*1 time, to the according allega- although, available at HIV-2 have created a test in the Pharmacia could complaint, tions routine Mr. Doe continued to have HIV Additionally, HIV-2. had a false again false and never following positive tests Thus, alleged to the facts according on the Elisa test. positive actor, a case in an this is not which complaint, the amended unsus- doctor, an such as a knew or should have known a disease and failed likely had or to have pecting person was to avoid transmission person party to advise that or a third See, v. Homes-Chester e.g., Lynch DiMarco contagion. (1990) Inc., (citing 525 Pa. County, of communicable avoiding spread concern of public policy allegedly who misad- concerning physician diseases a case as to the time patient exposed hepatitis proper vised a Allen, v. Skillings to abstain from sexual period activity); (1919) (citing policy public Minn. 173 N.W. to the who holding physician duty parents that a had from their after the daughter physi- contracted scarlet fever communicable). cian them that the disease advised was that the in the circumstances this employer, We conclude case, no to the of its Ac- duty spouse employee. tort owed in the questions negative. the certified cordingly, we answer QUESTIONS AS CERTIFIED OF LAW ANSWERED EQUALLY BE DIVID- SET FORTH ABOVE. COSTS TO ED BY THE PARTIES.
879A.2d 1097 Kareem WYNN Maryland. STATE Term, 115, Sept. No. 2004. Appeals Maryland.
Aug. 2005. *2 (Rene Sandler, Mercer, P.C., B. Stephen Mercer Sandler & Rockville; McLain, DC), William G. on brief for Washington, Petitioner. Graeff, (J. Curran,
Kathryn Atty. Grill Asst. Gen. Joseph Jr., Gen., Baltimore), on Atty. brief for Respondent. BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, Before
Argued CATHELL, HARRELL, GREENE, and BATTAGLIA JJ.
RAKER, Judge. case, court, In this we must decide whether a trial following mistrial, may dismiss an indictment in a criminal case in response to the State’s of a pre-trial scheduling violation that the Circuit Appeals held Special The Court order. Wynn’s County granting erred Montgomery agree prejudice. We the indictment with to dismiss motion affirm. I. stalled on traffic was July on midnight
Around com- as construction Montgomery County Interstate 270 This case three lanes into one. from merge drivers pelled navigated many who amongst from concerns two drivers accom- Humphrey, night. William convergence the lane in the middle drove daughter, six month old by his panied wife, in the his drove lane, accompanied by Wynn, and Kareem right into the merge Humphrey attempted As lane. right his opened passen- lane, Humphrey his path. blocked Wynn driving. Wynn about his Wynn questioned ger window *3 and Wynn then Humphrey approached Humphrey. passed actions. about his fellow driver’s expressed concern again stories Wynn’s and Humphrey’s at this point It Hum- that he could not understand claims diverge. Wynn window, comments, encourage and to closed his waved phrey’s a Wynn pointed claims that pass. Humphrey to Humphrey at him. pistol semi-automatic his events. reported called 911 and version
Humphrey after, Wynn car. stopped Wynn’s Police officers Soon car, he a a in his which had gun that he had acknowledged denied, however, that he He carry Pennsylvania. to in permit night, from the car’s center console gun had removed the five months. previous or in the even assault, of a use degree with first charged was Wynn violence, of a or a crime felony in the commission handgun tried Wynn in a vehicle.1 was transporting handgun a and arrest, degree Wynn's crime of first assault was 1. At the time (1957, Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.), Art. by proscribed Md.Code 12A-1, handgun a a in the commission of § the crimes of use of and handgun in vehicle transporting felony or a crime of violence and in jury before a the Circuit for Montgomery County. The jury Wynn guilty found in a transporting handgun deadlocked, jury vehicle. The and the court declared a mistri- charges. al on the other two Regarding charges, those two the court stated follows:
“Madam grant Court will leave to the State 30 days to decide or proceed whether not to further in this matter. All right. On the determination as to counts one two, and then the Court either on if will defer sentence there is to be a further proceeding impose to sentence if there is not to be a further proceeding as to count number All right. three. from today, you days
“So have 30 to elect and in you do writing the form of indicating counsel and to the Assignment if there Office needs to be a new trial set. It go any judge. could before It doesn’t have come back right.” before me. All later,
Forty-five days conference, the court held a status Wynn moved dismiss the outstanding charges. The following colloquy ensued: Thank It you. is not a matter of
“[PROSECUTOR]: recharging obviously. charges case are still out there and this is opportunity the first a trial get date the case. This is first by Assignment date set Office parties for all to come in pick a date. That is the purpose of the status conference. The date chosen time, Assignment Office is not an inordinate amount of time from the time the mistrial was declared.
“THE let me question. you COURT: Well ask this Did file *4 Line request by that the matter be reset? I talked with the Assignment “[PROSECUTOR]: Office. They called me about a week after the mistrial was declared if they and asked could go ahead and schedule a status (1957, Repl.Vol., were both set out Md.Code Cum.Supp.), § Subsequently, Legislature repealed Art. 27 36B. and reenacted 3-202, 4-204, provisions §§ both as Md.Code and 4-203 of the Laws, Chap. § Criminal Law Article. See 2002 Md. 1. I a status conference date and said schedule conference date. Well, to requesting proceed
“THE that is not COURT: or both. to counts one or two a status by setting I assumed that
“[PROSECUTOR]: in and set a date conference date we would come we would one of the reasons retry Frankly, to these two counts. that main officer in this case is waiting has been State it National has been Maryland a member of the Guard in he was to be called to serve. going unclear as to whether find waiting I have been to kind of out what Iraq. He’s I him and he is still again yesterday his status is. talked to is the first time this has been set for a available. This ready date and I am to pick— Well,
“THE I it is the first time it is set in COURT: know file a Line that said the State elects but all he had do was on the trial in counts one and two or proceed forward count one or count is that no notice was problem two. given. I assumed that this be sufficient would
“[PROSECUTOR]: to come into court a date. today pick “THE ... the indication that I have is that this COURT: trial was held on the 11th. The mistrial was declared on the 11th as to counts one Notices out to all and two. were sent 14th parties according February notify- Court file on on ing regarding of a status conference counts one and two this date. entry granted
“The Court notes also the docket leave they to the for 30 to determine intended days whether I should count proceed say on counts one and two and/or one two. and/or nothing nothing
“The file contains else and have received Anything you enlighten else. can me on? Honor, Your I didn’t file a Line.
“[PROSECUTOR]:
*5
“THE
All
I think that omission is
Okay.
right.
COURT:
fatal
and
counts one and
will stand
frankly,
accordingly,
two
prejudice.”
as dismissed with
The
to the
timely appeal
Special
State noted
reversed,
Appeals.
unreported
In an
the court
hold-
opinion,
ing
Court did not have the
Circuit
charges against Wynn.
dismiss the
a Writ
granted Wynn’s
We
Petition for
of Certiorari. 384
(2004).
Md.
“Whether a trial has the inherent to dismiss an indictment or other document for the viola- charging State’s a scheduling following tion of order entered a mistrial and objection by without absent a violation of the constitutional of a trial or a violation guarantee speedy (the 180-day Maryland rule contained in Rule 4-271 Rule)?” Hicks
II. Wynn argues a trial court has an implied power remedy dismiss criminal cases as a for the violation of State’s scheduling Wynn power order. describes this asserted as a “necessary corollary” the court’s inherent dismiss, control its own docket. Without the Wynn contends, a trial court would have no recourse when the State and, thus, violates scheduling order could not enforce its justice. Wynn role of that the deci- administering continues sion of the Circuit Court was a of its proper employment delay discretion. He claims that the caused him prosecutor’s distress, anxiety severe he did not because know whether trial, convictions, potential imprison- he would face a new ment. that a trial court responds possess does not a criminal authority to dismiss case for the violation a scheduling ability order. A trial court’s to control its
docket to a holding prosecutor scheduling order does not may lead to the conclusion that a court dismiss when charges In order. scheduling with a comply the State does alternative, if a court has that even trial argues the State *6 docket, case to control its to dismiss a authority inherent Finally, the prejudice. the case with may court not dismiss to dismiss power even if a trial court has the argues that State order, the scheduling a violating a case for prejudice with its discretion in this case. abused Circuit Court the mistrial and the short interval between given asserts inten- apparent good and the prosecutor’s status conference tions, a lesson—an acted to teach the State the Circuit Court dismissing charges. reason for the State’s inappropriate
III.
power
This
concerns the
of the inherent
scope
case
that the
Wynn argues
the trial court to control its docket.
its docket
of the trial court to control
authority
to dismiss criminal
for schedul
implies
power
prosecutions
disagree.
authority
order
We
Inherent
should
ing
violations.
of the
necessary
performance
be
when
to the
only
applied
judicial
enforcing
function. The interest of the trial court
order
the invocation of the ultimate
scheduling
through
of dismissal does not
such a severe constraint
remedy
support
State,
on
of the
the interests
representing
the broad discretion
Accordingly,
eases.
we hold
society,
prosecute
remedy
scheduling
Circuit
had no
the State’s
the indictment.
by dismissing
order violation
on the surviv
retry Wynn
The State had discretion to
jury
after
deadlocked and the court declared
ing charges
that, ordinarily,
mistrial.
It
a mis
is well-established
“when
or
necessity
trial has been declared as the result of manifest
defendant,
charge
with the consent of the
retrial of
same
the Double
Clause.” State v.
prohibited by
Jeopardy
see,
(1995);
e.g.,
338 Md.
659 A.2d
879
Griffiths,
667, 672,
2083, 2087, 72
Oregon Kennedy,
v.
456 U.S.
102 S.Ct.
(9
Perez,
Wheat.)
(1982);
v.
U.S.
L.Ed.2d
United States
(1824);
Wooten-Bey
Wynn solely relies on the inherent the court as support the action of the trial court. court While permit rules statutes federal courts and a number of state generally courts to dismiss criminal charges, Maryland has no rule or statute of comparable breadth. rules, the federal a court may
Under dismiss charges “unnecessary delay.” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) provides as follows:
“By the may indictment, Court. The court an dismiss information, or if complaint unnecessary delay occurs in: (1) presenting charge to a grand jury; *7 (2) defendant; an information filing against (3) a defendant to trial.” bringing Several states have similar adopted language to Fed. 48(b), authorizing R.Crim.P. the trial court to a prose dismiss See, cution when there “unnecessary delay.” is Alaska e.g., 43(c) (2005); 48(a)(2) P. (2005); R.Crim. Idaho R.Crim. P. (1995, Minn. P. R.Crim. 30.02 2005 Cum.Supp.); Vt. R.Crim. 48(b) (2003). P. parallel provision in Ohio is an even more general rule court dismissal covering objection over the of the 48(b) (2003). State. See Ohio R. Rule. Crim.
Other states have enacted statutes or authorizing rules courts sua criminal sponte charges dismiss “in furtherance justice.” (2005); § See Cal.Penal Code 1385 Idaho R.Crim. 48(a)(2); (Iowa 2002, P. I.C.A. Rule 2.33 2005 Cum.Supp.); (2003, § Minn.Stat. 631.21 2005 Cum.Supp.); Mont.Code Ann. (2003); § (1996, 46-13-401 § N.Y.Crim. Proc. 210.40 2005 (2003, § tit. Cum.Supp.); Okla. Stat. 815 2005 Cum.Supp.); (2003); (2005); § Or.Rev.Stat. 135.755 Utah R.Crim. P. 25 Vt. 48(b); 8.3(b) (2005). R.Crim. P. Wash. R.Crim. P. statute, Instead general of a rule or Maryland Legisla- ture and this Court have authorized trial courts to dismiss criminal in limited charges circumstances. Most often invoked
431
§
(2001,
6-
Cum.Supp.),
rule. Md.Code
the Hicks
Rule 4-271
103(a)
Article and Md.
Procedure
of the Criminal
circuit court
not be
may
trial
in the
that the
date
mandate
of the
appearance
after the earlier
days
later than 180
§ 6-
of the defendant. See
arraignment
or the
counsel
than
103(a)(2)
may
trial
not be later
that
date
(providing
“[t]he
of counsel or
appearance
earlier of
first
after the
days
[the
before the circuit
of the defendant
appearance
the first
“[t'jhe
4-271(a)(l)
that
date
court]”);
(providing
Md. Rule
days
...
be not later than 180
circuit court
shall
trial
events”).
Hicks,
In
v.
of those
after the earlier
6-103(a)
§
recognized
Since the of courts numerous con- the inherent recognized *8 Waldron, 683, 426 In v. 289 Md. Attorney texts.2 General 68, 95, 941, See, Conte, University e.g., v. 384 Md. 862 A.2d 2. Towson 210, State, 329, 360, (2004); Md. 859 A.2d 229 957 Archer v. 383 328, Roberson, 345, (2004); Attorney A.2d v. 373 Md. 818 Grievance 1246, 274, 299, 1059, (2003); King, Md. 799 A.2d 1069 MTA v. 369 142, 163, 806, (2002); Bregman, 707 A.2d 816 Post v. 349 Md. 1260 427, 419, (1997); State, 423, (1998); 421 v. Md. 701 A.2d Greco 347 886, State, 658, 678, Aggregates 655 A.2d 896 Maryland v. 337 Md. 161, 170, 232, State, (1994); (1995); 642 v. Md. A.2d 236 Chertkov 335 178, 1242, Stores, Watson, 4, Safeway 183 n. 562 A.2d Inc. v. 317 Md. McCann, 342, 352, (1989); 310 Md. 529 A.2d n. 4 O’Donnell v. 1245 432
A.2d 929 this Court described the source of inherent authority as follows: that, in the recognized past
“We have addition to the and functions specific powers expressly granted to the three Constitution, organs government by of the each branch additional from possesses powers perforce implied right Indeed, obligation perform its constitutional duties. powers existence such inheres the scheme of a constitution, written for without this the docu- authority, would, ment by necessity, exhaustively be but a tome cata- loging respective political sole institu- case, Particularly important tions. for the resolution of this 372, Sanzaro, 515, 526, (1987); 1080, 377 Turrisi v. 308 Md. A.2d 520 (1987); 290, 298, 964, Taylor Taylor, 1085 v. 306 Md. 508 A.2d 968 664, 674, (1986); 1042, Eberly, v. Balducci 304 Md. 500 A.2d 1048 McAlear, 320, (1985); 328, 1256, McAlear v. 298 Md. 469 A.2d 1260 (1984); Thomas, 605, 613, 1215, Thomas v. 294 Md. 451 A.2d 1219 (1982); Stillman, 390, 400, Discipline Comm’n on Med. v. 291 Md. 435 Ayre 747, State, 155, 160, (1981); 1150, A.2d v. 753 291 Md. 433 A.2d (1981); Clark, 385, 403, 411, Dep’t 1154 A. & Tax. v. 281 Md. 28, 38, (1977); Gould, Inj. Comp. 380 A.2d 42-43 Criminal Bd. v. 273 486, 501, 55, (1975); Scholl, Md. 331 A.2d 65 State v. Roll and 267 Md. 714, 4, 867, (1973); Director, 719 n. 298 A.2d n. 4 871 Austin v. 245 206, 211, 466, (1967); Holland, Md. 225 A.2d 469 Holland v. 224 Md. 449, 452, 380, Wethered, (1961); Tractor, 168 A.2d 381 Tr. v. Alban 224 408, 421, 358, (1961); Elections, Mahoney Sup. Md. 168 A.2d 365 v. 325, 335, 143, Hotel, (1954); 205 Md. 108 A.2d 147 Redwood Inc. v. Korbien, 514, 520, 28, (1951); 197 Md. A.2d 80 31 North v. Town Real 212, 216, 665, (1948); Boehl, Corp., Estate 191 Md. 60 A.2d 667 v. Cook 581, 589, 555, (1947); Lilly, 188 Md. 53 A.2d 559 Purdum v. 182 Md. 612, 619, 805, (1944); 385, 389, Bailey Bailey, 35 A.2d 808 v. 181 Md. 249, (1943); 264, 267, Godfrey, A.2d 30 251 Barnard v. Md. 157 145 A. 614, (1929); Vincent, 726, 1036, 718, 615 State v. 91 Md. 47 A. 1037 (1900); 25, (1872); Jackson, Dorsey Thompson, Hughes v. 37 Md. 46 v. 450, (1858); 385, (1853); Pegg Warford, Md. 12 456 v. 395 Brookes, 143, (1835); Boteler and Belt v. 7 & J. G. 154 Downes v. Downes, 598, 613, 1155, (2004); Md.App. Smitley 158 857 A.2d 1163 State, 477, 481-82, 315, (1985); Md.App. 61 487 A.2d 317 General Buick, Inc., 374, 389-90, Corp. Motors Md.App. v. Miller 56 467 A.2d 1064, (1983); Komorous, 332, 326, Md.App. 1072 Komorous v. 56 467 1039, (1983); 520, 530, Ayres, A.2d Md.App. 1042 Venables v. 54 459 601, (1983); Inc., Developers, A.2d 606-07 Md.App. Grant v. Allied 44 560, 564-65, Link, (1980); Md.App. 409 A.2d Link v. (1977); Propst v. Md.App. 371 A.2d (1968). *9 incidental, the course, come to be known as is what has branch of government— inherent of one power implied vested, police power its relation to the the judiciary —and the legislative Discussing in the branch. inherently, albeit democracy in in a struc- judiciary that inheres the power Wisconsin, ours, fifty the Court of over Supreme tured as of such authori- articulated the foundation ago, lucidly years ty: “ are they the for accomplish purposes ‘In order to which
created, also From time possess powers. courts must courts, immemorial, to certain have been conceded powers courts. have been con- they powers because are Such ceded, them could neither maintain they because without business, nor the accomplish their transact their dignity, * * * their existence. “The inherent purposes power itself; to power protect power the the the court is ...; the rules for justice power promulgate administer the none practice; power provide process where judicial is that the of this court power exists. It true was Constitution, but, coming being into by upon created Constitution, this court came into being under the with (State Cannon, 584, 221 powers.” inherent v. 196 Wis. (1928) Bruen, In re (quoting N.W. 603-04 Wash. ” (1918).)’ 172 P. (citations 690-91, omitted); see Id. at 426 A.2d 933-34 Stillman, Discipline also Commission on Medical (1981) the rationale (articulating from quoting passage for inherent the same Cannon). thus, concept authority, grounded of inherent is
understanding possess that courts must certain powers Similarly, order to function as courts. the role of the
necessary
protect
judiciary within
constitutional
Inherent
separation
powers.
authority pro-
courts the means both to
and fulfill
employ
vides
to the
granted expressly
judiciary by Mary-
functions
land
as to resist encroachments
Constitution
well
Stillman,
legislative and executive branches. See
291 Md. at
Comp.
(quoting
Lyon
Other state courts have
of court
and
articulated simi-
longstanding
power
source
have
See,
v.
e.g.,
Superior
lar rationales as has this Court.
State
(1954)
Court,
74,
887,
that
(stating
Ariz.
275 P.2d
889
78
“[tjhese
legislation
not from
but from the
powers spring
themselves”); Rose v.
nature and constitution of tribunals
(Fla.1978)
135,
County,
(stating
Palm Beach
361 So.2d
137
it
that
the inherent
“doctrine exists because
as an
judiciary
independent,
crucial to the survival of
v.
functioning
co-equal
government”);
branch of
Konrad
(La.1988) (de-
Council,
393,
520
397
Parish
So.2d
Jefferson
corollary
the inherent
doctrine as “a
scribing
powers
judicial
concepts
separation
powers
indepen-
and of
Tate,
45,
dence”);
442
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v.
Pa.
(1971)
193,
as
(justifying
powers
274 A.2d
197
neces-
as a
sary
judiciary
protect
position
co-equal
569,
v.
98
government);
branch
Wis.2d
Braunsdorf
(1980)
808,
power
813
an inherent
as
(defining
297 N.W.2d
function”).
cannot properly
“one without which court
Supreme
The United States
Court has held that federal
In
powers.
courts have inherent
the Court stated
“[cjertain
necessarily
must
result
to our
implied powers
from the nature of their institution” and
justice
Courts
powers
“necessary
described these
to the exercise of all
(7
Hudson,
Cranch.)
v.
11
others.” United States
U.S.
(holding
“jurisdiction
against
Courts across the
this
have
tained that inherent
should be
recognized
yet
“inherent,”
employed rarely. By declaring
judicial
power
courts
by
remove the
from control or limitation
See,
other
of government.
branches
e.g.,
Inj. Comp.
Criminal
Gould,
(1975)
Bd. v.
line of
(reviewing
“long
cases” which this
“has
consistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts
of the inherent power they possess to review and correct
an
agency
arbitrary,
actions
administrative
which are
ille
*11
unreasonable”).
gal,
such,
capricious
As
courts have
deemed
of the
prospect
expansive application
the
of inherent
authority
undemocratic,
potentially
as
invasive of the powers
branches,
of
legislative
the executive and
and detrimental to
inter-branch cooperation and harmony.
Roadway
See
Ex
765,
press, 447
at
100
(stating
U.S.
S.Ct. at 2463
that'“[b]e-
cause inherent
are
powers
shielded from direct democratic
controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discre
tion”); Stillman,
state constitution.” 786); Comm’rs, 241 N.W.2d at see also Lyon County (quoting causes a Pena, that the “need which (stating P.2d at 957 reasonably necessary be to invoke such must powers court Rose, (holding at 137 361 So.2d proper functioning”); its only be invoked power doctrine of inherent should “[t]he necessity”). of clear situations for a narrow are and the need magnified These concerns power is when the greater of inherent application and authority overlaps from inherent deriving claimed or executive branch. of the power legislative conflicts with a situations, power an inherent would application In such other or limitation from control power remove by the other possessed limit the powers branches would has described Supreme The North Carolina Court branches. inher- follow claimed for courts to when proper approach another branch of overlap powers ent with powers Facilities, 329 County In In re Alamance government. concerning power a case N.C. S.E.2d adequate county provide officials the court to demand facilities, follows: the court stated as judicial with as of the court must be exercised “The inherent powers usurp much concern for its potential it intended to usurpation for the is another branch as where other means only It a tool to be utilized correct. unavailable or judicial to the branch are rectify the threat ineffectual, be no more forceful or wielding must *12 requires. the circumstances exigency invasive than the of [*] [*] [*] necessary is reasonably to do what exercising power “In its the justice remedying of for the administration proper —in and coopera- a cautious proceed affront —a court must with powers areas its constitutional tive into those where spirit with those of other branches.” overlap an of between Accordingly, overlap at 133. eases Id. and a authority legislative of an inherent application asserted
437 the weigh carefully we must power, branch executive exercising necessity court and the interest in the interest of the other branch against power power. of its exercise unmitigated its docket is of a court to control authority The inherent 97, 111, See, v. e.g., widely recognized. Goins Osborn, 467, 550, (1982); 468 Parte 375 So.2d 442 A.2d 557 Ex 336, 364, Rivera, Ill.Dec. (Ala.1979); v. 198 Ill.2d 261 People (2001); 306, MacQuinn-Tweedie, 314 Macomber v. 763 N.E.2d Lillard, 131, (Me.2003); 493 v. So.2d 834 A.2d 137 Watson 85, (Miss.1986); 89 1277, 96 S.W.3d Honeycutt, 1278 State v. 151, (Mo.2003); v. 120 N.M. 899 Surgidev Corp., Gonzales Buchanan, (1995); 1044 Boston v. 89 P.3d P.2d 598 (Ok.2003). recognition 9 reason for this is widespread n. The to control ability clear: courts could not function without Pushaw, Jr., J. The Inherent their dockets. See Robert Constitution, 86 Powers Federal Courts and Structural (2001) courts could (arguing L.Rev. 854 federal Iowa their ability not function without the to exercise control over calendars, dockets, their through setting granting such cases, continuances, recesses, stays, consolidating and and that dismissal for failure to although arguing prosecute function). an docket control indispensable cases, In courts have held that the inherent Maryland civil empowers of a trial court to control its docket action as a sanction for the violation trial court to dismiss the v. See Zdravkovich scheduling plaintiff. of a order (2003) 295, 308, Siegert, Md.App. case after the the circuit court’s dismissal of civil (upholding trial, circuit court’s because of the appear did not party cases prevent the court’s docket and manage “obligation indefinitely”); Hossainkhail remaining from unresolved (2002) Gebrehiwot, A.2d Md.App. had the to dismiss civil that the circuit court (holding order discovery scheduling its failing comply case for with mange affairs on its “inherent based cases”). disposition orderly expeditious achieve an cases is enshrined courts to dismiss civil power Maryland *13 507(c),3 in Maryland Rule permits which the circuit court to 2— (cid:127) a dismiss civil case for lack of prosecution, with certain exceptions, year when a passed has from the last docket entry.
The United States
Supreme
has held that a federal
may
court
dismiss
civil case sua sponte pursuant
to its
to control its docket.
In Link v. Wabash
Co.,
R.R.
370 U.S.
82 S.Ct.
The power of
courts
dismiss civil cases based on their
inherent authority to control their dockets
recog-
has been
See,
nized widely by state courts as well.
e.g., Watson v.
Lillard,
(Miss.1986)
493 So.2d
(holding
“[t]he
power to dismiss for failure to prosecute is inherent
in any
court of
equity, being
law or
necessary
means
to the orderly
governs
3. Md. Rule 2-507
jurisdiction
dismissal in civil
for lack
cases
(c)
prosecution.
provides
Section
as follows:
prosecution.
"For lack
subject
An action is
to dismissal for lack of
prosecution
expiration
year
at the
entry,
one
from the last docket
Rule,
entry
other than an
ance”],
made under this
Rule
["Appear-
2-131
["Striking
or Rule
attorney's appearance”], except
2-132
permanent
that an action
alimony
subject
for limited divorce or for
only
years
dismissal under this section
after two
from the last such
entry."
docket
dock-
control of its own
the court’s
justice
expedition
*14
long
that
has
(stating
at 89
“[i]t
et”);
96 S.W.3d
Honeycutt,
inherent
the
necessarily has
a court
that
recognized
been
dismissing for
by
cases
in civil
that docket
to control
long”).
too
languished
a case has
to
where
prosecute
failure
(stating
Link,
631, 82
at 1389
at
S.Ct.
370 U.S.
generally
See
cases
civil
dismiss
power
the inherent
the fact that
that
many
the
...
from
apparent
gone unquestioned
long
“has
dismissals”).
sustaining such
court decisions
state
court to
authority of a
the inherent
of
application
the court
sponte
sua
dismissal
permit
its docket
control
in
civil
present
raises concerns
prosecutions
criminal
of
repre-
party,
is a private
in a civil case
The plaintiff
cases.
cases
of criminal
The prosecutor
interests.
personal
senting
in civil
interests. Unlike
State,
societal
representing
is the
to control
authority solely
cases,
of the
the exercise
limit the
prosecution
would
to dismiss
criminal
its docket
on
criminal cases
to prosecute
branch
of the executive
power
at 816
Braunsdorf, 297 N.W.2d
the
See
public.
behalf of
the
only
case affects
a civil
dismissal
(noting
“while
broader
in a criminal case has
a dismissal
parties,
litigating
whole”).
as a
society
for
implications
of
thus raises concerns
the
The action of
Circuit
branches. We will
judicial and executive
the
overlap between
in this
interests at issue
and executive
weigh
judicial
the
the
necessary
it is
conflict,
whether
and we will determine
recognize
judicial
of the
function
performance
of
as a sanction lor
violation
prosecutions
dismiss criminal
issue,
of the
we will
In our consideration
scheduling
order.
unnecessary
and
avoid
separation
powers
mindful of the
be
branch.
of the executive
powers
upon
intrusion
offi-
are constitutional
Attorneys Maryland
The State’s
(declaring
§
Art.
Maryland,
Constitution
cers. See
and
“[tjhere
county
for the
each
Attorney
an
State
shall be
”).
Baltimore,
Attorney’
‘The State’s
styled
to be
City
Yates,
A.2d 837
we
In
Murphy
of the
powers
of the
State’s
scope
and
origin
traced the
Attorneys. We concluded that the State’s
have
Attorneys
had
duty
constitutional
since 1851 to prosecute and
on
defend
of the
part
State all cases in
may
which the State
be
interested, subject only to constitutional
limitations.
Id. at
485-86,
§
A.2d at 843
Article
(citing
9 of the current
Maryland
Constitution).
Constitution and
Maryland
the 1851
This constitutional duty was derived from the common
law
statutory
powers
responsibilities formerly possessed by
Attorney
Maryland.
491-92,
General of
Id. at
In Murphy, this Court held unconstitutional an act creating
an office
Special
of
Prosecutor because the General Assembly
had no authority to reduce the constitutional
of
powers
the
State’s Attorneys and the Attorney
494-95,
General.
Id. at
“By Constitution of Maryland, Article Section State’s shall Attorney perform such duties as be may by law prescribed. By Code, section 33 of Article 10 of the that officer is to required ‘prosecute defend, on the part of State, all cases in which the State be may interested.’ crime, he must accused persons In such prosecutions the guilty between distinguish discretion to exercise a sound broad official must be trusted with the innocent. He causes, subject criminal prosecute to institute and discretion one not purely control. The office is judicial generally and discre- ministerial, learning the exercise of but involves rule, does Attorney the State’s general tion. As a whether a matter is particular prosecution not institute does that discretion in his discretion. Unless which rests or there is by statute duty compelled abused or such grossly exists, mandamus will showing duty a clear that such lie.” (citations omitted) (upholding at at 321
Id. A.2d to the of mandamus of the trial court issue writ refusal case); see also him to Attorney ordering prosecute State’s (1998) State, 106, 121, A.2d 349 Md. Beverly the determination is well-settled (stating “[i]t bring prosecu- if is a matter charges, any, criminal which discretion”); Babbitt v. torial (1982) that the circuit court had no (holding to initiate be- prosecution, counsel for appoint “to assume the State’s the court is not authorized
cause
and if to
to determine when
Attorney’s
constitutional
“abrogate
cannot
his
Attorney
and the
prosecute”
State’s
acquiescence”);
duty by simple
constitutionally prescribed
*16
495,
the
(describing
at
“A fair trial is the entitlement of the as as of an ‘People’ well justice accused. Our of criminal a system envisages trial accord with the law of the land to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The as the representative of public, may not be deprived trying person duly of charged with the commission merely crime to teach the of prosecutor a lesson his lack diligence in pursuing prosecution, being there no constitutional or statutory rights timely an accused to be involved. A tried trial course, judge has the authority, to control his docket. But, think'that we the action of the trial here judge went that, beyond authority. We believe in the peculiar case, particular circumstances of this the dismissal of the indictment did not meet the test for a sound exercise judicial discretion. We find it to be more according law; humor than more than arbitrary legal; more harsh just; than more capricious abiding by than the rules of reason.” added). 74-75,
Id. at
Id.
Court scheduling a for the court’s Wynn violating as sanction against order. THE APPEALS OF COURT OF SPECIAL
JUDGMENT BY AFFIRMED. BE PAID PETITIONER. COSTS TO in joins judgment only. BELL the Judge Chief WILNER, BATTAGLIA, J., Concurring Opinion by which JJ., GREENE, join. and case,
I
the result in this
but I believe that some
agree with
explanation
required.
additional
Maryland
the
that a
entirely
holding
I concur
with
Court’s
a
authority
court has no conferred or inherent
to dismiss
trial
has violated some
merely
prosecutor
criminal case
because
court.1
scheduling
by
of a
order issued
the
To hold
provision
control
empower judges
prosecution
otherwise would
the
device of
and
by
simple
placing arbitrary
criminal cases
the
in
orders —re-
requirements
scheduling
unreviewable
largely
that,
instances, may
incapable
in some
be
quirements
very
the
This case illustrates that
by
satisfaction
State.
prosecutor
To dismiss an indictment because the
problem.
judge,
a “line”
the time
specified
did
file
within
reasonably
expeditious-
acted
and
though
prosecutor
even
of the
purpose
to advance a retrial —which was
whole
ly
arbitrary
likely capricious
order —is at
least
well.
foot-dragging
The solution to
or arbitrariness
prosecutorial
(Emphasis (2001). A.2d 387 may properly manner in court
Therein lies the which case, in conformance in this judge control its docket. in the Circuit procedures applicable trial assignment with set, or directed the County, could have Montgomery so, he done the retrial of, for the retrial. Had setting a date faced would not be proceeded doubt have and we would no and been denied the prosecutor sought this Had appeal. with (or refused impetulantly) then petulantly postponement could, and, indeed, have been would the court proceed, to, required enter a guilty verdict of not based on insufficiency trial, of evidence. When a case properly called for the State is put to the burden of producing legally sufficient evidence convict, evidence, and if it produce fails to such for whatever reason, acquittal is mandated.
I can well a court’s appreciate need to in know advance whether a prosecutor proceed intends to with a new trial— there are always other cases pending and trial schedules need prepared be advance—and I problem have no with court, order, in a scheduling insisting that the prosecutor inform the court within reasonable time and a certain date whether the State to proceed. intends If the prosecutor order, fails with an comply such the court can simply set the case in for trial on a date it chooses and deal with the prosecutor’s ways. dereliction other A formal or informal remonstrance, a complaint to the State’s Attorney if it is an derelict, even, assistant who has been or if the violation is deliberate or particularly egregious, a complaint to the Attor- ney Commission, Grievance should suffice. In the most seri- cases, ous resort to the contempt rules be may appropriate. Dismissal of the case is not required to maintain either the dignity efficiency of the court.
879A.2d 1111 George Jonathan MOORE Maryland. STATE of Sept. No. 143 Term 2004. Appeals Maryland.
Court of
Aug. 2005.