179 A.D.2d 502 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1992
Plaintiff in action No. 1 is an architectural firm, which rendered services to defendant Harlem Interfaith Counseling Services (HICS) with respect to the rehabilitation of certain property owned by HICS, pursuant to a June 8, 1977 contract between those two parties. Plaintiff in action No. 2 is a real estate development consulting firm, which rendered services to HICS with respect to the same project under a January 1, 1978 contract between those two parties. Services under these agreements commenced in 1976, but groundbreaking did not occur until 1982, after HICS and UDC allegedly orally agreed that UDC would fund and control the project.
In 1989, the two plaintiffs filed mechanic’s liens against the defendants. The second cause of action against Mt. Morris and its parent UDC alleges that although neither executed the contracts here in issue, after 1983 UDC "controlled the purse strings and the construction” of the project, that plaintiffs were accountable to UDC, and that UDC held funds earmarked for the discharge of HICS’s obligations to plaintiffs. Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought foreclosure of their mechanic’s liens. Plaintiffs alternatively alleged that if the liens were void, then the defendants were liable in quasi-contract by reason of their control over HICS and the direction they exercised over plaintiffs’ services. A third cause of action alleged accounts stated against all defendants except PJR Construction Corp., the general contractor.
After answering, Mt. Morris, UDC and the State of New York (the State defendants) moved in each action to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The IAS court granted the motions to the extent of dismissing the third causes of action against those defendants, and otherwise denied the motions. The court recognized that plaintiffs had not alleged any agreement or contractual relationship between them and the State defendants, but nevertheless perceived a cause of action based upon promissory estoppel (see, Swerdloff v Mobil Oil Corp., 74 AD2d 258, lv denied 50 NY2d 913).
On appeal, plaintiffs concede that their Lien Law claims cannot survive, and those claims are accordingly dismissed. The IAS court’s promissory estoppel theory must also be rejected, because the record is devoid of the requisite allegation or evidence of a clear promise by defendants UDC or Mt. Morris to be obligated to the plaintiffs (Ripple’s of Clearview v Le Havre Assocs., 88 AD2d 120, lv denied 57 NY2d 609).