MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jennifer Yang (“Plaintiff’) commenced the instant action against her former employer, Navigators Group, Inc. (“Defendant”), seeking monetary damages and reinstatement for alleged violations of the anti-retaliation provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, and the whistleblower protection provision of the Dodd-Frank Act (“DFA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1).
Defendant now moves pursuant to Rule 12(c) for a judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant asserts that (1) Plaintiff did not make disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as purportedly required under the DFA to be deemed a whistleblower, and (2) Plaintiffs communications to her supervisors were not required or protected under SOX. Although Defendant answered the initial complaint, it has not filed an answer to the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff cross-moves for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint which supplements factual allegations and purports to clarify the existing pleadings, but adds no new claims. In opposition, Defendant asserts that (1) Plaintiff is not allowed to amend her pleading in opposition to a motion to dismiss, and (2) the proposed amended complaint would be futile because Plaintiffs communications were not protected conduct, because Plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that Defendant was committing fraud, and because Plaintiff purportedly is not a whistleblower within the meaning of the DFA. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs cross-motion is granted and Defendant’s motion is denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in the Amended Complaint and, where noted, in the Proposed Second Amended Complaint (“PSAC”). Plaintiff was employed as Defendant’s Group Chief Risk Officer from June 25, 2012, through November 2, 2012. In this position, she reported to Defendant’s chief financial officer, Ciro DeFalco (“DeFalco”). She left her previous position as Vice President and Regional Capital Management Director of another company to take the position with Defendant.
Plaintiff began her employment by learning the company business and existing enterprise risk management practice. She was initially tasked with developing a plan to improve the risk management function. Plaintiff allegedly noticed that in past presentations to Defendant’s board and to the rating agencies S & P and AM Best, the market risk assessments of certain investment portfolios appeared low considering their asset classes. She investigated further using outside investment consultants and found that risk models used for certain asset classes were improper. The result was substantial underestimation of investment risks. Defendant’s investments included municipal bonds, for which the old model did not account for callable features, and structured finance products, for which the old model ignored underlying collateral. Municipal bonds and structured finance products accounted for roughly 60% of Defendant’s entire portfolio. In a July 2012 meeting, Plaintiff informed DeFalco of her findings and expressed concern over Defendant’s investment risk. DeFalco ignored her concerns and insisted that risk was being properly assessed. Nevertheless, Plaintiff allegedly acquired resources to properly assess market risk.
In late July or early August 2012, De-Falco sought to include purportedly improper market risk assessment results in a report to Defendant’s board of directors. When Plaintiff cautioned him that the improper material should not be presented to
At some point, Plaintiff learned that five management committees shared responsibility for Defendant’s risk management. These included the Group Enterprise Risk Management Steering Committee (“Steering Committee”) and four subcommittees: the Underwriting and Claims Risk Committee, the Compliance and Governance Risk Committee, the Finance and Credit Risk Committee, and the Operational Risk Committee. Plaintiff chaired the Steering Committee, which included almost all the senior executives. Plaintiff realized that no committee was responsible for controlling reserving risk, one of the most significant risks faced by insurance companies. She also noted that the Finance and Credit Risk Committee had not met for almost a year, while Underwriting and Claims Risk Committee had not met for a long time and was out of compliance with its charter. According to the PSAC, neither the lack of meetings nor the failure of any committee to handle reinsurance recoverable was disclosed to rating agencies or in Defendant’s SEC filings. According to the PSAC, Defendant’s 10-K falsely represented that credit risk arising from reinsurance recoverable was actually monitored by a subcommittee. All this Plaintiff allegedly reported to DeFalco.
In or around August 2012, Defendant’s board of directors met to discuss emerging risk management, which the rating agency S & P assessed as weak. Plaintiff attended the meeting, and DeFalco emailed her immediately afterwards praising her performance. However, Defendant’s Chief Underwriting Officer and previous Chief Risk Officer, Clay Bassett (“Bassett”), accused Plaintiff of inviting questions from board members and insisted that she represented management’s interests in front of the board. Plaintiff replied that she was obliged to truthfully present information to the board, and that she had fiduciary duties to the company and its shareholders.
In September 2012, Plaintiff expressed to DeFalco that Defendant did not possess the proper skill set to manage market and credit risks, and she told DeFalco that certain subcommittees were out of compliance. She proposed solutions to risk management issues, including hiring additional personnel. Plaintiff told DeFalco and Bas-sett that Defendant’s market risk was too high to justifiably maintain an A rating from S & P, as it was over twice as large as the capital buffer Defendant wanted to maintain. She also noted that the aggregate catastrophe risk was at or beyond Defendant’s risk appetite. This angered Bassett because, according to the PSAC, he was responsible for catastrophe risk.
Plaintiff, in developing an action plan to address S & P’s concerns over Defendant’s operational risk control, allegedly sought certain additional information from DeFal-co and Bassett but received nothing. Becoming concerned that the lack of regular risk management processes and Defendant’s high aggregated risks threatened Defendant’s S & P rating, Plaintiff shared her concerns with DeFalco. DeFalco dismissed the concerns, saying a rating downgrade would not be the end of the world. Plaintiff shared the same rating downgrade concerns with Vincent Tizzio (“Tizzio”), president and CEO of a related
In September 2012, with a Steering Committee meeting one week away, De-Falco instructed Plaintiff to cancel the meeting because he and Bassett had not completed their assignments from the previous meeting. Plaintiff declined, saying the committee would be out of compliance if the meeting were not held. DeFalco then asked Plaintiff to postpone the agenda items on which he and Bassett were to report.
Plaintiff angered Bassett by insisting that the Underwriting and Claims Risk Committee meet. Bassett accused her of improperly pressuring him by mentioning Defendant’s CEO in an email. Bassett also accused Plaintiff of turning Steering Committee meetings into battle grounds by showing quantitative results and sharing an S & P report identifying weaknesses in risk control. Bassett then stated he would watch Plaintiff very closely. Plaintiff alleges it took three months of pressure to finally get Bassett to hold an Underwriting and Claims Risk Committee meeting on October 25, 2012. This meeting occurred after Plaintiff worked out an alternative solution with Tizzio. DeFalco never held a Finance and Credit Risk Committee meeting while Plaintiff worked for Defendant. DeFalco instead recommended reducing the number required of meetings per year for each committee.
In October 2012, Plaintiff expressed to Defendant’s general counsel her concerns over the failure of risk management subcommittees to hold meetings. She also discussed with Defendant’s internal audit director concerns over the lack of regular risk reporting and monitoring. The internal audit director confirmed there was no regular reporting or monitoring, despite the fact that Defendant’s presentations to rating agencies claimed internal audit had been an important part of the company’s risk management.
Also in October 2012, Plaintiff received risk assessment results from Defendant’s investment consultant (“first consultant”) whose assessments had been presented to Defendant’s board and to rating agencies in the past. She also received assessment results from a second independent investment consultant (“second consultant”). The second consultant assessed Defendant’s market risk at $95 million, whereas the first consultant placed Defendant’s risk at $40 million. Allegedly, the actual risk was greater than Defendant’s $80 million capital buffer, jeopardizing the A rating from S & P. On October 25, 2012, Plaintiff forwarded the second consultant’s risk assessment to DeFalco and Defendant’s CEO. DeFalco was angered because he did not fully vet Plaintiffs work product, and he accused Plaintiff of using the second consultant without his permission. Plaintiff alleges, however, that she had discussed with DeFalco numerous times she was using both consultants and that he had encouraged such use.
On October 26, 2012, DeFalco asked Plaintiff not to share any information with the CEO because the CEO would read it and ask questions. The same day, she presented the second consultant’s results to the Steering Committee. At the meeting, DeFalco remained unconcerned with the company’s risk profile. Executives at the Steering Committee meeting engaged in a heated debate over the risk measurement matrix.
During the days leading up to November 2, 2012, Plaintiff was preparing an enterprise risk management report for an upcoming board of directors meeting. Al
On November 2, 2012, DeFalco informed Plaintiff that she was terminated because she did not fit into Defendant’s culture. Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 28, 2013, alleging retaliatory firing after repeated internal reporting of Defendant’s improper risk control practices which constituted shareholder fraud and violated federal securities rules and regulations.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Amend Pleadings
A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course or at any time before trial with leave of the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)-(2). If a party seeks leave to amend a pleading, “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “The rule in this Circuit has been to allow a party to amend its pleadings in the absence of a showing by the non[-]movant of prejudice or bad faith.” AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or Motion to Dismiss
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed— but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Here, as De
On a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court “to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678,
IY. NO UNDUE DELAY IF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED
Defendant argues briefly that Plaintiff cannot amend her complaint in response to a motion to dismiss. However, Defendant relies solely on cases which state that “a complaint may not be amended by the plaintiffs brief filed in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Connolly v. Havens,
Defendant then asserts the Court should deny Plaintiffs motion because Plaintiff “knew or should have known of the facts upon which the amendment is based when the original pleading was filed, particularly [because Plaintiff] offers no excuse for the delay.” Berman v. Parco,
Here, Plaintiffs delay in adding additional facts does not amount to undue delay. Defendant does not demonstrate, or even argue, that it will be prejudiced by the addition of these facts, as it must show in order to defeat the motion to amend because of delay. Ruotolo v. City of New York,
V. FILING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WOULD NOT BE FUTILE
In determining whether a proposed amended complaint would be futile, a court must decide whether it states a legally cognizable claim for relief. AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
A. Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) prohibits publicly traded companies from, inter alia, discharging an employee
because of any lawful act done by the employee—
(1) to provide information ... regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341 [mail fraud], 1343 [wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or regulation of the [SEC], or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information ... is provided to ...
*528 (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct) ....
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
1. Protected Activity
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs alleged communications to superiors and other employees do not amount to protected activity under SOX. Defendant reasons that the communications did not “definitively and specifically relate to [one] of the listed categories of fraud or securities violations [in] 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).” Vodopia v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V.,
In the Second Circuit “[r]ulings by summary order do not have precedential effect.” 2d Cir. Local Rule 32.1.1(a). Thus, the Second Circuit’s adoption of the “definitive and specific” standard is not binding. Additionally, a year after the Vodopia decision, the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor (“ARB”), which reviews determinations in administrative proceedings under SOX, held that the “definitive and specific” standard is “inappropriate” because it “presents a potential conflict” with the statutory language prohibiting discharge for providing information “the employee reasonably believes constitutes a SOX violation.” Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A.,
The Court makes no determination at this time whether the “definitive and specific” standard applies. Regardless of whether it applies, the employee is not required to communicate to the employer which laws the employer’s conduct allegedly violated. Andaya,
Here, according to the PSAC, Plaintiff reported to her supervisor DeFalco that risk models Defendant had been using were “grossly improper” for a number of asset classes, (PSAC ¶¶ 13, 15), resulting in substantially underestimated investment risks, (id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff allegedly told DeFalco that two risk subcommittees had not met for nearly a year, that no risk subcommittee was dealing with reinsurance recoverable risk, and that neither issue was disclosed in Defendant’s presentations to rating agencies or in its SEC filings. (Id. ¶26.) Plaintiff additionally told DeFalco that Defendant’s 10-K filing stated falsely that a subcommittee handled reinsurance recoverable risk. (Id.) She allegedly told Defendant’s general counsel that subcommittees were not meeting as required by the company and as represented by Defendant in SEC filings. (Id. ¶ 52.) She also told Defendant’s internal audit director there was a lack of regular risk reporting and monitoring. (Id. ¶ 53.) The proper disclosure in SEC filings of Defendant’s investment risk practices certainly seems to be information which may be necessary to make required statements to the SEC “not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20. It also seems Defendant’s failure to state on its Form DEF 14A filings that the subcommittees did not actually meet may be an omission of material fact the disclosure of which would have made the proxy statements “not false or misleading.” Id. § 240.14a-9(a). Thus, in complaining that relevant information did not appear in these SEC filings as required, Plaintiff allegedly implicated SEC rules violations which are sufficient to state a plausible claim under SOX.
Defendant argues further that Plaintiffs communications could not possibly satisfy the SOX reporting requirements because Plaintiff was hired as the
2. Reasonable Belief
Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not reasonably believe Defendant’s practices were unlawful. “To demonstrate that a plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, a plaintiff must show that [s]he had both ‘a subjective belief and an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct [s]he complained of constituted a violation of relevant law.’ ” Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A.,
The PSAC alleges that Plaintiff was the regional capital management director at her previous employer of five years, but otherwise does not allege the extent of her training and experience. Nonetheless, the PSAC alleges that Defendant’s risk assessments resulted in understating the risk of 60% of Defendant’s assets to the board of directors and that other relevant risk-related information was not disclosed to the SEC and rating agencies. As this information would allegedly affect the actions taken by the board of directors and logically influence investment decisions by shareholders, it is not implausible that Plaintiff believed Defendant’s conduct constituted fraud on shareholders. It is also not implausible that Plaintiff believed Defendant violated SEC rules by failing to disclose certain details of its risk management practices and by affirmatively providing misleading statements to the SEC in required filings. In any event, Plaintiff need not prove a violation of the law to state a claim under § 1514A. Guyden v. Aetna, Inc.,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not subjectively believe shareholder fraud was being committed because she did not explicitly say so. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff signed two documents certifying she knew nothing of fraudulent or untrue statements of material fact in certain financial information, and Defendant attaches the two documents as exhibits. However, as previously noted, Plaintiff did not need to specify which laws she thought were violated: she needed only identify specific conduct she believed to be illegal. See Ashmore v. CGI Grp. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 8611(LBS),
Defendant finally contends that Plaintiff did not have an objectively reasonable belief that Defendant was committing fraud. However, Defendant merely repeats its unavailing arguments that it was part of Plaintiffs job to identify risk management issues, which is all she did here, see Barker v. UBS AG,
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint must be granted as to the SOX claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, as such an amendment would not be futile.
B. Whistleblower Definition Under Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act (“DFA”) prohibits employers from discharging
a whistleblower ... because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower — .
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.) ....
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). As previously discussed, disclosures protected under SOX include communications to “a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).” 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The DFA, however, limits the reach of its whistle-blower protection. The law defines “whis-tleblower” as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the [SEC].” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is not a “whistleblower” as defined by the DFA and interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,
Under the SEC regulation promulgated in 2011:
*532 For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(l) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)), you are a whistleblower if
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are providing relates to a possible securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a possible violation of the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in Section 21F(h)(l)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(l)(A)).
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (“Rule 21F-2”). According to the comments, “the statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to three different categories of whistleblow-ers, and the third category [which incorporates the SOX anti-retaliation provision] includes individuals who report to persons and governmental authorities other than the [SEC].” Securities Whistleblower Protections & Incentives, 76 Fed.Reg. 34,300, 34,304 (June 13, 2011). The SEC thus recognizes a narrow exception to the requirement that employees report violations directly to the SEC, based on the statutory language in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(l)(A)(iii) which incorporates reporting malfeasance to supervisors. Id. Rule 21F-2 was adopted shortly after the decision in Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS),
After the promulgation of Rule 21F-2, another court in this district followed the SEC’s interpretation using the two-step inquiry set out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Within two months of the Murray decision, the Fifth Circuit applied the two-step inquiry of Chevron and concluded that Congress had in fact spoken unambiguously on the question of who was protected by the DFA whistleblower provision. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,
Two other district courts have since followed the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation in Asadi. See Banko v. Apple Inc., No. CV 13-02977 RS,
“[T]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Virgilio v. City of New York,
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint must be granted as to the DFA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(l), as such an amendment would not be futile.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs cross-motion to amend the complaint is GRANTED and Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the motions (Docs. 31 & 46). Plaintiff is directed to file its second amended complaint on or before May 31, 2014.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Amended Complaint and Proposed Second Amended Complaint allege violations of subsection (h)(1)(B), which details the enforcement procedures, whereas subsection (h)(1)(A) provides the substantive prohibition of retaliation. The Court construes the plead
. Defendant argues that the SEC rules and regulations purportedly violated must be "regulations prohibiting fraud.” Livingston v. Wyeth,
. I.e., SEC Rules 240.14a-9 and ,12b-20, and 17 C.F.R. Part 229.
. The Court declines to entertain Plaintiff's wire fraud argument which appears only in her brief in support of the motion to amend the complaint.
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