Case Information
*1 Before: BARRY, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 25, 2011) ___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Petitioners, Xiu Jin Yu and Yong Sheng Liu (collectively, “petitioners”), natives and citizens of the People’s Republic of China, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to reopen. For the following reasons, we will deny their petition.
I.
Liu entered the United States on April 11, 2001, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) served him with a Notice to Appear and placed him in removal proceedings in June 2001. Yu, Liu’s wife and the lead petitioner, arrived on August 1, 2002, and the INS placed her in removal proceedings in August 2002. Both petitioners conceded removability, but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The petitioners feared returning to China, arguing that they would be forcibly sterilized for violating the one-child policy. Specifically, the couple believed they were at risk because they had a second child while residing in the United States.
In March 2005, following a merits hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ruled that
the petitioners failed to establish eligibility for any form of relief, and ordered them
removed to China. The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. The petitioners
sought review in this Court and we denied their petition in January 2008. See Yu v. Att’y
Gen. of the U.S.,
In February 2010, the petitioners filed a second motion to reopen arguing changed country conditions. They submitted hundreds of pages of documents, which, they asserted, establish that local government officials in Fujian Province utilize a policy of forced sterilization that is more severe than it was at the time of the petitioners’ IJ hearing. The BIA denied the motion to reopen as time-barred and number-barred under the applicable regulations. This petition for review followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the BIA’s denial of
the petitioners’ motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse of discretion standard to our
review. See Sevoian v. Ashcroft,
An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements are waived for motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Petitioners argue that they meet this exception as to the time and number restrictions.
Petitioners submitted voluminous documentary evidence that included the petitioners’ and their children’s birth certificates, petitioners’ marriage certificate, a 1997 Reply to Issues of Determination of Nationality, a 2003 Administrative Decision of the Fujian Province Family Planning Administration, the opinion of Dr. Flora Sapio regarding China’s family planning laws, accounts of Chinese nationals being subjected to coercive family planning practices, research articles and media reports, and various other documents.
Petitioners argue that the BIA abused its discretion by not fully considering and
analyzing the documentary evidence. The BIA must provide the Court “with more than
cursory, summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern the reasons for
declining to afford relief to a petitioner.” Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,
Here, although the BIA’s opinion did not individually analyze each of the many
documents in the record, the BIA’s analysis was sufficient under the Zheng standard.
The BIA first named all of the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the
motion. The BIA then concluded that of those documents, the foreign documents were
not properly authenticated in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6. See Liu v. Ashcroft,
*5
The BIA also concluded that evidence in the record showed that conditions had not changed since the petitioners’ IJ hearing. In particular, the BIA referenced the May 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions (“Asylum Profile”). Petitioners argued that the Asylum Profile was unreliable and should not serve as a basis for the *6 BIA’s conclusions. [3] The BIA analyzed and rejected the argument, concluding that petitioners’ bare assertions and the opinion of Dr. Sapio [4] were insufficient to undermine the Asylum Profile’s conclusions. In light of the Asylum Profile, the BIA determined that the petitioners’ evidence was insufficient to establish that Yu or Liu would face forcible sterilization, and thus insufficient to establish changed country conditions.
This Court recently reiterated that State Department reports are afforded high
probative value, and that the BIA is justified in relying on such reports rather than more
questionable evidence presented by those seeking a motion to reopen. See Chen v. Att’y
Gen. of the U.S., No. 09-3459,
Petitioners also argue that the IJ erred in denying them relief, and that we should
rule on the issue of whether having children in the United States standing alone can
provide a basis for asylum regardless of the particular facts of a case. To the extent that
the petitioners challenge the IJ’s ruling, the instant petition for review is not a means to
*7
relitigate the original removal proceedings. See Kaur v. BIA,
Based on the above, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
Sapio’s opinion was not entitled to be weighed as that of an expert. We note that in their motion to reopen, the petitioners also argued changed
country conditions due to more severe economic sanctions as part of China’s family planning policy. The BIA rejected the argument. To the extent that the petitioners allege the BIA’s analysis was wanting, we conclude that the analysis was sufficient under Zheng.
Notes
[1] In their motion to reopen, the petitioners argued that certain of the foreign documents were clearly authentic because they came from the Chinese government’s official websites. The petitioners, however, do not contest the BIA’s conclusion regarding the documents’ authenticity in their petition for review. Even if the petitioners are correct that certain of the foreign documents are authentic, it does not change our conclusion that the BIA adequately analyzed the documentary evidence in reaching a decision.
[2] See In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 213 (BIA 2010) (explaining that State Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 248 n.1 (BIA 2007) (denying a motion to reopen that included as evidence the Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China, the 1999 Changle City Family Planning Q & A, 2003 Fujian Province Administrative Decision, and the 2003 Changle City Administrative Opinion); In re J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185, 189-90 (BIA 2007) (denying a motion to reopen that incorporated the testimony of demographer John Aird); In re J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196, 201-03 (BIA 2007) (denying motion to reopen after taking account of State Department reports and 1999 Changle City Family Planning Q & A); In re C-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 899, 900-04 (BIA 2006) (analyzing the Aird affidavit in its denial of motion to reopen).
[3] Similar arguments were rejected by this Court in relation to the petitioners’ first
motion to reopen. See Yu v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,
[4] Petitioners alleged that Dr. Sapio is a “China expert.” The BIA found that Dr.