The certified question of law before this court is a consequence of a mobile society. The State of Wyoming established an insurance guaranty association to shield resident claimants or resident insureds from loss due to insolvent insurers. Now, in an era when many persons are no longer confined to one residence, the insurance guaranty association seeks to determine whether it must indemnify a loss suffered at the hands of an insured with multiple residences, including Wyoming. We havе concluded that the legislative intent of the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act requires that a single “place of residence” be established at the time the insured event occurred. As a result, the certified question must be answered in the negative.
I. QUESTION
The certified question of law from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming inquires:
The Court notes that “residence” is not defined in the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act. WYO.STAT. §§ 26-31-101 — 117 (1991). The interpretation of “residence” is critical tо the final disposition of this case. Specifically, did the Wyoming legislature intend for an individual claimant to be able to have multiple [residences] within the context of the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act?
II. FACTS
In early 1989, William F. Woods (Woods), a San Diego, California attorney, considered purchasing a 1986 Pitts Model S2B aerobatics biplane (hereinafter the plane) on behalf *194 of his professional corporation. The plane was owned by Paul Entrekin (Entrekin) and based in Pеnsacola, Florida. Woods and En-trekin agreed that the plane would be flown to San Diego before completing the purchase. Entrekin maintained $100,000.00 in liability insurance covering any “permissive user” of the plane under a policy written by the Ohio General Casualty Company (Ohio General).
Paul Crowley (Crowley), a retired airline transport pilot, agreed to fly the plane from Pensacola to San Diego for Woods. On February 11, 1989, Crowley and Woods met with Entrekin at the Pensaсola airport and inspected the plane. After completing the inspection, Crowley and Woods began the flight to San Diego. The trip started uneventfully with Crowley piloting under visual flight rules. However, about one hour and fifty minutes into the flight, the plane ran out of fuel and crashed about five miles from the community of Walker, Louisiana. Crowley admitted that during the last half-hour of the flight, he had been unable to see a fuel quantity gauge and had failed to reset another fuel control device.
Woods sufferеd a fractured femur and other injures in the crash. He was unable to work full-time for about one year. Crowley was not injured, but the plane was a total loss. Woods made a claim for damages with Ohio General.
• On June 27, 1989, Ohio General filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida to determine if coverage existed under its policy with Entrekin. The court determined that Ohio General had a duty to defend and indemnify Entrekin and Crowley for any liability they might hаve for the injuries suffered by Woods. Ohio General Ins. Co. v. Woods, No. 89-30177RV, slip op. at 16 (N.D.Fla. June 25, 1991). By the time the court issued its decision, however, the Ohio Department of Insurance had instituted proceedings to declare Ohio General insolvent. On February 15, 1991, the Department of Insurance of the State of Wyoming revoked Ohio General’s Certificate of Authority to do business in Wyoming. Prior to that, Ohio General had been a member, in good standing, of the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association (the Association).
Before Ohio General was placed in the hands of insurance regulators, Woods filed a civil action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, seeking compensatory damages from Crowley and Entrekin. During pretrial proceedings, En-trekin was dismissed from the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Before trial, Crowley agreed to pay Woods $40,000.00 for a covenant not to execute any judgment from the California proceedings against Crowley’s persоnal assets. Furthermore, Crowley assigned any indemnification or other rights he might have held under the Ohio General policy to Woods. In a trial to the court, Woods was awarded a total of $1,396,993.56 in damages from Crowley. Woods v. Crowley, No. 620299, slip op. at 2 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Jan. 31, 1992).
One of the documents Crowley executed in conjunction with the California civil proceeding assigned to Woods the rights to any claim Crowley may have against the Association. On February 24, 1992, Woods filed a claim, individually and as the assignee of Crowley, with the agent of the Association. Woods alleged that the Association owed a statutory duty to indemnify a loss resulting from the actions of a Wyoming resident, Crowley, who was the insured of Ohio General, an insolvent insurer.
Crowley is a person with multiple residences. At the time Crowley was hired by Woods to fly the plane from Pensacola to San Diego, Crowley was living in California but was a resident of both California and Wyoming. Crowley owned a home in Malibu, California and another home in Smoot, Wyoming. Typically, Crowley spеnt approximately six months of the year in California, during the winter and early spring, and six months of the year in Wyoming, during the summer and fall.
As a part of his multiple residence lifestyle, Crowley had motor vehicles registered in both California and Wyoming. However, his driver’s license was issued by Wyoming. Crowley maintained checking and savings accounts at financial institutions in both California and Wyoming. Because his pension *195 income was earned while working in California, Crowley was required to pay state income taxes there. Since Crowley stayed in Wyoming during the fall hunting season, Crowley voted in Wyoming. Crowley also obtained hunting licenses in Wyoming. The pilot’s license issued to Crowley listed his address, at the time of the accident, as Malibu. »
On August 6, 1992, the Association filed a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the First Judicial District of Wyoming. The Association sought a declaration from the court that Woods was judicially estopped by admissions in the prior civil actions in Florida and California from claiming Crowlеy was a resident of Wyoming. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. Woods filed a counterclaim seeking payment of the $100,000.00 policy limit of the Ohio General policy, pre-judgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs. During the pendency of this action, the California Insurance Guaranty Association denied coverage because Ohio General had never qualified to do business in that state. After extensive pretrial proceedings and motions, the certified question was presented to this court.
III. DISCUSSION
The Association was created by the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Wyo.Stat. §§ 26-31-101 through 26-31-117 (1991) (hereinafter the Act). The Act, as adopted in Wyoming in 1971, is based upon the Post-Assessment Property and Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Model Act (the Model Act) prepared by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (N.A.I.C.) in 1969.
District of Columbia Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Algernon Blair, Inc.,
The Act creates an involuntary nonprofit unincorporated legal entity, the Association, whose members are insurers qualified to transact business in Wyoming. Wyo.Stat. § 26-31-104(a) and (b). Each member contributes an assessment, based on a percentage of premiums from insurance policies written in Wyoming, to a fund which is used to pay claims. Wyo.Stat. § 26-31-107(a). When an insurance company is determined to be insolvent, the Association “steps into the shoes of the insolvent insurer.”
Washington Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Mullins,
The purpose of the Act is to provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims which avoids excessive delay in payment and avoids financial loss to claimants or insureds because of the insolvency of an insurer.
Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Allstate Indem. Co.,
*196
Generally, decisions of other courts offer persuasive support when questions arise concerning thе proper interpretation of uniform laws or model acts.
B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.,
In
Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Iowa Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
In
Eastern Seaboard Pile Driving Corp. v. New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
In
McMahon v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
The various constructions given by these courts to the provisions of the Model Act offer only limited guidance. We do not find a persuasive consensus. Furthermore, we do not accept the argument that certified questions of law should be resolved by simply adopting the logic advanced in a particular line of decisions.
B & W Glass, Inc.,
Both Woods and the Association have suggested that guidance on the proper interpretation of the Act may also be found in a document styled as “Guiding Principles For Settling Disputes Between and Among Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Associations As to Responsibility For Claims” (hereinafter Guiding Principles). 1 N.A.I.C. Proc. 458-59 (1986). This document was prepared by the National Committee on Insurance Guaranty Funds in August of 1985 and submitted to the various state associations to resolve disputes involving the situs of claims. 1 N.A.I.C. Proc. 457 (1986). The Association became a signatory of the Guiding Principles document sometime after September 6, 1985. The Guiding Principles, however, offer little assistance to our task of discovering legislative intent. The Guiding Principles merely represent an agreement among the signatory insurance guaranty associations to resolve disputes in a particular manner. The Guiding Principles do not have the force and effect of law. We must, therefore, turn to the express language of the Act as adopted by the Wyoming legislature and apply our rules of statutory construction.
The intent of the Wyoming legislature in forming the Association must be as
*197
certаined from the language of the statute which is viewed in light of its object and purpose.
Barcon, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization,
The Act defines a “covered claim,” in pertinent part, as:
(ii) “Covered claim” means an unpaid claim which arises out of and is within the coverage and does not exceed the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this chapter applies issued by an insurer, if the insurer is an insolvent insurer and the claimant or insured is a resident of this state at the time of the insured event or the property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this state[.]
Wyo.Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(ii) (emphasis added). This definition states several conditions for a covered claim. First, the claim must arise оut of and be within the coverage intended by an insurance policy issued by an insurer. Second, the claim must not exceed the coverage limit of the insurance policy. Third, the insurance policy must be a kind of direct insurance to which the Act applies. See Wyo.Stat. § 26-31-102. Fourth, the insurer must be insolvent. Fifth, the “claimant or insured” must be a “resident” of Wyoming “at the time of the insured event” or the property from which the claim arises must be permanently located in Wyoming. The certified question requires us to consider, in detail, the legislative intent of the fifth condition.
A “covered claim” under the Act may be made by a “claimant or insured.” Wyo.Stat. § 26 — 31—103(a)(ii). The use of the disjunctive “or” permitted the legislature to state, in plain language, that a claim may be filed by two distinct categories of persons. A “claimant,” a person asserting a right, demand or a claim, Black’s Law Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 1990), or an “insured,” the person who obtained coverage or is otherwise covered by insurancе. Black’s Law Dictionary 808 (6th ed. 1990). The Act defines a person as “any individual, corporation, partnership, association or voluntary organization.” Wyo.Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(vi).
Either the “claimant” or the “insured” must be a “resident” of Wyoming to make a “covered claim.” Wyo.Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(ii). The Act, therefore, permits a foreign “claimant” to seek recovery when the “insured” is a “resident.”
Algernon Blair, Inc.,
The legislature’s failure to define the term “resident” in the Act makes it an ambiguous term which is subject to varying interpretations.
Allied-Signal, Inc.,
Wyoming has recognized a distinction between the “residence” of a person and the “domicile” of a person.
Statе ex rel. School Dist. No. 1, Niobrara County v. School Dist. No. 12, Niobrara County,
We assume that in using the term “resident” in the Act, the legislature understood the difference between the terms “domicile” and “resident.”
Parker Land and Cattle Co.,
The term “resident” has a primary meaning of “one actually living in a place for a time irrespective of domicile.”
In re Yap,
Any person who occupies a dwelling within the State, has a present intent to remain within the State for a period of time, and manifests the genuineness of that intent by establishing an ongoing physical presence within the State together with indicia that his presence within the State is something other than merely transitory in nature.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1309 (6th ed. 1990). Accordingly, an occasional hotel stay, a vacation stay at a resort, or an occasional overnight visit to a business premises does not establish a residence, “but a permanent or recurrent hotel residence or a habitual summer residence does qualify as a residence.”
S. Axelrod Co., Inc. v. Mel Dixon Studio, Inc.,
As used in the Act, the term “resident” is modified by the phrase “of this state at the time of the insured event * * Wyo.Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(ii). This modification states the point in time at which the status of a “resident” is determined. However, the phrase leaves unanswered the basic question of whether a “resident” under the Act may simultaneously be a “resident” of more than one state.
The legislature provided an answer in another provision of the Act which states, in pertinent part:
(b) Any person having a claim which may be recovered under more than one (1) insurance guaranty association or its *199 equivalent shall seek recovery fírst from the association of the insured’s place of residence, except that if it is a first party claim for damage to property with a permanent location, he shall seek recovery first from the association of the location of the property. * * * Any recovery under this chapter shall be reduced by the amount of recovery from any other insurance guaranty association or its equivalent.
Wyo.Stat. § 26 — 31—111 (b) (emphasis added).
As used in the Act, “place of residence” is a term of art that designates a single locality. The primary meaning of the noun “place” is used to designate “an occupied situation or building.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1148 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). The locality in the term is delineated by the prepositional phrase “of residence.” As used in Wyo.Stat. § 26 — 31—111(b), “place of residence” is a singular term. The plural form of the noun “place” is “places.” While an individual may have several “places of residence,” the Act does not speak in those terms.
Settled common law has accepted that a “place of residence” for an individual means “a fixed and permanent abode and
dwelling place for the time being
as contradistin-guished from mere temрoral local residence.”
Silvey v. Lindsay,
We hold the intent of the legislature as found in Wyo.Stat. § 26-31-lll(b) is to designate a single “place of residence” for a “claimant or insured” making a “covered claim” under the Act. The point in time to determine the “place of residence” is “at the timе of the insured event.” Wyo.Stat. § 26-31 — 103(a)(ii). Under the Act, the “place of residence” for an individual with multiple residences is established by finding that individual’s single fixed and permanent abode and dwelling place at the time the insured event occurred. The “place of residence” for a corporation is established by the location of the corporation’s principal place of business at the time the insured event occurred.
In answering a certified question, this court’s role does not include fact finding.
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
Woods also attempts to structure constitutional challenges to the residency requirement of the Act which we need only briefly address. He broadly argues that a residency requirement under the Act offends the equal protection clаuse, U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; the privileges and immunities provisions, U.S. Const, art. IV, § 2; and the right to travel, U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams,
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislature passed the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act to protect *200 residents from financial loss due to insolvent, insurers. The complex factual situation presented by this case discloses the potential boundaries of that protection. The transactions between Woods, Crowley and Entrekin have resulted in litigation in state and federal courts in Florida, Ohio, California, and Wyoming. As a result of these actions, an injured party has been awarded damages for which at least partial indemnification was once available from an insurer.
The certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming inquired, in pertinent part:
Specifically, did the Wyoming legislature intend for an individual claimant to be able to have multiple [residences] within the context of the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act?
The answer is “no.”