MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is a motion filed by defendant Kenneth Salazar, the Secretary for the U.S. Department of Interior, to transfer venue of this case to the District of Kansas. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff Wyandotte Nation, a federally-recognized Indian Tribe based in Oklahoma, initiated the instant litigation against the defendant, alleging that he has failed in a timely manner to accept a tract of land located in Kansas into trust for the Wyandotte Nation’s benefit “as specifically required by” the Land Claim Settlement Act, Public Law 98-602, 98 Stat. 8149 (1984). The defendant contends that this case should be transferred to the District of Kansas, where the property is located, because it involves a matter of significant local interest and the District of Columbia has no particular connection to this dispute. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to transfer this case to the District of Kansas is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 26, 2011, plaintiff Wyandotte Nation, a federally-recognized Indian Tribe headquartered in Wyandotte, Oklahoma, filed this action challenging the Department of Interior’s alleged failure to accept title to a tract of land known as the “Park City Land” into a trust created for *263 the Nation’s benefit as required by the Land Claim Settlement Act, Public Law 98-602, 98 Stat. 3149 (1984). Compl., ECF No. 1.
This Act provides a mechanism to satisfy certain judgments entered by the Indian Claims Commission in favor of the plaintiff and against the United States. Specifically, the Act provides “for the use and distribution of certain funds awarded the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma,” and, among other things, mandated that “[a] sum of $100,000 ... shall be used for the purchase of real property which shall be held in trust by the Secretary [of the Interior] for the benefit of [the] Tribe” (“Land Purchase Funds”). Public Law 98-602, §§ 101(b); 105(b)(1).
The plaintiff alleges that, on November 25, 1992, it purchased a tract of land in Park City, Kansas (“Park City Land”) with Land Purchase Funds. Compl. ¶ 16. The plaintiff then submitted, on January 21, 1993, an application requesting that the defendant take the Park City Land into trust pursuant to the Land Claim Settlement Act. Id. ¶ 17. This request was transmitted from a Department of Interior (“DOI”) field office to the Washington, D.C. office for further review on February 19, 1993. Id. ¶ 18. No action, however, was taken by the defendant.
In 1995, the plaintiff states that it purchased a second tract of land with Land Purchase Funds in Kansas City, Kansas (the “Shriner Tract”) and requested the defendant to accept that tract of land into trust.
Id.
¶¶ 20-21. In 1996, the defendant accepted the Shriner Tract of land into trust, and approved gaming activities on that property under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701,
et seq. Id.
¶ 24;
see also Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton,
Following remand, in 2002, the DOI determined that the Shriner Tract was purchased with Land Purchase Funds and affirmed its decision to accept the property into trust.
See Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius,
During the pendency of litigation involving the Shriner Tract, on April 13, 2006, the plaintiff resubmitted its application to have the Park City Land purchased in 1992 taken into trust pursuant to the Land Claim Settlement Act. Compl. ¶ 27; Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 6, at 4. Like the Shriner Tract, the plaintiff intends to operate a gaming facility on the Park City Land. See Def.’s Mot. Transfer, ECF No. 6, Ex. C, Wyandotte Resolution No. 06-04-13 (Apr. 13, 2006). The defendant, however, has not acted on the plaintiffs revived application. Compl. ¶¶ 31-32; Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 6, at 4. The plaintiff alleges that “despite the Nation’s repeated requests and its undeniable need for prompt action, the Secretary has refused to act on the Park City Land trust acquisition, to provide any reasonable explanation for his delay, or even to specify a date by which he will act.” Compl. ¶3 1. Consequently, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 26, 2011, seeking a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to compel the defendant to accept trust title to the Park City Land (Count I); a finding that the defendant violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. (Count II); and a determination that the defendant breached his trust obligations to the plaintiff (Count III). Compl. ¶¶ 33-50.
On September 9, 2011, prior to filing an Answer, the defendant moved to transfer this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, where the Park City Land is located. 1 ECF No. 6. Shortly thereafter, on September 20, 2011, the state of Kansas filed a motion to intervene in this case. ECF No. 7. Both of these motions are currently pending before the Court.
As explained below, the Court agrees with the defendant that transfer to the District of Kansas is warranted given that the District of Columbia has no significant connection to this case, and this matter involves an issue that will impact considerably the local Kansas community. Given this conclusion, the Court will not address the State of Kansas’ motion to intervene, leaving determination of Kansas’ request to the district court in the District of Kansas.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, a district court may transfer a case to another district “[f|or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court may only transfer a case to another district “where
*265
it might have been brought.”
Id.
This statute “vests discretion in the District Court to adjudicate motions for transfer on an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’ ”
Otter v. Salazar,
III. DISCUSSION
The defendant argues that this case should be transferred to the District of Kansas because the decision to accept the Park City Land into trust pursuant to the Land Claim Settlement Act is a matter of a great interest to the local Kansas community, and the case has no significant connection to the District of Columbia. Consideration of the public and private interest factors at issue in the case demonstrates that transfer is warranted.
A. The District of Kansas Has Jurisdiction Over This Case
As a threshold issue, transfer of venue pursuant to Section 1404(a) is only permissible if the receiving district is one where the case could have been brought in the first instance.
See Van Dusen v. Barrack,
Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) provides that venue is proper in any judicial district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated.” With regards to the present case, as the defendant points out, “the subject of the Tribe’s land-into-trust application and complaint is located entirely within the State of Kansas.” Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 6, at 6-7; Compl. ¶ 16. Indeed, the plaintiff does not dispute that this action could have been brought in the District Court of Kansas. Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Transfer Venue (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF 10, at 4. Given that the District Court of Kansas would have subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute, and that venue would be proper in that court, this case may have been brought in, and accordingly may be transferred to, that district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court will now turn to analysis of the relevant public and private interest factors.
*266 B. The Public Interest Factors Weigh in Favor of Defendant’s Motion to Transfer
Courts typically consider three public interest factors when evaluating a motion to transfer venue: (1) the local interest in making local decisions regarding local controversies; (2) the potential transferee court’s familiarity with the governing law; and (3) the relative congestion of the transferee and transferor courts.
Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Agric.,
1. This Case Involves an Issue of Significant Local Interest
Central to the Court’s determination that this case should be transferred to the District of Kansas is that this dispute is a matter of significant interest to the local Kansas community. As the Supreme Court has noted, “in cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.”
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
The plaintiff argues that the there is no local interest in deciding the controversy because “[tjhis Court is being asked only to direct the Secretary to take land into trust as required by P.L. 98-602.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 10, at 6. The plaintiff contends that the local interest as it pertains to the Park City Land is only whether the plaintiff may open a gaming establishment on property taken into DOI trust, and this issue was resolved “during the twelve long years of litigation involving the Shriner’s Tract [and] ... has been finally and forever resolved in the Kansas litigations.” Id. The Court is not persuaded.
Regardless of the implications of the Shriner Tract litigation on the present suit, the resolution of this controversy will directly impact Kansas and the community adjacent to the Park City Land property. As the defendant notes, “[acquisition of the property into trust would establish tribal sovereignty over the land, thereby implicating considerable economic, political, and legal interests.” Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 6, at 7-8. Such affects would
*267
include “changes to criminal or civil jurisdiction, tax revenue losses, changes to zoning and land use, and other related concerns.” Def.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Transfer, ECF No. 13, at 2. The court in
Shawnee Tribe v. United States,
2. The District of Kansas is Familiar with this Dispute
The second public interest factor also favors transfer of the present controversy to the District of Kansas. Although “all federal courts are presumed to be equally familiar with the law governing federal statutory claims,”
Miller v. Insulation Contractors, Inc.,
First, litigation involving the plaintiff and the defendant regarding the plaintiffs rights under the Land Claim Settlement Act has been ongoing in the District of Kansas since 1996, when Kansas and other tribes challenged the defendant’s actions regarding the Shriner Trust.
See Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri, v. Babbitt,
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in
Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton,
Finally, the plaintiff argues that “the Kansas courts have no experience with the issue in this case (use of P.L. 98-602 funds to purchase land) as evidenced by the remand of that issue to the Secretary every time it was raised.”
See
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 10, at 4. Not only is this argument incorrect, but in fact the converse is true. While the District of Kansas has on prior occasions remanded proceedings involving Pub.L. 98-602 funds to the DOI, this fact shows that that court has familiarity with the both the legal issues involved and the DOI’s administrative decision-making process. The District of Kansas’ experience in resolving tribal land allocation issues in these cases, involving both the plaintiff and the defendant as litigants, strongly demonstrates that, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, this case should be transferred to the District of Kansas.
See Shauwnee Tribe,
C. Private Interest Factors Also Weigh in Favor of Defendant’s Motion to Transfer
As noted above, the private interest factors that courts typically consider are: (1) the plaintiffs choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) where the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to the sources of proof.
See Bederson,
1. The Parties’ Choice of Forum
“A plaintiffs choice of forum is afforded great deference, and is a paramount consideration in any determination of a motion to transfer.”
Shawnee Tribe,
Here, the plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to little deference because the plaintiff neither resides, nor has any substantial connections to this forum. The plaintiff, a federally-recognized Indian Tribe, maintains its seat of tribal govern *269 ment in the State of Oklahoma. Moreover, the property the subject of this dispute, Park City Land, is located entirely within the jurisdiction of the District of Kansas. The plaintiff contends, however, that its choice of forum is nonetheless entitled to deference because this court has “a [particular [ijnterest in [ejnsuring that [flederal [executive [officials in the Nation’s [cjapital [discharge their [statutory [djuties.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 10, at 11. This argument is of little significance to the Court’s consideration of the instant motion to transfer.
As courts in this district have routinely recognized, the involvement of a federal agency located in Washington, D.C. and its officials in a particular dispute does not necessarily militate against transfer to another district.
Shawnee Tribe,
Unlike
The Wilderness Society,
in this case there is no evidence of the Secretary of Interior’s personal involvement and the agency action in dispute appears to be a “run-of-the-mill” administrative decision that does not appear to have any national implications, but considerably affects the local interests in Kansas.
See Wyandotte,
No. 04-cv-1727, slip op. at 9 (concluding in another case brought by plaintiff Wyandotte Nation in the District of Columbia that the dispute did not implicate the same concerns that mitigated against transfer in
The Wilderness
Society);
Airport Working Grp. of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. Dep’t of Defense,
2. Where the Claim Arose
Although the present lawsuit involves a challenge to the DOI’s decision-making
*270
process, the plaintiffs claims did not arise out
of
the District of Columbia, but from the State of Kansas, where the Park City Land property is located.
See Wyandotte,
No. 04-cv-1727, slip op. at 8-9 (concluding that the dispute over a parcel of land arose in Kansas even though some agency decisions were made in Washington, D.C.);
Shawnee Tribe,
3. Convenience of Parties and Witnesses
In addition to consideration of the plaintiffs choice of forum, and the location where the plaintiffs claims arose, the Court additionally considers the convenience of the parties and potential witnesses. That said, “[c]ourts recognize that litigating in a particular forum is likely to inconvenience one party or another unless all the parties reside in the chosen district.”
H & R Block,
The Court concludes that transfer to the District of Kansas would increase the convenience of the parties because it is the jurisdiction in which the Park City Land is located. As the defendant notes, the plaintiff had little difficulty litigating in the District of Kansas in prior suits involving the plaintiff and the defendant. Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 6, at 7. Moreover, the defendant, as the moving party and the only party residing in the District of Columbia, clearly does not anticipate any issues of convenience associated with transferring the litigation to Kansas. Although the Court notes that plaintiffs counsel is located in Washington, D.C., “[t]he location of counsel carries little, if any, weight in an analysis under § 1404(a).”
Wyandotte,
No. 04-cv-1727, slip op. at 10 (citing
Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp.,
As to the convenience of the potential witnesses in this case, that factor is of little weight since the plaintiff seeks review of an agency administrative decision.
See id.
at 10-11. Where the plaintiff seeks administrative review of an agency decision, the “convenience to the witnesses, is of little or no relevance since this is a review of an administrative decision that will be limited to the record.”
Id.; Trout Unlimited,
4. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
The plaintiff contends that the “witness and documentation necessary to address these factors [regarding whether agency
*271
delay qualifies as unreasonable] are uniquely in Washington, D.C.” Pl.’s Opp’n, EOF No. 10, at 12. The defendant downplays this issue, asserting that this factor has “little applicability here” and, in any event, the defendant “is fully prepared to litigate this matter in Kansas.” Def.’s Mem., EOF No. 13, at 10 n. 6. With respect to the location of documents, in this digital age of easy and instantaneous electronic transfer of data, the Court does not find that the “ease of access to sources of proof’ factor carries any weight in the transfer analysis. This is particularly true in a case where both sides are sophisticated litigants and have the necessary resources to manage and exchange documents electronically.
See H & R Block,
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered the public and private interest factors implicated in the defendant’s motion to transfer, the Court concludes that transfer is warranted. Given the significant local interests at stake, the District of Kansas’ familiarity with litigation involving the plaintiff and the defendant, and the relatively minimal inconvenience to the parties, this case should be transferred to the District of Kansas. Accordingly, for the reasons explicated above, the Court grants the defendant’s motion to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Kansas.
Notes
. In its motion to transfer, the defendant requested an extension of time for it to respond to the Complaint until ten days after the Court's decision on the motion to transfer in order to "avoid uneconomically proceeding with case scheduling." Def.'s Mot. Transfer, ECF No. 6, at 1. Given the Court’s conclusion that this case should be transferred, the Court will not address this request and leave further scheduling issues in this case to the discretion of the District of Kansas.
. With regard to the relative congestion of the transferee and transferor court, the Court concludes that this factor is neutral in the present case. As the defendant notes, "[s]tatistics on federal case loads show that the time necessary to resolve a case in the District of Kansas (8.7 months) is nearly identical to that required in the District of Columbia (8.4 months). See 2010 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-5: Median Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/ FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics2010.aspx (last visited on Sept. 7, 2011).” Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 6, at 10.
. As previously noted, the Court withholds judgment on the State of Kansas' Motion to Intervene as the Court is transferring the suit to the District of Kansas.