OPINION AND ORDER
Thе plaintiffs Susan and Edward Wyant have moved to amend their complaint, pursu *921 ant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 20, to add an additional defendant, Nelson Maintenance Services, Inc. (“Nelson Maintenance”). Because the joinder of Nelson Maintenance would destroy diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiffs also have moved tо remand the ease to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). The defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) has opposed the motions and has requested, in the alternative, permission to amend its notice of removal to add an additional basis for federal jurisdiction.
For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs’ motion to amend is granted. Because the joinder of Nelson Maintenance destroys diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiffs’ motion to remand also is granted. Finally, the defendant’s application to amend its notice of removal is denied.
I.
The plaintiffs filed their complaint in this personal injury action in New York State Supreme Court, Nеw York County, on August 29, 1994. The case arises out of an incident in which Susan Wyant allegedly tripped and fell in the Amtrak waiting area of Pennsylvania Station in New York City on April 26, 1993. 1 Amtrak filed a notice of removal on October 7, 1994 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1332. In its notice of removal, Amtrak alleged that the Wyants are New York residents, that Amtrak is chartered under the laws of the District of Columbia and has its principal place of business there and that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. Thus, there was complete diversity between the plaintiffs and the defendant and the ease properly was removed. 2 Following removal, the plaintiffs filed their current motion to amend and remand.
A.
The plaintiffs contend that they have brought this motion because they only recently have learned, through discovery in this case, that Nelson Maintenance performs maintenance work at the location where Susan Wyant allegedly tripped and fell. (Pis.’ Aff.Supp.Mot. at ¶ 3.) Nelson Maintenance, a New York corporation, works under cоntract with Amtrak and is responsible for, among other things, the daily cleaning of the floors.
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that leave to amend the pleadings “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The decision whether to permit an amendment is committed to the discretion of the district court.
Gursky v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
Permissivе joinder of parties is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20. Rule 20(a) provides, in relevant part:
All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action....
Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). As the court explained in
Gursky:
“Under the Federal Rules generally, ‘the impulse is toward the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.’ ”
Gursky,
While permitting an amendment that destroys diversity jurisdiction requires a remand to state court, it is well-settled that a district court may, in its sound discretion, permit the addition of such new parties.
Gursky,
B.
The plaintiffs allege that they have a good faith basis for seeking to join Nelson Maintenance as a defendant under Rule 20. They contend that because their right to relief against both Amtrak and Nelson Maintenance arises out of the same occurrence and presents the same questions of law and fact with respect to any negligence that proximately caused Susan Wyant’s alleged injury, the joinder of Nelson Maintenance is proper. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20.
The plaintiffs’ case is based upon an allegedly defective condition in the floor of the Amtrak waiting area in Pennsylvania Station. The plaintiffs claim that because Nelson Maintenance cleans and waxes the floors, it could have caused and/or contributed to the allegedly dеfective condition and thus is an appropriate party to this action. They further claim that because Nelson Maintenance cleaned the premises on a daily basis, it may have been aware of the defective condition and failed to remedy it. 4 (Pis.’ Aff.Supp.Mot. at ¶ 5.) 5
Amtrak, on the other hand, argues that the plaintiffs do not have a good faith basis for joining Nelson Maintenance as a proper party and that their motivation in seeking to join Nelson Maintenance is solely to destroy the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. It argues that because Nelson Maintenance, under its janitorial services contract with Amtrak, is responsible for the cleaning of the floors only, and not the repair of the floors or the reporting of defects in the floors, it is not a proper party in this case. (Def.’s Supplem.Mem. Opp’n at 5-6.)
The plaintiffs have alleged a good faith basis for seeking to add Nelson Maintenance
*923
as a defendant. While the plaintiffs may not eventually prevail on their claims against Nеlson Maintenance, they have asserted ample bases on which to pursue them at the pleading stage.
See Rodriguez v. Abbott Labs.,
C.
Under Section 1447(e), courts have discretion either to deny joinder of a non-diverse defendant and retain jurisdiction, or to permit joinder and remand the case to state court.
Dinardi v. Ethicon, Inc.,
Each of the relevant factors weighs in favor of joinder in this case. First, the plaintiffs did not contribute to any delay; rather, they brought their motion to add Nelson Maintenance as a party within two weeks of their discovering that Nelson Maintenancе is responsible for maintenance of the floor where Susan Wyant allegedly fell. (Pis.’ Aff. Supp.Mot. at ¶ 3.)
7
Second, there is no appreciable prejudice to the defendant. While Amtrak complains that discovery is almost complete, courts have rejected such arguments as insufficient to preclude joinder and remаnd.
See, e.g., Rodriguez,
II.
Amtrak initially did not oppose the joinder of Nelson Maintenance as a party, provided that the case was not remanded. (Def.’s Aff. Opp’n at ¶ 7.) At that time, Amtrak based its argument that the case should not be remanded on two grounds. First, it argued that becausе diversity between the plaintiffs and the defendant existed at the time the case was removed, the Court’s jurisdiction would not be destroyed by the joinder of a non-diverse defendant. Second, it argued that the Court possesses an independent basis for jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1349 that would not be destroyed by the addition of a non-diverse de *924 fendant. Amtrak cannot defeat the plaintiffs’ motion with either of these arguments.
A.
Amtrak argues that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, remand is permitted only where the removal was, at the time it occurred, improvident and without federal jurisdiction. (Def.’s Mem. Opp’n at 2.) However, all of the eases that Amtrak cites in support of this proposition predate the еnactment of the current Section 1447(e) in 1988.
See, e.g., Skinner v. American Oil Co.,
Section 1447(e), which was enacted as part of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, explicitly рrovides that where a court permits the joinder of a defendant whose citizenship destroys diversity, the court is required to remand the case.
See, e.g., Amon,
The cases upon which Amtrak relies, therefore, do not provide authority for the proposition that this Court’s diversity jurisdiction is not destroyed by the addition of Nelson Maintenance as a defendant.
B.
Amtrak also argues that even if diversity jurisdiction were destroyed by virtue of the joinder of Nеlson Maintenance, the Court retains federal question jurisdiction. It alleges that because it is a District of Columbia corporation that was created by an act of Congress, pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. 8 , and more than one-half of its capital stock is owned by the United States, the Court retains subject matter jurisdiction over the action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441,1331 and 1349 even after diversity is destroyed. 9
Amtrak is correct that the law is well-settled that federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over suits by or against Amtrak under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
See, e.g., Lofurno v. Amtrak Nat’l R.R. Corp.,
No. 91 Civ. 5978,
A notice of removal is required to contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The notice of removal generally must be filed within thirty days after the receipt of the initial state court pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). A defendаnt may not amend its notice of removal after this thirty-day period to remedy a substantive defect in the petition. In
Stuart v. Adelphi Univ.,
No. 94 Civ. 4698,
*924 Courts generally agree that such leave [to amend a notice of removal] should be given only [when] the proposed amendments are technical in nature or merely serve to clarify what was contained in the original notice for removal, but not when the proposed amendment aims to remedy a fundamental defect in the original notice of removal or attempts to add a new ground for removal.
*925 Amtrak did not assert its federal question basis for removal in its notice of removal in any way. This Court cannot now, six months after the filing оf the notice of removal and more than seven months after the filing of the complaint, permit it to add this new substantive ground for removal.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motions are granted. The defendant’s request for leave to amend the notice of removal is denied. The plaintiffs are directed to servе and file an amended complaint within thirly (30) days of the date of this opinion. Immediately upon filing and service of the amended complaint, the Clerk of the Court is directed to remand the case to the New York State Supreme Court, New York County.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Plaintiff Edward Wyant has a derivative claim for loss of services.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise еxpressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending....
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
.Amtrak argues that becаuse the joinder of Nelson Maintenance will destroy diversity jurisdiction, its joinder is appropriate only if Nelson Maintenance is an "indispensable" party to the litigation. However, this argument improperly applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, which, in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), governs in this cаse.
The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), which was added to the statute in 1988, provides:
If after removal- the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). While Rule 19 sets forth the guidelines under which a court dеtermines whether parties are "necessary” or "indispensable” in determining whether it must dismiss an action because of an inability to join a party, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 does not incorporate or address this distinction and thus, the tests applicable under Rule 19 do not apply.
See generally
14A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3739 (Supp.1994);
seе also Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc.,
. Nelson Maintenance occasionally has notified Amtrak in the past of defective conditions in the floor. (Exh. B to Pis.' Supplem.Aff.Supp.Mot. at 26.)
. The language of the contract between Amtrak and Nelson Maintenance supports the plaintiffs' theory of liability. The contract states that housekeeping is "not considered merely an esthetic function by Amtrak; its proper execution is understood to be vital to safety[,] efficiency, and the financial success of Amtrak as a transportation business-” (Exh. C. to Pis.’ Aff. Supp.Mot. at 9.)
. This balancing test is based оn that used by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Hensgens
v.
Deere & Co.,
. The Court previously had ordered that additional parties be added by February 3, 1995; the plаintiffs filed their motion on February 1, 1995, seeking additional time to add Nelson Maintenance as a party.
. This statute was repealed on July 5, 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994) and now is covered generally in 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 24301.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 provides:
The district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action by or against any corporation upon the ground that it was incorporated by or under an Act of Congress, unless the United States is the owner of more than one-half of its capital stock.
28 U.S.C. § 1349.