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Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Allstate Indemnity Co.
844 P.2d 464
Wyo.
1992
Check Treatment

*1 INSURANCE WYOMING GUARANTY

ASSOCIATION, Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v. INDEMNITY ALLSTATE COMPANY D. Paul Schierer of Pence and MacMil- Company, and Allstate Insurance lan, Laramie, appellant. for (Defendants). Appellees Wright Richards, Brandt, Robert G. Nelson, UT, Miller & City, Salt Lake

No. 91-204. appellees. Supreme of Wyoming. Court MACY, C.J., THOMAS, Before *

Dec. 1992. CARDINE, GOLDEN, URBIGKIT and JJ. Rehearing Denied Feb.

CARDINE, Justice. Guaranty Insurance Asso- (WIGA) ciation upon was called step into the shoes of Laramie Company Insurance by assuming obligations of its automo- bile when Laramie Company Insurance became insolvent. The vehicle involved in this accident in- was sured Laramie Insurance Company. Herring Ms. driving was this non-owned permission vehicle with of the named in- Herring sured. Ms. driving this non- permission owned vehicle with named insured. Ms. Herring was also an insured separate under a automobile liabili- ty on an owned automobile appellee, with the Allstate Insurance Com- pany (Allstate). sought require WIGA Allstate to indemnify defend and in lawsuit filed. Allstate refused. The dis- trict court judgment entered in favor of Allstate.

We affirm. expounds

WIGA summary issues:

Did the trial court err in finding that Allstate Indemnity Company and Allstate (Allstate) Insurance was not insurer, responsible obligated cover the loss in Eigenberger v. Herring and not indemnify Wyo- ming Association paid for sums in settlement and defense of that action? argument.

* ChiefJustice at time of oral *2 restyles copy the issue with this of with declara- query: page tions is attached as “B” Exhibit and incorporated by herein correctly the trial court rule that reference. The

Did Indemnity Company Company Laramie Insurance appellee Allstate was de- (“All- pursuant and Allstate Insurance clared insolvent Wyoming to state”) obligation no to indem- shoulders 41—103(a)(iii) by Statutes a court of § 26— Wyoming nify the competent jurisdiction in Civil Action No. (“WIGA”) any liability, Association for 22800, District, County Second Judicial of arising from the damages expenses Albany, of Wyoming February State on Eigenberger action entitled A. Christine 14, A copy Appoint- 1990. of the Order 23150, No. in Herring, Civil v. Melina ing Directing Liquidation Receiver and In and Judicial District For Second Declaring and Insolvency is attached Wyoming? Albany County, State of incorporated hereto as Exhibit “C” and facts are: stipulated by herein reference. Pursuant to its statutory duty, Wyoming Statutes 26- The facts in this case are not in dis- seq., 4-101 et Plaintiff pute. August On or about 1989 at Insur- p.m., Herring (hereinafter 9:00 Melina Lee was ance about Guarantee Association in an accident A. “WIGA”) involved with Christine agreed referred to as to defend Eigenberger the corner at of Ninth indemnify Herring. and Avenue, Laramie, Wy- Street and Ivinson During defense, the course of said oming. Eigenberger traveling was north Plaintiff Herring WIGA learned that was bicycle on on Ninth Street when she insured under Allstate Policy No. 017- entered intersection. At the same 171-172, 10/25, FC9-645479 issued to time, Herring traveling was south on Herring John and Janet liability with lim- in an Ninth Street 1982 Buick Electra $100,000.00 person, $300,- its of each by F. Gay owned Otto Bolin and Leslie copy 000.00 each occurrence. A Bolin, Douglas, Wyoming. residents of page with declarations Herring permissive awas user of the attached hereto as “D” Exhibit and incor- Bolin vehicle at the time of the accident. porated by herein reference. WIGA sent Herring An accident occurred when at- notice of suit to Allstate with a re- tempted to turn East onto Ivinson. The quest that Allstate defend the action. bicycle and vehicle collided. Allstate declined. There is no issue re- Eigenberger Complaint seeking filed a garding adequacy or timeliness of $112,300.00 damages Herring from the notice. first made WIGA its demand Civil Action No. 22844 in the District $14,912.48 by September letter dated Court, District, County Second Judicial copy A of said letter is at- Albany, Wyoming. A copy State of hereto “E” tached as Exhibit and incor- complaint Ex- is attached hereto as porated by herein reference. incorporated “A” by hibit herein ref- pri- Civil Action No. 22844 was settled Eigenberger’s Complaint erence. al- $10,000.00 payment or to trial with a leged Herring negligent fail- Eigenberger. copy to A WIGA ing yield right way Eigenber- Release of All Claims Order of Dis- Herring ger completed when the left missal are attached hereto as Exhibits Ivinson, thereby causing turn onto respectively incorporat- “F” and “G” injuries Eigenberger. accident and by reference. ed herein WIGA incurred Herring denying negli- filed an answer $4,912.48 and, gence alternatively, alleging compa- as costs of defense. The settle- negligence. attorney’s paid rative ment amount and fees MacMillan Pence and WIGA de- accident, At the time the Bolin fense of Civil Action No 22844 are rea- vehicle was insured Laramie Insur- The sole issue to determined Company, sonable. be Policy No. LPA $100,00.00 is whether WIGA or Allstate was re- limits of each $300,000.00 person quired pay each accident. A to defend and the loss in Civil dling Action No. 22844. If Allstate was re- subsequent covered claims to an pay, Judgment quired insolvency, to defend and the cost of examinations un- $14,912.48plus per- the amount of seven der W.S. 26-31-112 and other ex- (7%) penses prejudgment Sep- cent interest from chapter; authorized tember 1990 should entered (iv) Investigate claims brought against *3 against Allstate. If WIGA was adjust, association and compromise, pay, Complaint to defend and Plaintiffs pay settle and covered claims to thé ex- should be dismissed. tent of the association’s obligation and deny claims; all other was created to assure that a poli- WIGA (v) Notify any persons as the commis- cy protected holder be would the event sioner directs under W.S. 26-31- insolvency of an insurer. W.S. 26- 109(a)(iii); 31-101, (1983); -117 19A A. Apple- John (vi) Handle man, through claims employees its Insurance Law and Practice (1) through or one or (1982); Anderson, more insurers or 2A Ronald A. Couch on persons other designated servicing (Rev. 1984). fa- Insurance 2d 22:27 Op- ed. cilities, voluntary whose accepted desig- erating generated by funds are member nation is to the commissioner’s assessments. W.S. 26-31-107 approval; powers duties and of WIGA are set out (vii) (1983): servicing facility W.S. 26-31-106 Reimburse each obligations for association pays it and for (a) The association shall: expenses incurred while handling associ- (i)Be obligated to the extent of the claims; ation and prior covered claims existing to the de- (viii) Pay any other expenses association insolvency termination of arising chapter. authorized this (30) thirty days within after the determi- (b) The may: association insolvency, nation of or before the policy expiration (i) in, (30) Appear date if than thirty less appeal any defend and ac- days determination, after the tion on a covered or before claim or on a claim replaced brought against association; the insured causes cancellation, its if he does so within thir- (ii) Employ any or retain persons neces- ty days determination, but the sary to handle perform claims and other obligation only includes duties; amount of association each covered claim which exceeds one (iii) necessary Borrow funds to effect the ($100.00) hundred dollars and is less than purposes of chapter this in accord with one ($100,- hundred thousand dollars plan operation; 000.00), except that the association: (iv) sued; Sue or be (A) pay Shall the full amount of any (v) Negotiate and become party to con- covered claim arising out of a worker’s necessary tracts to carry out purpose compensation policy; and chapter; of this (B) obligated Is not policyholder to a (vi) settlements, Review releases and ad- or claimant in exceeding an amount justments to which the insolvent insurer obligation insolvent insurer’s under the parties its insureds were to determine policy from which the claim arises. settlements, the extent to which the re- (ii) Be deemed the insurer to the judgments extent leases may properly be obligation contested; its of the covered claims rights, and to that extent has all duties (vii) Refund to the member insurers in obligations of the insolvent insurer proportion to the contribution of each insolvent; as if the insurer were not insurer, member that amount (iii) provided As association’s assets W.S. 26-31-107 as- exceed its liabili- ties as the determines; sess insurers’ amounts board of directors necessary pay obligations association’s para- (viii) under Perform other necessary acts graph (i) subsection, subsequent carry purpose out the chapter, of this to an insolvency, expenses [emphasis of han- added] provision of the act is also Another es- Section 4. “Other” Insurance Claus posed sential to resolution of the issues es. In all instances where the insured consideration, (1983): our W.S. 26-31-111 holds more than one of uninsured policy upon cases The existence of WIGA makes the Laramie here tute policy specifically provides that subject of uninsured motor vehicle insur- No ny limits are first exhausted. The Allstate ance {See Insurance collectible insurance.” shall be excess insurance over Insurance claim settled for less than the Laramie obligation upon sured motorist tions of the vehicle,” subject to the terms and condi- respect thereof within the limits cause of motor vehicle where the 31-10-101, the term “uninsured motor ter shall Because any recovery of an insolvent insurer which able an *4 [emphasis added] covered person For (a) Any person automobile or non-owned automobile Wyoming’s “with coverage. until the Laramie Insurance on a under W.S. 31-10-102 purpose is unable to make policy co-policy WIGA relies almost has a claim claim, which insolvency. respect covered coverage, reduced coverage, under the insurance legal liability Allstate to defend or limits, statutes which treat policy. Any are shall first exhaust his W.S. a to a having collectible. Since this claim specified concerned with unin- other than a there was never an includes an insured provides: temporary 31-10-101, we also consider under this liability a claim the amount of p. payment of its insured amount under W.S. the Allstate therein be- exclusively any its insur- insurer Compa- infra.) substi- policy, also a chap- other -104 pay- pay. this case. law do not this and that the uninsured motor vehicle been written eral duty is a covered claim as statutes, insolvency. whether Allstate was sions: agree. its er, claim existed 103(a)(ii)(1983) and that Part 1: gally obligated damages which the insured shall be le- The Allstate contends its bined be construed automobile provides primary policy. will be recoverable to the full extent of separate premiums extent age motorists insurance or is entitled to re actual Such cover under more than uninsured motorists Allstate will WIGA indemnify [1] combined limits of all such parties agree minimum recovery, as to all other coverages damages of this rules and under Section 31-9-102—W.S. to to apply W.S. apply differently prior involved pay under the to mean that coverage requirements however, to pay sustained 26-31-106(a)(i). The the claim because the to the determination of under all this circumstance. We that the claim at issue regulations, defined W.S. 26-31- included these pay have been an instance such as insurance, in primary policy for an insured all policies except WIGA had a if because of: the accident. circumstances will be the com for the insured disagree it had intended will not exceed in one policies, policy would have the insured for cover to defend for which and case paid, policies. Howev- as to which provi- shall gen- Regulations, ch. XXI- bodily injury by any 1. sustained II, (1989), provides: person, and 31-9-102(a)(xi) (1) (1) accident, provides: any 1. person W.S. one one (1) (xi) person, limit for one responsibility” "Proof of financial ($50,000.00) fifty ability respond amount of thousand dollars means evidence of in dam- (2) bodily injury ages liability, resulting because of to or death of two from accidents oc- accident, (1) curring persons any or more one to the effective date of the subsequent proof, arising ownership, twenty out of the in the amount of thousand dollars mainte- vehicle, ($20,000.00) injury nance or use of a motor in the because of to or destruc- ($25,- twenty-five property any amount of thousand tion accidentj.j dollars of others in one 000.00) bodily injury because of to or death of respect bodily prop- or with to which there is a injury to or destruction injury liability bond or insurance erty, applicable at the time of the accident but ownership, mainte- arising out of company writing the same either has use, loading and including nance denied thereunder or is or be- automobile or unloading, of the owned comes a non-owned automobile. insolvent[.] [*] Hs [*] [*] [*] [*] Section 26-31-106(a)(ii) provides there is other insurance was deemed to the insurer of the WIGA If under this

Allstate shall not be liable insured once Laramie Insurance any greater proportion 1 for a Part became insolvent. The uninsured motor applicable liability limit of statutes, loss that the supplementing vehicle rules and in the declarations bears to the stated regulations, and case law cited WIGA applicable limit of of all total operate repeal would or override W.S. loss; against such collectible insurance 26-31-106(a)(ii) give if we were to them the however, provided, the insurance with re- quot- effect contended for WIGA. The spect temporary automo- substitute provisions ed of the Allstate or a non-owned automobile shall be bile provide coverage the insured is driv- when excess insurance over other collect- ing only apply non-owned automobile *5 ible insurance. there is no other where collectible insur- Part 2: ance. We hold that under the factual cir- presented cumstance here W.S. 26-31- Non-duplication Benefits; Oth- 106(a)(ii) eligible injured per- furnishes a source of collectible er Insurance. No duplicate benefits for insurance. son shall recover under the same elements of loss Affirmed. In any similar insurance. the event the injured person eligible has other similar URBIGKIT, J., dissenting opinion files a applicable insurance available and to the THOMAS, J., joins. which accident, recovery the maximum under not exceed the all such insurance shall THOMAS, J., separate dissenting files payable been amount which would have opinion. provisions of the insurance under limit, providing highest and dollar URBIGKIT, Justice, dissenting, with greater shall not for a be liable THOMAS, Justice, joins. any proportion of loss to which this cov- respectfully I dissent. erage applies liability than the limit of appli- hereunder bears to the sum of the problem majority The I have with the limits of of this cable opinion employs appli- is that it a selective other and such insurance. statutory language cation total disre- The Allstate included “Uninsured gard Wyoming Legislature’s State Insurance.” That section of the Motorist purpose adopted Wyo- intended when it policy included: ming Guaranty Insurance Association Act ” means: 3. “uninsured automobile summarily in 1971. Because it concludes (a) respect that the As- a motor vehicle with to the (WIGA) “step[ped] ownership, maintenance or use of which sociation into the is, specified Company there at least the amounts shoes” of the Laramie Insurance 26-31-106(a)(ii) responsibility pursuant Wyo.Stat. the financial law of the § (1983), majority derogates Wyo.Stat. state which the insured automobile is 26-31-lll(a) garaged, bodily injury principally no lia- while at the same bility policy applicable ignoring body time an bond or insurance extensive related respect underlying policy at the time of the accident with case law and the consid- any person organization legally support re- erations which a different result. automobile, sponsible statutory provisions part: state in for the use of such Those right shall first exhaust (a) poli- shall: his under the The association [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] cy”)- Next,

(ii) majority the insurer to the ex- summarizes the dis- Be deemed obligation positive of the covered of its basis for its decision —since this tent rights, to that extent has all and claims case involved a borrowed automobile —the obligations of the insolvent (Allstate) duties poli- Allstate Insurance ifas the insurer were not insol- insurer cy only provides any excess “over Further, vent^] other collectible insurance.” existence of WIGA makes the insolvent 26-81-106(a)(ii). Wyo.Stat. § Company’s policy Laramie Insurance “col- (a) Any person having a claim lectible” and Allstate thus had no obli- insurer under an insurance an * * * effect, gation pay. to defend or first exhaust his under shall majority appellate adopts argu- Allstate’s Any payable on a policy. amount ment in toto and without relying on chapter shall claim under this covered authority application other than a literal any recovery by the amount of reduced 31—106(a)(ii) and the “other policy. under the insurance 26— insurance” clause in the Allstate 26-31-lll(a). Wyo.Stat. § simple presented appeal The issue in this appreciate path taken fully To (DOC) whether “drive other car” cover- critique of majority, synopsis brief age,1 in the case where the initial insurance opinion Following is in order. majority insolvent, applied carrier is should be to a issues, stipulated appellate recitation loss the claimant’s resort before facts, concerning statements WIGA’s guaranty justified. The fund is ma- funds, operating purpose and source of jority strongly disagree. “no” says quotes Wyo.Stat. 26-31-106 majority appellate dismisses WIGA’s powers) and (outlining WIGA’s duties and *6 argument by characterizing relying it as provision the “exhaustion” 26-31-lll(a) (“Any having exclusively” upon a “almost “uninsured mo- person § * * * policy an insurance torist” cases.2 Without discussion of or claim policy. in Section of the Allstate 1. discussion of DOC and unowned vehicle condition II For coverage, Appleman policy Alan The "other insurance” clause in Section II states: see 6C John respect bodily injury Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac- With an insured and Jean 1979) (Buckley occupying A. an automobile not owned tice 4455 ed. and 12 Ronald while § insured, Anderson, the named the insurance under this Couch on Insurance 2d 45:239 (1981). coverage only apply excess shall insurance any over other similar insurance available case, motorist section of In this uninsured applicable to to such insured and such au- (Section policy the Allstate II —Protection primary coverage. tomobile as Motorists) Bodily Injury by Against added.) Uninsured (Emphasis recovery source of was unavailable as direct aspect policy I elaborate on this of the Allstate Eigenberger policy First, since for Christine A. emphasize for two reasons. I want to that only provides uninsured for motorist equate insurance Allstate seems to "collectible” (Melina bodily injuries sustained the insured Black’s Law Dictio- with "available” insurance. Herring) injured persons not for third (6th ed.1990) Lee nary 135 defines "available" as Nonetheless, majority (Eigenberger). accessible; obtainable; useable; "[sjuitable; quotes does not discuss the "uninsured auto- but present ready Having immediate use. for effectual; Allstate mobile” definition in Section II of the efficacy; sufficient force or valid.” however, noteworthy, case, It that added.) (Emphasis this since the Lara- In pol- provision insolvent, uninsured motorist in the Allstate mie Insurance was its in- icy clearly anticipates having provide "useable; accessible; certainly surance obtainable; was competitor protection insurance due to insol- ready present immediate for (i.e., vency company writing “the the [insurance use.” * * * insolvent”). policy] Second, is or becomes injured person in this case had if the Further, Herring compare driver rather than bi- the “other insurance” con- been automobile then, (which Eigenberger, question, policy cycle without rider dition in Section I of the Allstate insurance policy Allstate would have been liable for the Allstate “shall be excess states that argue any coverage and would not have been able to other collectible insur- insurance over automobile) poli- in the respect that the uninsured motorist ance" with to a non-owned added), body cy case law relied (emphasis and the whole of related with the "other insurance” body reference to the accumulated of relat- tral National Cal.App.3d Ins. ed case law3 and (1981)) the wealth of other au- Cal.Rptr. (“ Legis- ‘The thority appellate discussed both sides lature provide chose to a limited form of briefing, majority protection dismisses WIGA’s public, not a fund for the argument protection by simply stating that companies the court of other insurance agrees with Allstate that the uninsured from the insolvencies of fellow mem- statutes, rules, ”) motor vehicle regulations (Emphasis bers.’ original.) 19A See and case apply law do not in this circum- Appleman John Alan & Appleman, Jean stance. Consequently, majority sum- Insurance Law and Practice marily concludes that WIGA “furnishes a source of By collectible insurance.” this question The real presented is whether linguistic adaptation, the majority elevates the state fund has been structured to be “excess insurance over other col- the insurance resource of last resort or a lectible insurance” clause in the Allstate substitute primary for the carrier when the policy derogation “ex- primary carrier becomes insolvent. This provision Wyo.Stat. haustion” 26-31- decision should be determined clear stat- 111(a). utory language interpretive and not appli- Although provide WIGA was enacted to cation of insurance pri- exclusion or a “last resort” source protec- of insurance ority terminology. tion, majority affirms that pays WIGA There argument can be no that at the and Allstate does not. regard, place time and accident, of this the tort majority’s statement that “WIGA was cre- feasor, Herring, was by, insured and the ated to assure holder would victim, Eigenberger, protected by, was an protected in the event insolvency operational that was of an forgotten. insurer” is (Emphasis operator included coverage: DOC— added.) Allstate, a solvent insurance com- clause, unowned vehicle Allstate insurance pany paid by Herring provide compre- 017-171-172, No. FC9-645479. Ac- protection, hensive ends tually there were three insurance resources up being “protected” party as a result in effect at requirement that time as a By of this decision. no stretch of the financial responsibility Utah, law of imagination qualify does Allstate as the where written, the Allstate “policy holder” that WIGA was created to *7 of the state of Wyoming where the driver protect from other-insurer insolvency. engaged was in operating a motor vehicle.4 Ross v. Co., Canadian Indem. Ins. Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. (1983) In describing these three coverages, it (quoting Union Ins. Co. v. Cen- should recognized they that are not nec- California upon by inapplicable. tion, WIGA was I find no Establishing Statute Compen- Effect of justification conditioning availability for sation Claims Not Paid Because Insurer's unavailability coverage type for this Insolvency, (1984). 30 A.L.R.4A 1110 For the solely of accident injured party on the basis of whether the subject, associated Draper, see Jane M. Annota- third-party is a first or claimant. tion, Primary Insolvency Affecting Insurer’s as Although Eigenberger would not have been able Liability, Excess Insurer’s 85 A.L.R.4A 729 to claim under the uninsured motorist (1991). portion (Section II), of the Allstate she clearly qualifies as someone who received bodi- states, many In there would be a fourth re ly injury at the hands of an Allstate-insured source Wyoming. which does not exist in It is permissibly operating driver pri- a non-owned insurance, usually designated no-fault personal passenger vate automobile under Part 1 of Sec- injury (PIP). protection plan benefit See McMi tion I portion of the Allstate —that Robertson, Md.App. chael v. 549 A.2d policy governing Herring’s personal liability protection. For a clear Herring recitation of the pur- and all others who operative theory liability chase distinctions in automobile and result be insurance do so in part protect against exactly tween themselves uninsured motorist and what no fault first- happened party here. coverages, automobile insurance see Lo max v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 964 F.2d 1343 3. The case law on the is extended. See (3rd Cir.1992). Miller, Annotation, Caroll J. Validity, Construc- amount, long are do not know how in but driver had been essarily supplementary application. Wyoming, suggests order for in but reason her sta- always priority as primary college and excess insurance regulari- This is not tus was as a student. The is discuss. This subsequently we shall ty may with which driver have driven first is insurance. The stages or levels of Gay F. and Leslie the Otto Bolin vehicle is which, operation of insurance vehicle event, undisclosed. also the Utah acts, insurance responsibility financial policy complies with both the Fi- pri- is provisions, and uniform codes Responsibility Act, Wyo.Stat. nancial 31- § of its to the extent mary if it exists and (in (c)— particular 9-405 subsection course, assuming coverage. (This is, of and, operator’s policy provision) although first have PIP as the state does not phrased differently, provi- with the Utah always apply which would party insurance sion, 41-12(a)-402 Ann. Utah Code §§ level). Apple- 8C John Alan a first See (1988)(in particular 31A-22-303 31A-22- Law Appleman, Jean man & 303(b)(ii),which establishes the same crite- 5102.65, (1981). The at 511 Practice ria). coverage, operator’s level is second policy provided The Allstate a broad (UY) DOC, coverage, or unowned vehicle operator coverage, “coverage unowned actually provided in this case as * * * arising out of the use of a non driver Allstate. insurance to the primary AA— owned vehicle” which included a relative as first insurance resource is the The third definition, By Herring clearly an insured. coverage, which party uninsured motorist complied. Her status as an insured under the victim in this case since is not involved indemnity require defense and bicycle rather than a motor was on a Controversy is not at issue. the action vehicle, perchance policies, under some was confined to the claim that the state riding motorcycle. fund, replacement the insolvent carri- The fourth insurance resource is WIGA. vehicle, provide er on the motor had to pri- Consequently, the issue is whether the argues first. Allstate insurance, second- mary operator which is carrier did that since first level solvent application, through operator’s ary in exist, appear the state fund should clause, escapes liability policy DOC or UY as the written on replacement priority against the by an assessed earlier sought the vehicle while the state fund fund. escape required in the exhaustion of other statutory provi- insurance criteria of the recognition. require facts Some basic 26-31-lll(a). sions in subject with which this case becomes The pro- embodied is litigation interesting facet of this Responsibility within the Financial visions motorist cases the multitude of uninsured policy covering the tort Acts. The Allstate (UM), or UV clause and the dearth of DOC *8 evi- driver was a Utah No feasor cases.5 in All- provided was the record that dence us, A of UM cases teach with multitude essentially used an different exception of the state of Loui- apparent in Wyoming. than it issues We for Utah required guage exhaustion of available insur fringe partly concept or related cases 5. Some found, although none of direct relevant cases can be but ance or the broad based UM involving Wyo- clause in either substance ming DOC Pennsylvania insolvency to be fund law seems fact, only has been or Utah. In one case Donegal majority trend. See Mut. within specific which addresses this unearthed 574, Pa.Super. Long, 564 A.2d 937 Co. v. 387 Ins. relationship between DOC-UVclause cov- (1991). (1989), Although 597 A.2d 1124 aff’d erage insolvency of the automobile insur- after principal sources was one of the two that case responsibility. ing fund I carrier and the state Allstate, argument by the ma its nonuse carefully, the one relevant case have considered although logical inapplica my jority view of its confirms majority opinion. is not not cited in It statutory interpretation Wyoming bility to this clearly logically precedentially sound and decision. comply lan- does not with 472 operator on

siana,6 offending Nat. Ins. v. Protective vehicle Hickerson (La.1980), Omaha, 377 applied 383 So.2d should be Co. before state fund is applied first are faced payment predicate that UM benefits within the develops. exposure guaranty fund requirement provided by Wyo. before exhaustion Clarkin, 244 v. 26-31-lll(a). The Kansas court in Hetzel Stat. Essentially, 800, 698, stated: 804 Kan. 772 P.2d question relatively simple seems under only reported appears “Louisiana to be 26-31-lll(a), as the statute allowed the state has not jurisdiction which is, being rephrased Herring, “[any person] association credit for guaranty insurance having against a claim Allstate [an insurer] * * * plaintiffs from the recovered own sums shall first exhaust under [her] coverage].” motorists policy. Any [uninsured payable amount on a cov- recognized that: “The Loui- The court then chapter claim ered under this shall be re- Supreme analysis siana Court’s Hicker- any recovery duced the amount of under son, motorist that uninsured policy.” the insurance contemplated ‘nonduplication’ not There is a most recent Oklahoma case Act, provision Guaranty appli of its is not involving complex sequence of insolven- Hetzel, to Kansas.” 772 P.2d at 804. cable majority cies which uses the rule UM therein, cases cited sus Other otherwise compelling authority cases as view, taining the same include King v. Jor Welch, 847, In exhaustion. 776 P.2d dan, (Alaska 1979); 601 P.2d 273 Witkow adopted Oklahoma court had earlier Brown, (Del.Su ski v. 576 A.2d 669 majority under insured motorist rule. per.1989); Spearman v. Ins. State Sec. case, the current Oglesby Liberty v. Mut. Co., 393, 729, Ill.App.3d 57 14 Ill.Dec. 372 Co., (Okl.1992), Ins. 832 P.2d 834 a claim (1978); N.E.2d 1008 Lucas v. Illinois Ins. party’s prod- a third carrier on a 237, Fund, Ill.App.3d Guaranty 52 10 Ill. ucts claim was the insurance 81, (1977); Dec. 367 N.E.2d 469 McMichael target guaranty exhaustion fund. 208, Robertson, Md.App. 77 549 A.2d v. The Oklahoma court found a rule (1988); Vokey v. In 1157 Massachusetts requiring by citing exhaustion ten cases. Fund, 386, Insolvency 381 Mass. surers Id. at 843 n. 40. The court then held for (1980); N.E.2d 783 v. Ameri Wondra compensation worker’s offset exhaus- Family Group, 432 can Ins. N.W.2d 455 purposes tion that the carrier for a third (Minn. App.1988), overruled on other party products liability defendant must be grounds sub nom. v. Northland Garrick pursued recovery first before from the Co., (Minn.1991); 469 N.W.2d 709 Ins. guaranty justified. fund was Liability Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. State Co. approach I find that majority policy Kiser, N.J.Super. v. 402 A.2d of exhaustion of “other available insur- (1979); Armer, (Okl. Welch v. 776 P.2d 847 equally applicable ance” here to the vehicle 1989); Henninger Riley, Pa.Super. v. driver’s own insurance under the (1983); 464 A.2d 469 v. Sands Penn coverage. existent DOC See also Paul G. Ass’n, Guaranty sylvania Ins. 283 Pa.Su Roberts, Note, (1980); Insol- per. 423 A.2d 1224 Virgi vencies and Insurance Funds: Property nia and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. A Nonduplication Look at the Recov- International Ins. Va. Clause, (1989). ery 74 Iowa L.Rev. 927 S.E.2d 614 agree concept Oglesby with the stated applica- cases demonstrate that UM may that this court exception read an tion of benefits from the claimant’s own *9 legislature. into a statute not made the required is the state carrier before fund responsible. triangular We move here to becomes There is a result which is cre- stage: primary coverage another whether ated this decision. At one cor- exception subrogation by 6. The Louisiana was further distin- the UM carrier the in- carrier, guished Pennsylvania Henninger in the case of sured the insolvent which most state 570, statutes, Riley, Pa.Super. including Wyoming, v. 464 A.2d 317 469 would not. See (a). by explanation permitted that the Louisiana law 26-31-111

473 point inapplicable second principle ner is Laramie for decision coverage and now in- with the automobile which is application the of broad insurance corner is the driver solvent. At the second terminology to specific the constrained and (DOC/UV), at the third cor- coverage and private passenger in- automobile coverage. In deter- first-party ner is UM Initially, surance. this is the differentia- principle settled mining priorities, it is separate policies tion between may which if language that the policy law and vehicle classified primary be as and excess and insured, is not the driver’s insurance is provisions policies in the same pro- applied the uninsured motorist before first- vide for application levels of of the same coverage applied. party will be Further- carrier’s responsibility. The in- automobile more, available, coverage if UM is it must surance constricted within the crite- the be exhausted before state fund.as- ria of the Responsibility Financial Acts as obligation. coverage sumes Since DOC required driver coverage does not encom- applied applies, must be UM before and pass the of a concepts primary broad UM exhaustion required is before the state and another coverage umbrella insurer.7 liability, consequent- fund accrues it would In place, the first coverage DOC-UV ly seem even reasonable that without UM should not be conceptualized as excess in- involvement, coverage the DOC exhaustion surance, it is primary insurance as a second would be the before state fund coverage level to applied only after the obligation case, appears. this since we vehicle, insurance on the any, described if bicyclist have a victim rather than a motor is exhausted. If is no there automobile victim, sequences require vehicle a juxtapo- coverage, provides clause DOC-UV sition so that of a absence victim UM, primary coverage. or its half broth- vehicle, coverage is DOC claimed to er—under insured motorist insurance then, change positions time, for the first (UIM) either, not conventional excess —is jump higher to a than the level second it since is not behalf written on of the tort responsibility in after step instead of feasor, protection it is substitute written Frankly, before the state fund. I find no for the victim in the sense that similar first magic justification for this movement ei- person property damage your insurance on statute, logic, ther in terminology. motor vehicle coverage is not excess coverage, exposure Where there is UM property damage coverage liability hopeful- coverage DOC/UY is the second level ly provided by the feasor’s tort but, fund; if there is before no. policy. exposure coverage, by UM this court’s decision, operator coverage can then Conventional and primary excess cover- priority. move to last age general application definitions umbrella, major

One of the general liability, difficulties these and floater cases comes from Allstate’s utilization of a are 16 defined Ronald A. Co., typical coverage, Lexington For umbrella excess Vickodil v. Ins. 412 Mass. Wurth, drop requirement (1992); insurance where a down 587 ver N.E.2d 777 518 N.E.2d at guaranty application present precepts resulting policies sus a state ed, fund 611. Those from de- umbrella, floater, Washington etc., liability, see general Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. fined as Co., (W.D.Wash. F.Supp. provide Nat. high Ins. 1160 upon level based 1988); primary Wurth v. Ins. underlying Ideal Mut. 34 Ohio existence of a (1987); App.3d coverage, provide 518 N.E.2d Lechner do not the same character of Scharrer, v. (1988) (umbrella relationships private 145 Wis.2d N.W.2d 491 with the found passenger pri over a responsibility excess vehicular automobile financial cases, mary carrier). statutory require approved policies subjects In these where are PIP exists, and, not, regarding policy provisions coverage, ments were not at if it if the automobile entirely any; issue coverage, and the resulted decision from an insurance age if the driver’s cover- then, coverage; language third-party finally, examination of excess insur as London, Lloyd’s first-party coverage. gen- ance Luko v. Use UM of terms Pa.Super. (1990); Lechner, erally applicable primary A.2d insur- umbrella concepts designa- 429 N.W.2d primary at 492. This discussion can turn excess applied policy coverage into effectively limits versus tions do not automobile fit *10 reasonably relationship. amounts recoverable discussion. 62:41,

Anderson, four) applied on Insurance 2d levels of coverage. Couch There is § (Rev. Supp.1992): ed. at 55-56 1983 & only a classical difference in insurance character, protection Primary coverage is insur- but insurance also a coverage whereby, under the terms control in the latter significant case for liability attaches immedi- policy, aspects policy See, provisions. e.g., Bar ately upon happening of the occur- Transp., Inc., 499, tee v. R.T.C. 245 Kan. gives liability. Excess rence that rise to (1989), 781 P.2d 1084 where complexity secondary coverage coverage of the case involved responsi both financial policy, whereby, under the terms of the bility statute policy requirements driven only predeter- attaches after a concepts primary umbrella and car primary has mined amount coverage. rier See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. secondary A insurer been exhausted. Fowler, (Fla.1985), regard 480 So.2d 1287 greatly reduces his risk of loss and thus ing Responsibility Financial primacy Act reflected in this reduced risk is the cost criteria. secondary An excess or Having my impres- summarized overall operation policy will not come into in the sions, I spe- now focus attention on several primary coverage absence and excess aspects First, cific of the majority opinion. liability policies clauses in can context, although taken in only there are three be obtained where there is other primary coverage majority (which, sentences in the opinion available. Until such primary effect, time as the limits embody insurance majority’s attempt at exhausted, coverage are secondary cov- legal analysis) appear that to be unrelated erage provide any does not collectible and, my opinion, are unsubstantiated Thus, insurance. where insured failed to authority: available procure primary coverage, excess insur- person against No has a claim the All- could not policies. ers be held liable on policy until the Laramie Insurance Towing Whitehead v. Fleet Co. Company limits are first exhausted. The 449, App 110 Ill 3d 66 Ill Dec policy Allstate specifically provides that NE2d 1362. respect its insurance “with tempo- to a None of this discussion fits the automo- rary substitute automobile or a non- relationship bile where the better owned automobile shall be excess insur- level, PIP, exists, designation is first if it ance over other collectible insur- McMichael, 1157; Md.App. 549 A.2d * * * ance.” The existence of WIGA level, states, second in non-PIP makes the co-policy Laramie Insurance vehicle; level, specific operator on the third collectible. DOC-UV; insurance clause and fourth lev- I find these statements troublesome for el, orUM UIM. several Initially, reasons. the statement explanation One form of distinguish is to person has a claim “[n]o general excess limits such as um until the Laramie Insurance coverage from a with brella excess Company limits are first exhausted” re- clauses which is the financial responsibility legislative verses the Wyo.Stat. intent of statutorily defined automobile insurance 26-31-lll(a) essentially eliminates § policy. That is what is involved here. See language the “other than” in the statute. Washington Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. effect, improperly combines F.Supp. Nat. Ins. procedural elements in the “exhaus- (W.D.Wash. 1988), and its extensive discus tion” in statute set forth 26- Appleman sion of 8A John Alan & Jean 31-lll(a) proposition unrelated Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice that a Laramie solvent at 348 and at 385 primary would have insurer in been concept underly Both the business and the and, thus, this case “ex- ing insurance would need to be entirely structure is different genuine policies hausted” before other between excess sources of insurance (or might and the automobile with its three become available.

475 * * greater ”) signifi- of far *.’ Second—and v. Wurth Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., majority the “excess 325, 607, cance—the balances 34 App.3d Ohio 518 N.E.2d over other collectible insur- (1987)(“ insurance 612 ‘[Cjollectible’does not refer to language ance” in the Allstate payment actual a sum money, of of but legislature’s underlying pur- instead refers to the existence of other pose creating majority con- WIGA. applicable insurance based on the prevail that Allstate cludes should because particular question.”); occurrence see Company the insolvent Laramie also Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. is In do- “collectible” from WIGA. Co. v. Co., American Hardware Mut. Ins. so, majority I fails to ing believe that the 487 P.2d (Wyo.1971). 320 recognize what said in this court Allstate case, As I consider find that the Dept., 672 Co. v. Ins. P.2d Ins. central issue the “conflicting resembles 810, (Wyo.1983): 816 argument statute” by raised WIGA and an parties While the to insurance con addressed this court in West v. Wyo- right embody tract have the ming Treasurer, State 822 P.2d 1269 such they lawful terms as wish (Wyo.1991) (involving question of * * * agreement insurance must not whether the State Treasurer had a of pertinent public conflict with statutes or paid-out reimbursement for worker’s com- policy. McKay Equitable v. Assur Life pensation following benefits a party third States, Society Wyo. ance the United of wrongful recovery by death decedent’s sur- (1966); 421 P.2d 166 Insur Cincinnati beneficiaries). West, vivor this court Mallon, ance v. 409 N.E.2d paid homage to our well-established rules (Ind.App.1980). 1100 of statutory construction when argu- two question, Wyoming’s Without insurance ably conflicting statutes need to be “har- supersede any contradictory statutes insur monized:” policy language acts to that circum “ ‘If the of a language statute is clear the statutes. pro vent Just as is unambiguous, we must abide using from in its hibited terms plain statute, meaning of the but where a public policy; contracts which conflict with statute ambiguous, is the court will re this court should from also refrain constru sort general principles statutory ing policy language so as to con attempt construction in an to ascertain legislative flict with intent. State Farm legislative Furthermore, intent. it is a Mut. Auto. Ins. v. United Co. Services fundamental rule interpreta Ass’n, 133, 211 176 Auto. Va. S.E.2d 327 tion portions that all of an act must be (1970); American Ins. Motorists Co. v. materia, read pari every word, 53, Kaplan, 209 Va. S.E.2d 161 675 clause, and must sentence be construed simply By concluding pro- that WIGA part inoperative so superflu that no is insurance,- vides “collectible” source of ” ous.’ Paternity of JRW, Matter 814 the statutorily-im- eliminates 1256, (Wyo.1991), P.2d quoting 1262-63 procedural posed requirement that other Deloges v. rel. Comp. State ex Worker’s claim” insurance be “covered exhausted' Div., (ci (Wyo.1988) 750 P.2d 1331 26-31-lll(a). pursuant Wyo.Stat. Al- omitted). tations though expend both sides in this case sub- Furthermore, “[[legislative intent should energy stantial effort discuss what ascertained, nearly possible, insurance,” as meant “collectible the ma- language from the of the statute does viewed jority not hesitate to decide without light object purpose.” of its elaboration WIGA is source of “col- Harvey, v. 816 P.2d Compare insurance.” lectible Deisch and Moncrief Marion, (Wyo.1991). also Allied-Signal, P.C. v. International Ins. See (“Because P.2d Inc. (Colo.App.1989) Equalization, v. State Bd. insolvency primary carrier], (Wyo.1991). P.2d Statutes relat [the ing together underlying (primary) insurance cover- same are read age legislative was not the insured to ascertain Longfel- ‘collectible intent. *12 State, (Wyo. erty and casualty v. P.2d

low insurance. Section 102(1) Act, 1701.102(1). 1991). 40 P.S. § implement To purpose, the statute added). West, (emphasis 822 P.2d at the Pennsylvania established Insurance accepted complete disregard of our In Guaranty (“Association”), Association construction, majori- the statutory rules of charged it obligation with the of attempt no to har- ty in this case makes paying “covered property claims” under 26-31-106(a)(ii) Wyo.Stat. monize with §§ casualty policies by issued insurers Instead, 26-31-lll(a). the rede- that become insolvent. Section 201 of 31—106(a)(ii)by Wyo.Stat. fines sum- § 26— Act, 40 P.S. 1701.201. The Associ- § concluding that furnished the marily WIGA statutory ation becomes a insurer in of insurance when it source collectible place of the insolvent carrier to the ex- “step[ped] into the shoes” of the Laramie obligations tent of its on covered claims. time, Company. At the same 1701.201(b)(l)(ii). 40 P.S. func- § [The majority gives no consideration to equivalent Wyo.Stat. of tional 26-31- § 26-31-lll(a) Wyo.Stat. whether or not § 106(a)(ii) connection, In that the Associ- ] procedural precedent creates a condition rights, duties, ation has “all and obli- that must satisfied or “exhausted” be be- gations of the insolvent insurer as if that “step[s] directly fore in.” A WIGA con- Id. insurer had not become insolvent.” in trary result a somewhat similar case can is, duty pay The Association’s claims Palmer Diacon v. Montana in be found course, conditions, of not the Ass’n, Ins. Guar. 239 Mont. 779 P.2d 61 requirement least of which is the set (1989), two funds were involved. where 503(a) in forth section to the [identical impression is a in Since this case of first language 26-31-lll(a) Wyo.Stat. in ] Wyoming, of consideration how courts provision of the Act. That states the jurisdictions other have construed substan- following: tively identical and insurance pol- “Non-duplication recovery icy provisions helpful. example, is For Any person having against a claim Forbes, Bethea v. 519 Pa. 548 A.2d any provision an insurer under in an (1988), several accident automobile insurance other than a joined personal injury in a victims action an insolvent insurer which is also a the tortfeasor driver of a second claim, shall be covered first car who had become uninsured because of to exhaust his poli- under such insolvency. his carrier’s In view of cy. Any payable amount on a covered insolvency, plaintiffs also filed claim under this act shall be reduced provi- claims under the uninsured motorist the amount of recovery under sion the non-tort-feasor driver’s automo- such policy.” Bethea, policy. resolving bile insurance 1701.503(a) added). 40 P.S. (emphasis Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined effect, general In its the import of the nearly Pennsylvania identical versions first sentence in the provision above 26-31-106(a)(ii) and 26-31- §§ clear: if Even a claim is one otherwise 111(a): Act, covered the Insurance Guaranty insolvency The tort-feasor’s in- [the person’s right to obtain relief under the company] brought operation surance into statute does not arise unless or he until provisions Pennsylvania of The In- has, has rights exhausted such as he (“In- Guaranty surance Association Act respect claim,” to the “covered un- ** * Act”), surance of No- der an insurance other than the amended, 25, 1970, vember P.L. one issued the insolvent. An obvious 1701.101 et seq. That P.S. statute example of such a situation is where a give enacted protec- a measure of person has been negligently injured in an

tion to accident, holders and claimants who and, automobile being unable are faced payment with financial loss because of obtain from the insur- insolvent insolvency prop- tortfeasor, of certain may carriers er of the look to er, provision secondary in his own motorist insurer should re- uninsured applica- sponsible or in some other specific absence of lan- guage contrary. secondary ble premium insurer received a has for the Bethea, orig- (emphasis 548 A.2d at 1216 risk, secondary insurer, and thus the inal). CIGA, should be responsible for *13 Zappala, writing in concurrence Justice of the loss. quoted majority opinion the Bethea Cal.Rptr. Id. 191 at 104. legisla- See above, thought to also Palmer gave additional Diacon, by 779 P.2d at 64. intent: tive stop- a Intending the Association to be Recognizing the statutory context ex- of measure, legislature provided the gap isting Wyoming reflecting law and on Be- recovery a claimant who could seek that as I thea and read the Ross (he of a other than that under case, in “specific this fail to find lan- insolvent insurer must first exhaust his guage” in the Allstate which would under such 40 1701.- P.S. § defending serve to absolve Allstate from 503(a). provision legis- the This reflects paying Eigenberger the claim. With fiscally intent that insur- lature’s solvent priorities obligation, the restructured of we ers, obligated contractually which are to change the state fund from an instrumen- claim, primary the source of pay be tality public, the protect Appleman, 19A payment. 367, supra, at 10801 into a un- fund to § were The Association’s resources derwrite solvent carriers from natural busi- to be used intended unless insolvency ness risks of of other carriers. (1) by was: provided the solvent insurers The covered claimants should not be other provided by than that the insolvent less liability. carriers with established Palmer insurer, cover inadequate Diacon, 78, by 239 Mont. 779 P.2d 61. damages by sustained the claimant. The This prioritizes court two statutes to de- legislative provided scheme that As- sequential termine fund obligation. sociation would be the last resort for terms, if simplest Wyo.Stat. 26-31- § payment of a claim. 106(a)(ii) (as applied is first it is this Bethea, added). (emphasis 548 A.2d at 1218 majority), requirement then initial of Hetzel, 698, 244 Kan. 772 P.2d 800 and See conveniently is “exhaustion” eliminated.8 Anderson, A. on 2A Ronald Insur- Couch as a WIGA was established “source of last 22:27, (Rev. 1984). 2d at ed. ance § and, definition, there can resort” — nothing case, Ross, 142 An earlier California Cal. (other to “exhaust” left than 396, App.3d Cal.Rptr. involved an resources) you at WIGA’s finite once arrive primary carrier ex insolvent and a solvent Herring, by majority the “last resort.” In reviewing public policy cess carrier." decision, not first exhaust rights does her in considerations involved the creation of carrier, Wyo.Stat. Allstate. her Guaranty Insurance Associa the California Thus, 26-31-lll(a). when WIGA § tion, the California court concluded: of deemed a source “collectible insurance” view, Wyo.Stat. application In our CIGA Insur- a literal of 26- [California § Guaranty 31-106(a)(ii), majority operates re- created “to Association] Thus, 26-31-lll(a). Wyo.Stat. protection public. peal for the override” secondary in our of Contrary when insurer is available well-established rules construction, primary statutory majority opin- the event of an insolvent insur- Wyo.Stat. interesting the title to note that 12 of the saw fit to amend of 26-31- 8. It is Section Liability Guaranty explicit Property require- Asso- 111 to exhaustion reflect 26-31-lll(a). Wyo.Stat. § Model Act drafted Asso- ment in The title ciation the National poli- was enti- now reads: "Exhaustion of remedies under ciation Insurance Commissioners “Non-Duplication Recovery.” Although cy; one from more than tled claims recoverable association; substantively equivalent identical statuto- claim limitation." See 1983 House Wyo. ry Act, Wyoming’s provision in the Model 2—H.B. Ill at 904 and 1990 version of Bills—Part again legislature 96. in 1983 and Sess.Laws ch. Gillette, 995; Wyo.1978, of the related statutes 584 P.2d Appli- ion does not read all legislative Wyo.1960, ascertain intent.” Hagood, order “to cation 356 P.2d State, 803 P.2d Longfellow v. West, (Wyo.1991); 822 P.2d at see also Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of hand, possible it is 1272. On the other Canada, Corporation, Ltd. v. Y-Tex statutory language harmonize all of (Wyo.1979). P.2d satisfy legislative intent behind the recognized We have provi Wyoming Insurance Association bargain sions part become a con procedural require- Act if the “exhaustion” templated by parties Wyoming 26-31-lll(a) is first ment though actually the statute were includ applied. P.2d 273. King, 601 See also ed the terms. Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Annotation, Miller, Validity, Caroll J. Con- Cattle Breeders Canada Ltd. v. Y- struction, and Statute Establish- *14 of Effect Corporation, Tex 590 P.2d (Wyo. 1306 ing Compensation Claims Not Paid for 1979); Association, Tri-County Electric Insolvency, 30 Because Insurer’s of Gillette, City Inc. v. 584 P.2d 995 of (1984)and cases cited A.L.R.4th (Wyo.1978). use of regarding therein first other insur- Century v. Ready-Mix Company Lower & coverage. policy ance vehicle Company, (Wyo.1989). 770 P.2d Because I find that WIGA does would provisions Contractual cannot rise above provide a source of “collectible insur- constitutional and law. provisions express ance” under the in Sec- Association, Tri-County Electric Inc. v. policy tion I of Allstate within the Gillette, City P.2d (Wyo. persuasive existing statutory framework of of 1978). law, hold and case we should that the All- policy, provided which for It is well that laws settled which subsist liability protection injured of the bicy- at place making the time and of of a clist, should first be exhausted before re- contract, it is performed, and where to be proper. sort to the state fund would be part enter into and a become of it as though expressly referred to and incor- I would reverse. porated (Citations omitted.) in its terms. THOMAS, Justice, dissenting. Application Hagood, 356 P.2d of I, too, (Wyo.1960). would reverse decision of the case, I agree trial court in this with the me, analysis For the correct is to assume dissenting opinion Urbigkit, Justice of in that the Wyoming Guaranty Insurance As- join. really I am satisfied the case sociation Act is analyz- not available when 26-31-lll(a) by Wyo.Stat. controlled ing rights of claimants and the (1991), major fallacy in the majori- and the policies. insureds under the insurance It is ty opinion is the conclusion there is no that, WIGA, clear in the of absence there against claim Insurance Allstate would policy be a claim under the Allstate adoption because of the insolvency because of the of Laramie In- Association Act Company. surance WIGA does not ex- (WIGA). Wyo.Stat. 26-31-101 to -117 §§ punge the of insolvency Laramie Insurance The effect of the decision Company, provide it but does certain inject provisions is to of the Allstate rights parties results after the have gloss statute, upon as a rather been determined without reference to reading than as controlling statute exactly Wyo.Stat. WIGA. That is what provisions policy. of the insurance 26-31-lll(a) contemplates says: when it precisely This result is inverse of our (a) having Any person a claim usual rule. an insurer under an insurance oth- part a

The U.C.C. became an contract er than a insolvent insurer though claim, into written its terms. which is shall Tri- also a covered first County policy. v. City Any Electric Association exhaust his under the under payable on a covered claim amount by the chapter shall be reduced PORTER MUIRHEAD CORNIA & HOW recovery under the insur- ARD,

amount of Porter Muirhead & f/k/a Wyoming corporation, Porter; James A. Porter; Muirhead; Robert D. T. only makes sense if Chris statutory provision Kumor; Dodson; Joanne R. for exhaustion of the provide it is read to James B. Howard; Cornia; rights prior turning Dennis R. Gerald D. interpretation is Hopkins, individually, This buttressed WIGA. Steven W. referring definition Appellants (Plaintiffs), “covered claim” found 26-31- v. 103(a)(ii): (ii) unpaid “Covered claim” means an Wyoming, By Through The STATE of claim which arises out of and is within the WYOMING BOARD OF CERTI and does not exceed the ACCOUNTANTS,Appel FIED PUBLIC applicable limits of an insurance (Defendant). lee chapter applies which this an issued No. 92-73. insurer, if the insurer is an insolvent insurer and the claimant or insured is a Supreme Wyoming. Court of resident this state at the time of the *15 insured the property event or from which Dec. the claim permanently arises is located in state, but “covered claim” does not include:

(A) Any reinsurer, amount due in-

surer, pool underwriting subrogation

association as recoveries * * otherwise; *. appropriate language para-

If the apply

phrased proposi- to this case the

tion is: Eigenberber having

Christine A. a claim Company Allstate Insurance un-

der an insurance poli- other than a

cy Company of Laramie Insurance claim,

is also a covered shall first ex-

haust her under the Allstate Insur- Company policy. Any

ance pay- amount chap-

able on a covered claim under this

ter shall be reduced the amount of

any recovery under the Allstate Insur- policy.

I am permit satisfied that

language application to control the

statute is fallacious both as a matter of

correct law and as a matter of judgment

would reverse the of the trial

court.

Case Details

Case Name: Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Allstate Indemnity Co.
Court Name: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 21, 1992
Citation: 844 P.2d 464
Docket Number: 91-204
Court Abbreviation: Wyo.
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