38 Cal. 60 | Cal. | 1869
Dissenting Opinion
The principal features of this case are nearly identical with those of Treadway v. Semple (28 Cal. 652) and Semple v. Wright (32 Cal. 659.) Indeed, I perceive no material difference in the facts, except that in the present case it appears, that when the survey of the Jimeno rancho was finally confirmed, Semple, the claimant of the Coins rancho, had ceased to have any interest in the particular parcel of land which is in contest in this case, having, before that time, conveyed it to the plaintiff, who was there in the actual
Of the two ranchos, the surveys of which are in conflict, the Jimeno was first granted by the Mexican Government and was first presented to the Board of Land Commissioners for confirmation; but the confirmations of both ranchos became final by the action of the Supreme Court of the United States, at its December Term, 1855. In both cases the surveys were ordered into the District Court of the United States for review, in pursuance of the Act of Congress of June 14, 1860; and, on the 2d of February, 1861, the survey of the Colus rancho was approved by a final decree of said Court, and on the sixth day of the following April, the survey of the Jimeno rancho was in like manner approved by a final decree of the Court. Whilst the question of survey of the Colus rancho was pending in Court, one Hagar, who had succeeded to the title of the grantees of the Jimeno rancho, to that portion thereof which includes the premises in controversy, and under whom the defendants claim title, intervened, and excepted to said survey on the ground that it embraced a portion of the land granted to Jimeno; but he afterward, with leave of the Court, withdrew his intervention. When the survey of the Jimeno rancho was pending in Court, Semple, to whom the Colus rancho had been finally confirmed, intervened and filed exceptions to the survey, alleging that he was the owner of an undivided interest of about two-thirds of one league of the Jimeno rancho, claiming title thereto under the original grantees, and that said survey, to the extent of two leagues, had been located “upon land claimed by the owners of the Colus grant, containing two leagues, finally confirmed to this affiant;
That the proceedings under the Act of Congress of June 14, 1860, are of a judicial nature, admits of no debate. They are conducted before a Court having the requisite jurisdiction. The parties in interest are allowed to intervene, and to adduce proofs on the questions at issue, and the Court is to pronounce a judgment on the facts, either approving or modifying the survey, or rejecting it entirely and ordering a new one. These are the peculiar functions of a Court, clothed with the requisite authority, to decide that class of cases, and its proceedings in that behalf are
But, assuming that each" party was equally concluded by the survey of the other, and that the priority in time does not vary the rights of the parties, the case then resolves itself into this: That there was granted to Jimeno eleven
In other words, each party holds a legal title, so far as the patent of the United States could confer it. In cases of conflicting patents for the same lands, it is well settled that, even in an action at law, the Court will look behind the patents, and ascertain which has the better and prior equity; and will give effect to the rights of the parties accordingly. (Smith v. Athearn, 34 Cal. 506.)
Tested by this rule, which of these parties has the better title ? If the grant to Jimeno, which was prior in time, had been for a specific parcel of land, by metes and bounds, and if the Government had subsequently granted a portion of the same land to Semple, or his predecessor, the question would be free from embarrassment. No one could doubt that the title of Jimeno would prevail in an action at law, even though his patent was subsequent in date to the other. We would, in that event, invoke the rule to which I have adverted. We would look behind the patents to inquire into the equities ; and, on ascertaining that the grant to Jimeno was prior in time, and for a specific parcel of land, by metes and bounds, we would hold that his grant was paramount to a subsequent grant of the same land to another. But, from
The material facts of this case are very similar to those in Waterman v. Smith, (13 Cal. 373), in which case it appears
The same reasoning applies to the case at bar. When Jimeno received his grant for eleven leagues, to be after-wards located within an area embracing nineteen leagues, he knew that the Government reserved the right to locate it anywhere within that area, and that it had the power to grant the surplus to another. When a portion of this surplus was afterwards granted to Semple, or his predecessor, and was subsequently located by the Government, it only exercised an undoubted power, in nowise prejudicial to the rights of Jimeno or his grantees. The subsequent location of the grant to Jimeno on the same land, cannot, and ought not to prejudice the claimants of the Coins, who are, in no respect, responsible for the erroneous action of the Government in that behalf. If the location of the Coins was proper when it was made, as we must presume it was, it could not after-wards have become erroneous by force of the fact that the Government-subsequently located the same land in the grant to Jimeno. It is impossible that both locations can be
Nor do I perceive how the result can be varied by the fact that both locations were made under the authority of the District Court, under the Act of June 14, 1860, and not by the executive officers of the Government. The result of these proceedings is, that each claim has been finally located, and the title of the defendants has ripened into a patent, whilst the plaintiff has a final approved survey, which is equivalent to a patent.
In other words, each party has a legal title, so far as the Government can confer it. They occupy, therefore, the same relative positions which they would have occupied, if each had obtained a patent prior to the passage of the Act of June 14, 1860, unless there be something in that Act which varies their rights; but, as we have seen, if Semple is concluded by the survey of the Jimeno grant, the claimants of the latter are equally concluded by the survey of the Colus grant. On the other hand, if the latter are not concluded by their failure to intervene, after notice, Semple is not concluded by his actual appearance and his consent to the Jimeno survey. A failure to intervene, after notice, in the one case, is equally as obligatory as an actual appearance and consent in the other. I do not, perceive, therefore, but that the rights of the parties are precisely the same as they would have been if each had obtained a patent in due course of law, prior to the passage of the Act of June 14, 1860. It results from the foregoing views, that it is not material whether or not the plaintiff intervened and excepted to the Jimeno survey. He is as much bound by it as if he had intervened and actually consented to it. But the defendants being in like manner concluded by the Colus survey,
It is alleged, however, that these views are inconsistent with those advanced in Leese v. Clark (18 Cal. 570), and several subsequent cases decided by this Court, and in Beard v. Federy (3 Wallace, U. S. R. 478), in which it is held that a patent of the United States, issued upon a confirmation of a claim to land, by virtue of a right or title derived from Spain or Mexico, is to be regarded in two aspects : as a deed of the United States, and as a record of the action of the Government upon the title of the claimant as it existed upon the acquisition of California. That, as a deed, its operation is that of a quitclaim, or rather of a conveyance of such interest as the United States possessed in the land, and it takes effect, by relation, at the time when proceedings were instituted by the filing of the petition before the Board of Land Commissioners; that, as a record of the Government, it is evidence that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico; that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty, and might have been located under the former Government, and is correctly located now, so as to embrace the premises as they are surveyed and described. The argument in behalf of the defendants is, that the patent for the Jimeno rancho is conclusive evidence, on the authority of these decisions, that it is correctly located, and that neither Semple nor his vendees can impeach its correctness in a collateral action. But inasmuch as the final survey of the Colus rancho is equivalent to a patent, it falls within the same category; and the same argument which establishes that the location of the Jimeno grant cannot be assailed, of necessity, applies to the location of the Colus rancho. Assuming that neither can impeach the survey of the other, and each holding a legal title under a claim derived from Mexico, we are compelled to go behind the respective patents and inquire into the equities. On this inquiry, we find, for the reason already stated, that the superior equity is in the claimants under the Colus grant. Nor is it material which was first
So far as the cases of Treadway v. Semple and Semple v. Wright contravene these views, they ought, in my opinion, to be overruled, and the judgment in this action ought to be affirmed.
Sprague, J., expressed no opinion.
Lead Opinion
This case, in its material facts, is not distinguishable from Treadway v. Semple (28 Cal. 652), and Semple v. Wright (32 Cal. 659.) The fact that plaintiff received a conveyance of the premises in controversy before the confirmation of the survey of the Jimeno rancho, is not material, as, under the rule laid down in Rodrigues v. United States (1 Wal. 587)— upon the authority of which these cases were decided—the confirmation of the survey was binding upon all persons, whether they intervened or not. If that rule is believed to be wrong, the correction must be sought in the tribunal that laid it down. Its decisions on questions of this character are binding on us.
Upon the authority of those cases, the judgment of the Court below is reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.