41 Pa. 195 | Pa. | 1862
The opinion of the court was delivered,
This was an action of ejectment. The plaintiffs claimed as heirs of Timothy Fuller, of whose person and estate a committee was appointed on the 18th day of June 1841, under a commission of lunacy. In his lifetime he had been seised of the property in dispute, and he had died intestate. The defendants claimed under a sale, made by order of the Court of Common Pleas, for the payment of the debts of the lunatic, including also the expenses of his support and maintenance, and that of his family. The petition for the sale was presented by the committee, and an order to sell was granted on the 12th of November 1842. The first sale made was set aside by the court, but the land was again sold to one under whom the defendants claimed, on the 4th of March 1844, and the sale was confirmed on the 11th of May next following. These proceedings of the Common Pleas, on their face appear to have divested the title of Timothy Fuller. But to avoid their apparent effect, the plaintiffs offered to show at the trial that Fuller, the lunatic, died on the 6th day of April 1842, before the order of sale was granted. Whether it was competent for them to show that fact is the sole question before us.
It is a familiar principle that the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be reversed or inquired into in a collateral proceeding, except for fraud. Nor, standing on the public records, shall it be deemed a nullity, provided the magistrate had jurisdiction of the matter adjudicated. This principle is said to have no exception: Hazlett v. Ford, 10 Watts 101. No fraud is alleged in this case. But it. is said that the Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction over the estate of Timothy Fuller after his death, and that consequently the order to sell and the sale made under it were void. It is not enough for the plaintiffs to show that they were erroneous, for errors of law, or even of fact, can be corrected only by writ of error or by appeal. It may be that the order of sale must have been set aside, had an appeal been taken from the court which made it. But the question now is, in this collateral action, whether the order was wholly void for defect of jurisdiction to make it.
The fifth article of the constitution of the state declares that the several Courts of Common Pleas shall have the power of a Court of Chancery, so far as relates to the care of the persons and estates of those who are non compos mentis, and authorizes the legislature to vest in the said courts such other powers to grant relief in equity as shall be found necessary. The power of a chancellor over the estate of a lunatic is that of custody, of "management, and of application to the lunatic’s support and that of his family, to the education of his minor children, and to the payment of his debts. Under our Act of Assembly this power is exercised through a committee, appointed by the court, and the
There is even less reason for holding a decree in rem, such as was this order of sale, to be void, if made after the death of the owner of the property. The reason why even a judgment in personam is voidable in error, is because the party against whom it was rendered has been deprived of an opportunity of showing cause against the plaintiffs’ claim. But in a proceeding in rem he may, or may not, intervene. As already said, in an application for an order to sell the real estate of a lunatic, the law does not contemplate his being heard. He has lost nothing, therefore, by death. His property has been intrusted to the court, which is to exercise its discretion over both its custody and its sale. If then a personal judgment obtained against him after his death, jurisdiction of the person having once been acquired, would be only voidable, a decree for the sale of his property, the court having had jurisdiction over it, can be no more than voidable, though made when he had ceased to be in life.
Tho cases relied upon by the plaintiff are not in conflict with these views. Letters of administration on the estate of a living person, and the probate of the will of such a person, are of course void, for there never was any jurisdiction of the person or property. The bond and warrant of a married woman to confess judgment are void; and of course can authorize no judgment at all. The observation of Chief Justice Gibson, in his dissenting opinion in Campbell v. Kent, 3 Penna. Rep. 79, when remarking upon Randall’s Case, 2 Mod. 308, and Warter v. Perry & Spring, Cro. Eliz. 199, was but a suggestion not called for by the case. He said that “ perhaps the true ground of both these cases was that the judgment was not only injurious, but void, as having been rendered against a party not in existence, and therefore requiring no reversal to render it a nullity.” That was, however, not the ground on which the cases were rested. Warter v. Perry & Spring was a scire facias against bail of Brooke, who pleaded that Brooke was dead the day of the judgment given. “The court,” says the reporter, “first held-it no plea, for it goeth in avoiding the judgment, and proveth it to be erroneous, which cannot be avoided but by error. But they might plead the death of Brooke before scire facias and after judgment, for
Had, therefore, the plaintiffs been permitted to prove that Timothy Fuller died before the order of sale, it would have availed them nothing. It would not have annulled the order, though it might have shown it to have been erroneous. The evidence offered was, therefore, properly excluded.
We feel'the more satisfaction in coming to such a conclusion in this case, for it results in obvious justice. The property was sold eighteen years ago. It was sold for the payment of the debts of the lunatic, a part of which were debts due these very plaintiffs. The heirs of the lunatic knew of the order to sell, and of the sale, for some of them moved the court to set aside the first sale made under the order, not on account of his prior death, but because it was believed the property would bring more if offered for sale again. It would be a great hardship, if, after all this, and after the lapse of eighteen years, the heirs could now recover the land from purchasers who bought on the faith of a judicial decree, and who may have greatly improved the land and enhanced its value.
The judgment is affirmed.