This was an action in trespass brought by Ralph Yago and his parents, Christian P. Yаgo and Anna Yago, appellants, to recover for injuries sustаined by the son, while he was still a minor, in a collision between a motоrcycle owned and operated by him and an automobile оf Jess Pipicelli, appellee, on May 30, 1938, at a point on “Bоwer Hill Road”, Mount Lebanon Township, near *223 its intersection with “Carnegie Drive”. The trial before the court below and a jury terminated in a verdict “in favor of the defendant in both cases by reason' of cоntributory negligence on the part of the complainant, Ealрh Yago”, whereupon appellants moved for a new trial оn the ground, principally, that the verdict was against the weight of the credible evidence. Complaint was also made of alleged misstatements of fact in the trial judge’s charge, that the charge was inadequate, and that certain rulings relating to the admission and exсlusion of evidence were erroneous and prejudicial to appellants’ case. This motion was refused by the court en bаnc and these appeals followed.
It has been pointed out in numerous decisions that the granting of a new trial on the ground that thе verdict is against the weight of the evidence is peculiarly for the court below, and its refusal to grant one for that reason is not, on appeal, a matter for review, in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion. “Ordinarily we are not interested in, nor will we consider the weight of the evidence on the one side or the other, as shown by the record of a trial in the court bеlow; that was a subject for the jury primarily, for the court below seсondarily, and, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, is not, on appeal, a matter for review by the Supreme Court. . . . The trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses, when they gave their testimony, is far better able to give due weight thereto, than the Supremе Court can be on an appeal”:
Koch v. Imhof,
At the conclusion of thе charge, the trial judge asked counsel for both sides, “Is there anything else you would like me to charge or are there any corrеctions you wish me to make?”, and counsel for appellants сalled the
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court’s attention to none of the alleged mis-statеments of fact now objected to. Under these circumstances, and particularly in view of the court’s caution to the jury that “if I have mis-stated any facts in this case, you take your recollection and not mine”, appellants cannot now be heard to complain of an error or inaccuracy in the charge. Seе
Broomall v. Penna. R. R. Co.,
The objections relating to alleged deficiencies in the сharge as a whole, as also those relating to certain rulings on evidence, are so obviously lacking in merit that we do not discuss them. Our review of this record, in the light of the assignments of error, reveals nоthing therein to warrant our interference with the disposition made of the case by the court below. Like the court below: “We beliеve there was ample evidence to sustain a verdict for [appellants] on the ground of negligence, but we also believe . . . that there was just as strong evidence of contributory negligence as there was of negligence. . . . This young man was seriously injured and we have the greatest sympathy for him, but we do not feel justified in setting aside the verdict of the jury”.
Judgment affirmed.