24 Fla. 64 | Fla. | 1888
delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellee filed his bill in said court against the appellants, praying that a certain deed, made and executed by the appellant, the Pensacola & Atlantic Railroad Company, to the appellant, Jackson Yates, conveying the northwest ¼ of southeast ¼ of section 3, in township 3, north of range 16, west, be cancelled, and that said Pensacola & Atlantic Railroad Company be directed to execute a d.eed of said land to the appellee, and, upon the hearing, the Chancellor granted the relief prayed and a decree to that effect was entered on the 19th day of May, A. D. 1885. The appellee, in his bill, as ground for said relief, states “ that
To which bill the appellants made separate answers.
The Pensacola & Atlantic Railroad Company acknowledge that its agent, YanKifk, did receive fifty dollars from appellee for the purchase of forty acres of land, but. that by mistake he described in his receipt the land in controversy, while it should have been the northwest ¼ of the southwest J of the same section, which latter piece the ap
They also acknowledge that they have refused to execute a deed to Gadi Yates and have executed one to Jackson Yates to said land.
Jackson Yates, answering separately, says that he is informed and believes that Gadi Yates did pay VanKirk fifty dollars and got a receipt for the same, but had no knowledge if he claimed it as a purchase. That he is informed the railroad company have refused to make a deed to Gadi Yates, and that he (Jackson Yates) holds a deed to said land from the railroad company, he knew that Gadi Yates had and claimed to hold a receipt for said land.
It appears from the answer of the railroad company that they had published to the world that in selling their lands they would give preference to those living and having improvements on their lands. This is fully sustained by the evidence on behalf of the appellants, as well as by the correspondence between the appellee and the officers of the company prior to the dateof the receipt given by VanKirk, the agent, to him for purchase money of this land. Gadi Yates, in a letter to VanKirk, dated July 6th, 1883, complaining of the action of the company, states that “Jackson Yates did not make application for the land until the fall of 1882, while he, Gadi Yates, had applied in November, 1881, to Chipley,” but it would seem from the reply of Ghipley and Bonifay, officers of the company, that the ap
The answer of the railroad company denies that Van-Kirk had power to sell lands, but says all his sales were subject to approval by"W. D. Chipley, their Vice-President and Superintendent. This is sustained by the testimony for both parties : Erank Phillips, a witness on behalf of appellee, testifying that he ceased corresponding with Van-Kirk and addressed his applications to Chipley, direct because Chipley refused to ratify a sale VanKirk had made to him. Again, as early as December 13th, 1881, Chipley addressed a letter to Gadi Yates, the appellee, informing him that he was “ the person to apply to for lands.”
Upon learning that Jackson Yates lived and had improvements upon the land for which Gadi Yates held VanKirk’s receipt for purchase money, which information of the company is fully sustained by the evidence before us, VanKirk offered to procure a deed to Gadi and Jackson Yates jointly to said land, which Gadi Yates positively refused ; whereupon the railroad company refused to approve the sale contracted by VanKirk with Gadi Yates, and executed and delivered a deed to Jackson Yates for said land, which we think they had the power to do.
The receipt attached as an exhibit to the bill of complaint is signed by VanKirk as special agent. The testimony shows that his employment was special. He, himself, says he was a real estate agent and had the lands of
The general rule is, “ if a special agent exceeds his authority the principal is not bound unless the latter in some way subsequently ratifies the act.” 1 Parson’s on Contracts, 42, citing many authorities, English and American.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Pensacola & Atlantic Railroad Company were not bound by the act of YanKirk in this case.
Also that the circumstances of the case do not entitle the appellee to claim the relief sought against the appellant, Jackson Yates.
This being our view, it follows that the decree appealed from is erroneous and should be reversed, and that the bill should have been dismissed ; and a decree will accordingly be entered reversing the decree of the court bel.ow and remanding the cause with directions that the bill be dismissed.