135 Ky. 207 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1909
Opinion op the Court by
Reversing.
At the January term, 1908 of the Carroll circuit court the grand jury found and returned against the appellant, W. P. Yancey, the following indictment: “The grand jury of Carroll county, in the name and by the authority of the commonwealth of Kentucky, accuse W. P. Yancey of the offense of criminal libel committed as follows, to-wit: The said W. P. Yancey in the county and circuit court aforesaid did, on the 17th day of January, 1908, within 12 months next before the finding of this indictment, unlawfully, willfully, maliciously, and knowingly write and publish a certain written statement, to-wit, a letter, which letter imputed to one F. C. Greene, then commonwealth attorney of the Fifteenth judicial district of Kentucky, dishonesty, misconduct in office, corruption in the discharge of his official duties, and incompetency in the performance of same, and did sign same and mail and deliver same to the following persons in Carroll county, Ky.: B. W. Ransdell, John Davis, A.' S. Lee, A. G. Kendall, Arthur Carico, C. M. Bond, C. C. Coghill, J. C. Duvall, R. E. Crutcher, Harry Grobmeyer, Joe Hayes, Forrest Adcock, and divers others whose names are to this grand jury now unknown, all residents of Carroll county, Ky., said written letters being in words as follows: ‘W. P. Yan
Appellant’s first complaint is that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer to the indictment. This complaint is mainly based upon the .ground that both the letter and the inclosed petition set forth in the indictment were privileged communications, and therefore their publication did not constitute an indictable offense. Subsection 6, section 1, Bill of Rights, Const., provides that citizens of the state shall have “the right of assembling together in a peaceable manner for their common good, and of applying to those invested with the power of government for the redress of grievances, or other proper
Section 2172. Ky. Stat., provides: “A person desirous of procuring the impeachment of any officer shall, by petition in writing to the House of Representatives signed hy himself and verified by his own affidavit, and the affidavits of such others as he may deem necessary, set forth the facts upon which he prays an impeachment.” It will be observed that the paper Coghill was asked by appellant to sign was an affidavit and petition addressed to the House of Representatives. As appellant was judge of the Owen county court, and Coghill had been a member
An impeachment proceeding is a judicial proceeding ; the Legislature being the trial court. This being true, whatever writings in the way of petitions, affidavits, or pleas as may properly be used in an impeachment proceeding are, as to the statements of fact contained therein as much privileged as other writings or pleadings prepared for use or filed in the course of ordinary litigation in the courts of the country. An excellent statement of the law on this subject, as we understand it, may be found in Roberson’s Criminal Law, sec. 592: “There are certain communications which are privileged, and are not deemed libelous, because of the occasion upon which they are made, though the party making them may in fact be in error, and not able to prove them to be true. A communication is regarded as privileged if made in good faith, upon any subject-matter upon which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty public or private and either legal, social, or moral, if the- defamatbry matter is honestly believed to be true by' the person publishing it, and made to a person or body of men having a corresponding interest or duty. Thus proceedings in courts of justice, legislative proceedings, and petition and memorials to the Legislature are privileged.” The rule here announced was approved by this court in Ranson v. West, 125 Ky. 457, 101 S. W. 885, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 82; Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky., 223; 103 S. W., 374, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 642, 11 L. R. A., (N. S.) 723. Also Cooley on Torts, sec. 251; Townsend on Slander and Libel, sec. 221; 18 Am. & Eng. Ency, of Law, 1023.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.