26 Fla. 484 | Fla. | 1890
At the Fall Term, 1889, of Osceola Circuit Court, the plaintiff in-error, Tames Yates, Jr., was tried, con
There is but one error assigned: “ That the Court erred in denying the motion of the defendant for a new trial, on the grounds set forth in said motion.”
The grounds of the motion for new trial are:
1. Because the jury found contrary to law, and against the law.
2. Because the jury found contrary to the evidence, and against the evidence, and against the weight of evidence.
3. Because the jury found against the law and the evidence.
4. Because the jury found upon, the statement of State Attorney J. D. Beggs as to what the testimony was, and not from their own recollection as to what the witnesses swore, to-wit: while W. L. Palmer, Esq., Assistant State Attorney, was addressing the jury, one of the jurors, to-wit: Newton Lackey, asked him what the testimony was as to whether or not Yates wrote a letter at the store, and the said W. L. Palmer gave his understanding, to-wit: that there was no evidence as to his having written.
5. Because while J. D. Beggs, Esq., State Attorney, was addressing the jury, that two of the jurors asked him what the evidence was as to certain points of the case, and that the said District Attorney J. D. Beggs proceeded to tell them what it was, to which conduct defendant’s counsel then and there excepted.
6. Because while Jack Woods was testifying in the case, one of the jurors, to-wit: B. F. Cobb, was sleeping, and could, therefore, not have heard the testimony, as will appear by the affidavits of G. A. Worley and Burrill Yates, hereunto attached.
The first ground of the motion was not well taken. The verdict of the jury was in due form and conformed to law in every respect.
There was no exception to the charge of the Court, and the charge is not complained of here.
■ Second ground. The following is substantially the evidence in the case as shown by the record :
J. L. Hines testified for the State: I know James Yates, Jr., and knew M. H. Mitchell. Was at Mitchell’s store, at Turkey Hammock, September 20th, in the afternoon. John Johnson, Dan. Sanders, James Johnson, James Yates and myself were present. Yates is present in court, and witness points him out. I was at the store that night; store in Osceola county, Florida. That afternoon we all went down to meet the boat. Yates and others went on the boat. Mitchell, myself and one of the Gilbert boys were in the house when the boys came in from the boat. When they came in Mitchell began cursing Lewis Johns, and Yates got up on a corn sack and the rest stood around. This was about 3 or 4 o’clock. We remained at the store until 'the rest-got ready to leave, about a half hour by sun. I didn’t leave then. Yates came back after I went to get suoper with
On cross-examination the witness testified that there was a conversation between Yates and Mitchell. While they were talking, Yates pulled out his pistol and laid it on the counter, and Mitchell asked him what he was going to do with it. Yates offered to swap pistols with Mitchell, but Mitchell said he wanted to sell his, and Yates said he would like to sell his. Mitchell was pretty drunk when he came off the boat and went to sleep about 3 or 4 o’clock. He was cursing and rearing, and got after Lewis Johns with his pistol until we got him to stop. Yates was speaking kindly to Mitchell when talking to him about there being danger of his losing his property. Don’t know exactly how far I had got from the store before I heard the shot. It might have been more or less than fifty yards. I was traveling in an ordinary walk. When Mitchell was going to the store I thought he was “stepping pretty peart.” He seemed to be mad; don’t know whether he was excited or not. I left Woods in the store at the time—he was at the table. There was nothing to have prevented Yates shooting Mitchell as he walked off. Think itchell’s pistol a 38, a self-cocker.
On rc-direct examination the witness testified Yates could have gone out of the house before I heard the pistol shot; he could have gone out as I did.
On cross-examination, the witness testified that Yates’ manner towards Mitchell when advising him about leaving his store open, seemed to be kind. When I left the store, Mitchell was advancing towards Yates. At this time, Yates had moved up a little towards the door where Mitchell was. In going out, Yates would have to pass in front of the door, in going out of the door I went out of. That was the only door without going through the store. The next morning, Yates said he was going to Pine Castle, and then would come back and give up.
On re-direct examination, the witness testified : I don’t know how long Mitchell was out of my sight when he went.out of the kitchen or bed-room to the store; not very long, I don’t know whether he was gone long enough for Yates to have gone out; “it looks to me like if he had time he could have gone out.”
Newton Allen testified for the State: I knew Mitchell, and points out Yates. Knew of the difficulty in which Mitchell was killed. Saw Hines, Mitchell and a baby in the store. I cooked supper on Mitchell’s stove inside of the door in Mitchell’s bed-room. Witness testified as to the transactions and conversations which preceded the difficulty, substantially as Hines did, and then said: “Yates asked Mitchell and said, if you had no friends you would lose all you had, and when he repeated the words again, Yates got up and started towards him, and Mitchell told him he had dogs he thought more of than his friends, and Yates slapped his jaws; in that time he turns back and gets his butcher knife and started towards Yates, and Yates backed back to the corner and let him pass by.” If Yates had anything in his hand I did not see it. When Mitchell went out I left; I was the first to get out. Yates walked out directly after the pistol fired, and I heard a lumbering in the house. Yates walked about ten feet from me, and I heard him cock his pistol.
Woods being re-called by the State, testified: When I left Mitchell’s store that night, I didn’t see any one in there but Yates and the little girl. These were the only persons I saw in there just as I stepped out, and I had only got about ten feet from the door, when the shot was fired. I saw a little place -of blood on Mitchell’s body that looked like something went into his breast. It looked like it might have been a bullet-wound; did not examine it closely.
On cross-examination, the witness testified: Yates did not tell me the circumstances, only he said Mitchell was right in the act of shooting him, and that he had to kill him in self-defense. He spoke of surrendering himself as soon as he attended to some business.
Lewis Jones testified for the State: I was on the jury that held the inquest on Mitchell’s body. I was present when the pistol was taken from Mitchell's hand, and it was loaded, every barrel; saw the wound on the body; it looked like a ball went into his body. I never examined a wound before, a shot hole that way. It was a small hole right in there, (indicating the place.) There was a sign of powder on the shirt. There was no physician present.
On cross-examination, the witness testified: None of us inserted anything in the wound to see how deep it was. The wound did not go through the body, but into it. It bled but little.
John M. Lee, testified for the State, that according to the official maps, Mitchell’s store is in this (Osceola) county.
The following is Yates’ statement to.the jury : “ I was a friend to the old man, and he insulted me several times and I taken it. Pie started towards me with his knife, and I gave back, and he threw'down his knife and -went in and got his pistol, and I started out of the door. Pie came to
It is not claimed by counsel for the accused, that he did not commence the unfortunate difficulty which culminated in the death of Mitchell, but it is insisted that notwithstanding Yates was the aggressor, the deceased used more force than was necessary to repel the assault made upon Yates; in other words, that when Yates slapped Mitchell, he, Mitchell, armed himself with a pistol, renewed the difficulty, assaulted Yates with the pistol and put him in imminent danger of losing his life, or imminent danger of bodily harm at the hands of Mitchell, and, if the position thus contended for was borne out by the evidence, and the accused had discontinued the difficulty already commenced and honestly shown an intention to avoid further trouble with the deceased, and at this time Mitchell had assaulted him under such circumstances as to induce the accused to honestly believe that he was in imminent danger of losing his life, or was in imminent danger of great bodily harm, the homicide at most would have been manslaughter; but unfortunately for the accused, the evidence does not sustain the assumption that the accused had at any time abandoned the difficulty; on the contrary, the accused evinced a willingness to renew the conflict at any time. After Mitchell was slapped by the accused, and upon his taking up the knife and starting towards Yates, Yates drew his pistol and said to him, “ cut if you want to,” thus showing a readiness and willingness to renew the difficulty. When Mitchell threw down the knife, went from the dining room into the store, the witnesses, except Woods, left the dining room, but what did the accused do ? Did he, after provoking the
The only evidence in the case that tends to show that Mitchell, on his return to the dining-room from the store with the pistol in his hand, made an effort to assault the accused, is the defendant’s own statement. This statement the jury evidently did not believe, and, under all the circumstances, we are not prepared to say they were not warranted in not believing it.
There is a very significant fact shown in the evidence of Woods, who certainly was not a willing witness for the State. He says that on the morning after Mitchell was
Under our statute, to establish murder in the first degree, it devolves upon the State to prove all the elements required to constitute murder in this degree. This proof, however, need not be express or positive. It may be adduced from .all the facts attending the killing, and if the jury can reasonably and satisfactorily infer, from all the evidence, the existence of the intention to kill, that the killing was unlawful, malicious and from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, it will be sufficient. State vs. Underwood, 57 Mo., 49. The jury in this case, under the evidence and the law given them by the Court, convicted the prisoner of murder in the first degree.
And after giving to the whole evidence that careful consideration demanded by the gravity of the issue involved, and after examining and scrutinizing every fact and circumstance disclosed by the "evidence, our opinion is, that the finding of the jury is sustained by the evidence, and consequently, that the Court below committed no error in overruling the motion to set aside the verdict of the jury as being against the evidence.
The fourth and fifth grounds of the motion may be considered together. During the trial, two of the jurors asked the State Attorney, in the presence of the Court, what was the evidence upon certain points, and the State Attorney requested the stenographer to turn to the evidence and see what the evidence was, but to this the defendant objected
The sixth ground of the motion was not well taken. After the trial closed, the defense introduced certain affidavits for the purpose of showing that Cobb, one of the jurors, was sleeping while one Jack Woods was testifying in the case. The State filed counter affidavits, and among others that of the juror, in which he stated that he was not sleeping as charged, and that he heard the whole of the evidence. The witnesses for the defendant stated, upon belief, that the juror was sleeping, which is fully met and overthrown by the juror’s statement that he was not at any time sleeping. But if the juror was sleeping, and that fact was at the time known to the accused or his counsel, it should have been brought to the attention of the Court, but failing to do so, the objection, if it could be called one, was waived. Baxter vs. People, 3 Gilman, 368; Cogswell vs. State, 49 Ga., 104.
Seventh ground of the motion. Upon the motion for new trial, the defense introduced the affidavits of C. E. Lightsey and David Allman, for the purpose of showing that the accused was not tried by a fair and impartial jury, in that the juror, Tindall, had stated to each of the affiants that if he could get on the jury he would break Yates’ neck. Counter affidavit of Tindall was filed by the State, in which he states, most positively, that he had made no such statement either to Lightsey or Allman. The accused states that he did not know of the statements alleged to have been made by Tindall until after the trial of the cause, and if it was clear that Tindall made the remarks imputed to him, it would be ground for setting aside the verdict.
When affidavits are taken as in this case, and the evidence is conflicting, the verdict will not be set aside, unless
The evidence in the case at bar shows that both Lightsey and Allen were distantly related by marriage to the accused; that Allman was a personal enemy to the juror; and it also shows that Lightsey was present when the trial was in progress, and it is remarkably strange that if it were true that they had heard the juror Tindall make the remarks which the witness swore he did make, and neither of them said anything about it, until the trial was over. That the trial judge believed the statement of Tindall, and did not believe those of Lightsey and Allman, cannot be doubted, and, under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, we will not say that the judge’s conclusion in the matter was not correct, In the case of Irvin vs. State, 19 Fla., 872, motion was made for new trial and the affidavits of three witnesses were introduced to show that one of the jurors had stated before going on the jury that if he was on the jury he would hang the accused. Counter affidavit of the juror was filed in which he denied the statement imputed to him, and the Court held that “ aside from these considerations, Coburn, (the juror), by his affidavit, sets the question at rest. He,has no recollection of having used the expressions as charged in several affidavits presented by the defendant on the motion. He says he had not informed himself of the circumstances of the killing, and that when he was sworn as a juror he had no
Upon a careful consideration of the whole case, we see no cause for reversal, and, therefore, the judgment of the Court belowis affirmed.