevent the mule being struck; and that the mule was overtaken by the engine after running ninety feet. It is also shown that the headlight only threw a light for seventy-five yards, and that in going downgrade three hundred feet were required within which to stop the train. The only conflict suggested in the case is that the plaintiff, Mr. Frazier, testified “the train was running up grade when it struck the mule. ’ ’
Appellant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to grant a peremptory instruction to find for defendant. The question before us is: Did the killing of the mule result from the negligence of the railroad company, or was it an unavoidable accident? There is no real conflict in the testimony in this case. The difference in the testimony relative to the train going up grade or down grade at the time is- not material. The uncontradicted testimony shows that the mule jumped on the track only a
It seems to us that the killing of the mule was clearly unavoidable. The present case is very similar to that of Railroad Company v. Greaves, 75 Miss. 360, 22 South. 804. In that case it was shown by the testimony of the engineer, in order to meet the prima facie case made by plaintiff, that all the appliances of the train were in proper order, and that it was running at the rate of fifty miles an hour, at night, down a slight grade, when the horses which were killed were seen, about one hundred and fifty feet in front of the engine; that everything which could have been done was done by the servants of the company to prevent the injury. Evidence was also introduced in that case to show that the train was running on an up grade rather than a down grade track at the time of the accident, but this apparent conflict was considered immaterial. The judgment of the court in favor of plaintiff was reversed. Chief Justice Woods, who delivered the opinion of the court, in deciding that a certain instruction stating that it was the duty of the agents of the com
Counsel for appellee contends that the train was being negligently run, because the headlight only threw a light for seventy-five yards, and that it required three hundred feet within which to stop the train, and cites to sustain his contention the case of St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Moore, 58 South. 472, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 978. We do not ihink the rule stated in that case, to the effect that the inability to stop a train by the use of ordinary means and ■appliances, within the distance in which an obstruction on the track can be seen by the aid of the headlight, amounts to negligence, will apply in this case. It will be noted that in the Moore case the train was running within the limits of an incorporated town when the accident occurred. In the case of Nixon v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 60 South. 566, in which the rule as stated in the Moore case was referred to, the train was also running in an incorporated town when the deceased was struck. There is a statute in this state (section 4043 Code of 1906) which limits the
It seems clear to us that the court’ in rendering the opinion had in mind the facts of the case then under review, and only intended to decide that the running of a, train at night through an incorporated municipality at a. rate of speed in violation of the statute, and so rapidly that the train could not be stopped within the distance shown by the glare of the headlight, should be deemed such reckless conduct as amounted to negligence. In the case before us, we do not find any violation of the statute regulating the rate of speed nor any reckless running of the train, nor any carelessness on the part of appellant’s servants. The accident did not occur in an incorporated
We believe that the peremptory instruction should have been given. The case is therefore reversed, and judgment entered here in favor of appellant.
Reversed.