34 Neb. 280 | Neb. | 1892
This action was brought in the court below by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error to recover
The principal claim of the defendant in error is that McKesson had paid the decree and, therefore, that no title passed by the sheriff’s deed. McKesson testifies that he had paid the amount due on the decree, but fails to show when or to whom, while both Ballard and Kingman testify in the same' general way that no such payment was made. Mr. Owen also testifies that after the time McKesson claims to have paid the same that he admitted the indebtedness to him, and we think the clear weight of testimony tends to show that the amount due on the decree was not ■ paid. It will be observed that there is consider
“$48.73. redemption certificate. No. 2533.
“The State of Nebraska, County of Lancaster, } ss
“County Treasurer’s Office,
“Lincoln, June 20, 1883.
“I, R. B. Graham, treasurer of said county, do hereby certify that Kingman & Ballard have this day paid me the sum of $48.73 in full for the redemption of the following described real estate in said county, the same having been sold on the 25th day of June, A. D. 1881, for the taxes levied for the year A. D. 1879, and for taxes of 1880, 1878, 1877, 1876, 1875, 1874, 1871, 1870.
“Description — North Lincoln, 1, 3, 4; section or lot, 5; town or block, 3. R. B. Graham,
“Treasurer.
“E. L. Sayre.”
It also appears that W. H. Snelling, who transacted all the business in the case for his wife, the defendant in error, had, previously to the date of said redemption, purchased these lots at tax sale, and that after Kingman & Ballard had paid the redemption money to the county treasurer he accepted the same, thus admitting their interest in the lots in question. The ease is similar in many respects to that of Strong v. Irwin, 12 Neb., 446. In that case, after judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court found the amount of taxes due to the defendant on the land, and the sum so found due was paid into court by the plaintiff for the defendant and accepted by him, and the court held that he was thereby estopped from questioning the judgment. The same doctrine had been announced in Wamsley v. Crook, 3 Neb., 352, and McMurtry v. Brown, 6 Id., 368. The same rule should prevail in the ease at bar.
Here were two persons claiming title under conveyances from McKesson. In the one case the title was derived through proceedings in the foreclosure of a mortgage and in the other by a quitclaim deed made by McKesson after the foreclosure proceedings had culminated in a deed. Now the person holding under the quitclaim accepts the amount paid by the ostensible owners of the land to redeem the same from tax sale. If the property was personal it would be an admission that the person paying the money had a superior right to the one accepting the same, and that rule may justly be applied to real property. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.