43 N.Y.S. 31 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1897
There can be no doubt from the complaint — and the position was ' emphasized by an admission of plaintiff’s counsel during the exami
The plaintiff’s whole claim is based upon an erroneous view of his positiou at the time he was stopped. Kierst agreed to complete the work “ on or about the 20th day of March, 1885.” He testifies that
. It is impossible, however, for the law to overlook this breach with the same easy good nature. If the provision of the contract as to time is to be overlooked, it must be because the case falls within that narrow class where courts have always, held time not to be of the essence of the contract. .On this head Parsons .says-: “The court will always inquire into the time when a thing is to he done, as they will into any other part of the contract; * * * if it seems that the whole value, or a material part of the value, of the transaction * * * depends upon its being done at a certain time, and no other, or that the substitution of any other will subject him (one of the contracting parties) in any way to loss or' material inconvenience, then time is certainly of the essence of the contract so far as he is concerned, and the court will so regard it.” (3 Pars. on Cont. 384-386.)
Most certainly this case is of the class thus referred to. The defendant testified, without contradiction, that she saw the deláy .would result in her not being able to 'rent the building when the season'came. But it required no such ■ testimony to show that time was, here, of the éssence of the contract. It was manifest from its very nature that delay meant loss of rents.
■ Nor did the defendant, waive her right thus .to terminate the contract. It appears that she did not expel Iiierst at once when he ran •over his time. But this cannot be construed.into a consent that he might go on, in any event, until he snould get the work-done. An owner may be willing to wait fór a brief period without being willing to wait indefinitely. The continued failure on the contractor’s part to complete the work is a continuous breach of the contract,, of .■which the owner may avail himself at any Time. To hold otherwise would put the owner completely at the mercy of a dilatory ■contractor. .
If the plaintiff' seeks to recover upon a quantum meruit, he must prove' what it was he did which was not paid for under the contract, and its value. He cannot throw upon the defendant the burden of showing what he omitted. Hor can he escape, this result by contending that the full contract price shall represent the reasonable value of the contract work. It is no evidence whatever of such .value. (Gumb v. Twenty-third St. Ry. Co., 114 N. Y. 411; Kennedy v. McKone, No. 1, 10 App. Div. 88; 41 N. Y. Supp. 782.) He cannot evade a heavy burden of proof by calling his action one thing when it is, in fact, another. Though he sued upon a quantum meruit, his proof was for a recovery under the contract, and, by the course of the trial, this cause of action became practically substituted for the other. Hor was its nature changed' by the concession that the defendant might cut down the amount, so far as she.could, by proof of the value of the uncompleted work. The plaintiff could not thrust this concession upon the defendant, and take in exchange — against her' will — the right to call the contract price of $5,200 the prima facie value of the work' done.
It is true that considerable laxity has arisen in regulating the rights of parties to building contracts. Courts have been. quick, perhaps at times overquicb, to work out from the facts presented a waiver, on the -part of the owner, of rights he would otherwise have had against 'the contractor, by reason of the non-fulfillment of
As the judgment must, for thé reasons stated, be reversed, it becomes unnecessary to consider the second cause of action, upon the Morgan claim, as to which the evidence and findings, may be entirely different upon a new trial.
The judgment should be reversed, the order of reference vacated,, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the defendant to abide the-event.
Rumsey, Williams, O’Brien and Ingraham, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed and order of reference vacated and new trial ordered, with costs to defendant to abide event.