Yachanin v. Cleveland Civ. Serv. Comm.Yachanin v. Cleveland Civ. Serv. Comm.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., Jones, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 10, 2013
Stewart D. Roll
David M. Cuppage
Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli
55 Public Square, Suite 1950
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Barbara Langhenry
Director of Law
James C. Cochran
Assistant Director of Law
City of Cleveland
601 Lakeside Avenue, Room 106
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant George Yachanin (“Yachanin“) appeals the trial court‘s judgment affirming the Cleveland Civil Service Commission‘s (“the CCSC“) decision to sustain Yachanin‘s layoff. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
{¶2} Yachanin began employment with defendant-appellee city of Cleveland (“Cleveland” or “the city“) in 1987. He worked in various positions including driver and laborer until January 2003, when he was appointed to the class of Construction Equipment Operator (“CEO“), Group B. He was made a regular member of the class in November 2008, when a charter amendment passed that allowed him to be grandfathered in as a regular, full-time member.1
{¶3} On May 16, 2011, Yachanin received a letter informing him he was going to be laid off as of May 30, 2011. The letter indicated the city was forced to reduce its workforce and lay off personnel as a result of state imposed budget cuts. At the time of his layoff, Yachanin was employed by the Division of Waste but was performing work for the Division of Streets.
{¶4} Yachanin appealed the layoff to the CCSC. Following a hearing, the CCSC sustained the city‘s decision, finding that the city complied with all applicable civil service commission rules. Yachanin appealed the CCSC‘s decision to the common pleas
Standard of Review
{¶5} In the first assignment of error, Yachanin argues the common pleas court‘s decision should be reversed because it applied the wrong standard of review.
{¶6} Yachanin brought this administrative appeal pursuant to
{¶7} The right to appeal under
Any party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin County, * * * except that appeals under division (B) of section 124.34 of the Revised Code from a decision of the state personnel board of review or a municipal or civil service township civil service commission shall be taken to the court of common pleas of the county in which the appointing authority is located.
{¶8}
{¶9} Yachanin‘s complaint is appealable pursuant to
(A) Except as otherwise provided in sections 2506.05 to 2506.08 of the Revised Code, and except as modified by this section and sections 2506.02 to 2506.04 of the Revised Code, every final order, adjudication, or decision
of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505 of the Revised Code.
The CCSC is a municipal administrative agency whose final order may be appealed pursuant to
If an appeal is taken in relation to a final order, adjudication, or decision covered by division (A) of section 2506.01 of the Revised Code, the court may find that the order, adjudication, or decision is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record.
See also Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147-148, 735 N.E.2d 433 (2000).
{¶10} In affirming the CCSC‘s decision, the trial court in this case stated:
The court having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the appellant and appellee, the court affirms the decision of the Cleveland Civil Service Commission, finding the decision is not unconstitutional, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.
Therefore, trial court applied the correct standard of review to this administrative appeal.
{¶11} Yachanin‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶12} The standard of review to be applied by the court of appeals in an
Lack of Funds/ Seniority
{¶13} In the second assignment of error, Yachanin argues the trial court erred in affirming the CCSC‘s decision because the CCSC‘s decision ignored Cleveland‘s burden of proving that Yachanin was laid off due to a lack of funds. He also argues the trial court should have reversed the CCSC‘s decision because his seniority prevented him from being laid off.
{¶14}
{¶16} Cleveland‘s May 16, 2011 letter to Yachanin advised him that he was being laid off due to a lack of funds. Yachanin contends there was no proof that Cleveland, the appointing authority, “ha[d] a current or projected deficiency in funding to maintain current, or to sustain projected, levels of staffing and operations.”
{¶17} However, Ronnie Owens (“Owens“), the commissioner of waste collection, testified that lay offs were based “on the city‘s financial situation, as well as operational needs,” and explained that the city was receiving less funding from the state. The Division of Waste manages its own budget and payroll, which must be approved by city counsel annually. Owens also testified that there was substantially less trash being collected in recent years, so the city required fewer people to move it.
{¶18} Further, Debbie Southerington testified that she became Cleveland‘s human resources director in March 2011, just before numerous layoffs were going to occur. She stated that human resources interacted with all city departments and divisions concerning lay off notices because layoffs were occurring city wide as a result of the state‘s funding reductions. The implication of this evidence is that as a result of state funding cuts, there was a projected deficiency in funds to sustain current staffing levels. Yachanin offered no evidence to refute the city‘s evidence that lay offs were necessitated by a loss of state
{¶19} Yachanin also argues that because he had more seniority than other CEOs, those CEOs with less seniority than he should have been laid off before him. He contends the CCSC should have determined layoffs from a list that included all of the city‘s CEO Class B operators regardless of the division in which they were employed.
{¶20} However, Civil Service Rule 8.20, which governs lay offs, provides, in relevant part:
Whenever it becomes necessary to reduce the working force in a classification in any Division of the City service, the appointing authority may lay off any appointee in such classification; provided that where two or more persons are employed in a classification, they shall be laid off in the inverse order of their appointment in such classification. (Emphasis added.)
Civil Service Rule 8.20 clearly provides that lay offs are made according to seniority within a city‘s division and not seniority within a classification as a whole. The rule expressly states that it is aimed at reducing “the working force in a classification in any Division.”
{¶21} Yachanin concedes the two other CEOs employed in the Division of Waste had seniority over him. The fact that Yachanin had more seniority than other CEOs employed in other divisions throughout the city is irrelevant under Civil Service Rule 8.20. Therefore, the CCSC and the trial court applied Civil Service Rule 8.20 correctly when it laid Yachanin off because he had the least seniority in the division.
{¶22} The second assignment of error is overruled.
Complete Record
{¶24} As previously explained,
{¶25} Yachanin does not argue that the CCSC failed to file the record in a timely manner or that any specific parts of the record are missing. He contends the affidavit from Munday Workman (“Workman“), the supervisor of CCSC records, attesting to the authenticity of the “Administrative Record,” fails to contain a certification that the agency has submitted a “complete record” of the administrative proceedings to the court. He argues, citing McKenzie v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 5 Ohio St.2d 229, 215 N.E.2d 397 (1966), that unless the agency member who certifies the record specifically states that it “is a complete record,” the record is not complete. However, the McKenzie court discussed the record requirements for appeals brought pursuant to
{¶26} Moreover, in Arlow v. Ohio Rehab. Servs. Comm., 24 Ohio St.3d 153, 493 N.E.2d 1337 (1986), which also involved an
{¶27} In the affidavit certifying the record in this case, Workman states: “The attached documents are a true and accurate copy of the Administrative Record of the Civil Service Commission proceedings in the matter of George Yachanin.” The McKenzie court held that certified copies of documents are sufficient to complete the record. McKenzie at paragraph two of the syllabus. Yachanin fails to demonstrate any prejudice caused by Workman‘s failure to state that the true and accurate copy of the Administrative Record is a “complete record.”
{¶28} Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶29} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR