183 Misc. 934 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1944
The amended complaint in Action No. 1 asks to set aside a separation agreement between plaintiff Bussell Yates and defendant Helen Yates dated January 27, 1939, together with a collateral trust agreement for $27,500, in which defendant Lincoln-Alliance Bank and Trust Company is named as trustee, made to secure the performance of the separation agreement, and likewise an earlier trust agreement for $44,000, dated November 2, 1936, also made by plaintiff for the benefit
Upon the trial the complaint was dismissed insofar as it asks to set aside the $44,000 trust agreement of November 2, 1936, by reason of the plaintiff’s failure to prove facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for that relief.
The collateral trust agreement for $27,500 of January 27, 1939, stands or falls with the separation agreement of even date therewith.
The amended complaint attacks the separation agreement upon the following grounds: (1) that defendant Helen Yates has violated her obligations thereunder, (a) by refusing to permit plaintiff to see or visit their children, the infant defendants Jane Yates and James Carlton Yates, (b) by annoying and molesting the plaintiff ■ and (c) by spending upon herself moneys paid under the separation agreement for the use of the children; (2) that said separation agreement was entered into by plaintiff in consequence of duress practiced upon him by defendant Helen Yates in that she threatened that otherwise she would take their children Jane Yates and James Carlton Yates to unknown places so that he would never see or be able to communicate with them again, and that she would have him arrested; (3) that when the separation agreement and accompanying trust agreement were signed plaintiff was under the influence of intoxicating liquor so as to be unable to comprehent the nature thereof; and (4) that said separation agreement was entered into. upon the express understanding that the defendant Helen Yates would obtain a divorce -against the plaintiff in the State of Florida, which allegation was amended upon the trial by adding that the object of said divorce was to enable defendant Helen Yates to marry one Arthur Danihy.
A discussion of the evidence applicable to most of these grounds may be omitted. It is not found that plaintiff was under the influence of intoxicants on January 27,1939, so as to be unable to comprehend the nature of the separation agreement and trust agreement executed upon that date, nor is it found that the said instruments were entered into by plaintiff as a result of coercion or duress. Defendant Helen Yates has not broken'the agreement by refusing to permit plaintiff to see or visit their children, nor does the evidence sustain plaintiff’s contention that she has neglected to spend or was required to spend for the benefit of the children any stated portion of.the monthly installments paid to her under the separation agreement. It provides that Helen Yates shall receive $425 per month “ for her sup
The serious question in the lawsuit is whether the separation agreement was made as an inducement to procure a divorce, and became void as against public policy on that ground. Immediately after it was signed, the wife commenced an action for divorce in Florida in which a decree was rendered three weeks later. He appeared. This procedure had been agreed upon orally in advance of the written agreement and before her departure from Rochester, New York. He had paid to her the estimated expenses of the divorce upon the day before the separation agreement was signed, which was entered into in contemplation of divorce in the sense that both parties desired to have the marriage dissolved and intended to make financial arrangements adapted to that end, and considered the separation agreement and divorce as a single transaction. In these respects the separation agreement is claimed to run afoul of such decisions as Schley v. Andrews (225 N. Y. 110, 113), Murthey v. Murthey (287 N. Y. 740), Gould v. Gould (261 App. Div. 733), and Train v. Davidson (20 App. Div. 577). In the leading case of Schley v. Andrews invalidity was held to result where “ The agreement was entered into by the plaintiff for the sole purpose of inducing the defendant to procure a divorce.” Not all agreements conditioned on divorce are illegal. (Butler v. Marcus, 264 N. Y. 519; Werner v. Werner, 153 App. Div. 719, approved in Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 644, 649, 650, affd. 209 N. Y. 429; Hamlin v. Hamlin, 224 App. Div. 168, 170, Hunker v. Hunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 643.) It is true that in Werner v. Werner supra, p. 722) the court said that “ The action for divorce being pending, there was no legal objection to the parties entering into a .stipulation fixing the amount that the defendant should pay in the discharge of this obligation [of support] ”. (Italics supplied.) But an examination of the opinion as a whole discloses that this' statement was not intended to be laid down as a rule of law. Under the facts of that case the pendency of a divorce action was regarded as some indication that the husband’s promise to pay a stated amount after decree in lieu of alimony was not responsible for starting the action and was not the procuring cause of the divorce. This is necessarily the crucial point in ascertaining whether public policy
What test is to be .applied to determine whether a separation agreement tends to promote divorce? Public policy looks with favor upon the continuance of the marriage relation, and does not encourage the procurement of divorces even where ground for divorce exists. Thus, if the financial provisions that have been agreed upon in favor of the wife are substantially in excess of what the divorce court would allow, a separation agreement may be void, as tending to promote divorce, regardless of whether there exists a legal basis on which the marriage could be dissolved. In Moore v. Moore (255 F. 497, 502) the court said: “ But the promise .was for something more than for support of the divorced wife during the period of the husband’s life — an obligation which the laws of some states would impose upon him. He undertook to support her for her life, and to do this, he bound ‘ his heirs, executors, and administrators ’ to continue payments for her support after his death. By this promise, the wife was shown, that if she succeeded in getting a divorce, she would receive more than the law would award her, even if the law were as she thought it. This was a substantial inducement to her to prosecute her divorce proceeding to the decree on which alone she could reap the promised reward.” The New York courts have followed this principle, although sometimes without formulating it. Gould v. Gould (supra) involved a guarantee of support by a third party which the wife could not have obtained in court. Schley v. Andrews (supra,) was brought to enjoin the collection of a $35,000 judgment which the wife had entered against the husband under a confession of judgment which he had executed pursuant to a separation agreement allowing her to use the confession on condition that she obtain a divorce, It also
The separation agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Yates contained no provision rendering the estate of Mr. Yates liable for her support after his death. During the trial the court overruled the contention which was advanced in favor of the infants that they were intended to be provided for by this agreement after their father’s demise. The same reasoning leads to a similar conclusion with respect to the provision for the wife. It is true that Mr. Yates did put up $27,500 in collateral security for the performance of the agreement during his lifetime, but the evidence shows him to have been a sufficiently wealthy man so that it can hardly be said that the collateral security added much to the value of the agreement. He had abundant personal, financial responsibility to be able to meet the stipulated payments for support during the probable remainder of his life without the necessity of resorting to collateral security for its performance. . It would be unrealistic' to require that in order to satisfy public policy separation agreements must make provision for the wife in the same form as that in which the divorce court is allowed to do by statute. The question is whether the value of the contractual benefit to the wife is substantially in excess of the value of what the court would ordinarily grant under the circumstances of the case pursuant to the applicable statute of divorce. The Yates’ separation agreement, in providing $425 per month for the wife and two children, did no more than would reasonably be expected of a man of his wealth and position at the time when the agreement was made. That his income later was reduced- somewhat and his taxes increased does not bear upon whether the separation agreement was an inducement to the wife to obtain a divorce, which must be weighed in the light of conditions which existed at the time it was signed. In this case it was not such an inducement. Neither is the situation the same as though the $425 per month were exclusively for the benefit of the defendant Helen Yates. Even if it were necessary for Mr. Yates to dip into his principal to some extent in order to maintain and educate his children,
A word is in order concerning the effect of the Florida divorce as res judicata. Since the husband appeared in the action, the decree is not subject to collateral attack and is conclusive evidence of the existence of grounds for divorce (Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N. Y. 296; Frost v. Frost, 260 App. Div. 694) which would be true also of the validity of the separation agreement if it had been incorporated in the decree (Hess v. Hess, 276 N. Y. 486; Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N. Y. 31, 37; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 265 App. Div. 223; Fales v Fales, 160 Misc. 799, affd. 250 App. Div. 751; Goldberg v. Mayer, 243 App. Div. 477; Stewart v. Stewart, 198 App. Div. 337; France v. France, 79 App. Div. 291; Matter of MacGregor, 168 Misc. 557). Since this agreement was not adopted by the Florida court, nor its validity adjudicated in that action the decree does not dispose of that question, (McDonald v. McDonald, 228 App. Div. 341; Van Horn v. Van Horn, 196 App. Div. 472, 482, 483) which is left open to be the principal issue here. In the last mentioned decision the following is stated: “ The plaintiff could have consented that the agreement be merged in the decree or could have rested on her rights under it; and with respect to alimony and the support of the children, I think it was intended to continue the agreement as such without merging it in the decree, in which it is not set forth, until a further application should be made to the court.”