Yates v. StateYates v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Griffin
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially:
Whilе I concur in the affirmance, I believe that we should discuss Yates’ claim that the judge erred in not disqualifying herself because of hеr active participation in a task force on domestic violence since domestic violence was the nаture of the case against him and since the judge exercised her discretion to sentence him as a violent careеr criminal.
Because of Yates’ prior record and his egregious conduct against his former wife which was the basis of the currеnt charge and which was adequately proved at trial, the sentence itself, even though enhanced, does not evince bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. If Yates is to prevail, it must be because the judge’s participation in such аn organization is, in and of itself, disqualifying or at least presents a reasonable basis for a belief that she cannot be impartial. Yates’ objection to the judge’s participation in his sentencing was raised by oral motion. And although it was not as detailed as it could have been, it nevertheless asserted that the judge established and served as chairman of the task force and participated in a dedication ceremony at which the victim in the present case, although before the occurrence of the events that led up to the current charge, presented a wreath during the dedication. There was nо allegation that the judge knew the victim at the time of the dedication or recognized her from that ceremony during the present controversy.
The judge denied the oral motion “based on legal insufficiency.” It is not clear from the record whether the judge “denied” thе motion because it was not in writing (in which case, the better practice would have been to strike the motion as being legally insufficient) or because the grounds stated in the motion were insufficient as a matter of law to create “a well-grounded fear on the part of the defendant that he will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge.”
In his brief, Mr. Yates seems to commingle the аrgument that the judge should have stepped out of the case once he moved for recusal based on the judge’s involvеment in the task force and her appearance at the dedication ceremony with an argument that the judge should have disqualified herself in any event because of her participation in the task force. This case shows the wisdom of the supreme court’s determination in Rogers v. State,
The Supreme Court of Idaho in State v. Knowlton,
In the present case, Judge Goff served on the Governor’s Task Force for Children at Risk at the request of the governor.
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We find nothing in the makeup of the task force or in the task force’s enumerated responsibilities which would cast doubt on Judge Goffs capacity to conduct impartially a probation revocation hearing involving child abuse_ The enumeratеd responsibilities contain no specific agenda with respect tó the treatment, probation or punishment of conviсted child abusers. On the contrary, the focus of the task force is on the protection and treatment of abused and neglected children. We do not believe this equates to Judge Goff acting as an “advocate,” as Knowlton suggests, against “persons situated in [Knowlton’s] shoes.” A judge does not have an affirmative duty to withdraw from cases which merely tangentially relate to the judgе’s participation in an organization or committee. To hold otherwise would deprive the citizens of this state of the knоwledge and experience which a judge brings to groups designed to improve the legal system.
I agree with the. Knowlton court that the judge has no affirmаtive duty to automatically step down from a case because of membership on a task force unless the agendа of the task force is inconsistent with the judge’s duty to judge impartially. The next issue is whether Yates had a reason, recognizable аt law, to believe that the judge could not be impartial. I think not in this ease. Mere membership in the task force should not justify a beliеf that the judge cannot be fair unless there is a showing that the agenda of the task force advocates stiffer penaltiеs for domestic abusers. The fact that a judge opposes domestic violence is no more relevant at sentencing than the fact that a judge opposes robbery or drug abuse; nor does it distinguish a particular judge from any other member of thе bench. So far as I know, all judges oppose criminal conduct.
The only other allegation is that the victim in this case aрpeared at the dedication and presented a wreath. This occurred, however, before the events which led up to the current charge. And there is no indication that the judge knew the victim either when she appeared at the dedication or rеmembered her from the dedication when she appeared in the current proceedings. There is simply no sufficient reаson given by Yates to justify a fear of judicial bias.
If it could have been shown that the task force does advocate stiffer рenalties for domestic abusers or that the judge has indicated, through words or practice, a tendency to more severely punish domestic abusers, then Yates would have had a basis for a reasonable fear that the judge would not be evenhanded in the application of her discretion. In such event, if defense counsel failed to discover such evidence, then a 3.850 motion might be appropriate.
Notes
. Lewis v. State,
Lead Opinion
AFFIRMED.