55 Neb. 9 | Neb. | 1898
Charles C. Garmong, being the owner of part of lot 11, in block 13, of E, Y, Smith’s Addition to the city of
The lumber company insists that this finding is not sustained by the evidence and that the judgment against it based thereon should be reversed. There was, it is true,- no understanding or agreement between Garmong and the company that the latter should buy the property and hold the title thereto in trust for the former; neither was there any such obligation imposed by law. Nevertheless, the conclusion reached by the trial court is warranted by the evidence and must be approved. Mrs. Garmong was not a party to the judgment on which the sale was made, and, therefore, the sale did not extinguish her inchoate right of dower in the premises. The estate acquired by the warranty deed being superior to the right of dower, and that obtained by the sheriff’s deed being subordinate to that right, the best interests of the company demanded that the two estates be kept separate so that its rights under the former deed might be asserted in a court of equity if the necessity therefor should ever arise. Whether the estate conveyed by the warranty teed merged in the estate conveyed by the deed of the sheriff would depend, of course, on the intention of the company at the time it acquired the equity of redemption. (Forbes v. Moffat, 18 Ves. Jr. [Eng.] 384; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, [1st ed.] sec. 791; Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Fisherdick, 37 Neb. 207.) There being, at that time, no unequivocal expression of intention, its purpose must be inferred from its acts and con
AFFIRMED.