38 Kan. 31 | Kan. | 1887
Opinion by
On the 6th day of December, 1884, the plaintiffs in error commenced an action in the district court of Lyon county. Their petition set forth three alleged causes of action; the first two were on promissory notes, the third on an account. All were alleged to be due in the petition, but the fact was that the account set forth in the third cause of action was not due at the time of the commencement of the action, and did not become due until the 10th day of January, 1885. An order of attachment was issued at the commencement of the action, and levied on certain goods found in possession of one Wilkins, who claimed to own them. On the 12th day of December, 1884, an affidavit for an order of attachment was caused to be filed by the plaintiffs in error, and this affidavit conformed to §§ 230 and 231 of the code of civil procedure. The order of the district judge was obtained for an attachment for so much as was claimed to be not due on the third cause of action stated in the petition; the order of attachment was issued by the clerk, and levied upon the identical property bound by the lien of the first order of attachment.
An answer was filed on the 17th day of December, containing, first, a general denial; second, that the debt sued on was not due at the commencement of the action, nor at the filing of the answer’. On the 19th of March, 1885, Suppe filed a motion to discharge the attachment issued on the 12th day of December, 1884. Among the various causes enumerated for a dissolution of this attachment only two become material in the inquiry, and they are: Third, “No bond as required by law, upon which said order of attachment of December 12, 1884, was based, was ever filed herein;” fifth, “The action in which said order of attachment was issued was prematurely brought before the claim sued on was due, and this attachment
It is insisted here that there was no reasonable notice given of the filing of the motion to dissolve the attachment, and of the hearing thereon; and that it was proper to join causes of action not due with causes of action that were due, in one and the same suit; that when Suppe disclaimed any interest in the attached property, the court should not have entertained his motion to dissolve the attachment by which it was held; that the court erred in the dismissal of the third cause of action; that the court erred in dissolving the attachment on the third ground set forth in the motion, as a good bond was already on file in the action.
I. As to the notice: Whether the notice was reasonable or not under all the circumstances of the case, is a question that, in the absence of some express rule controlling it, must largely rest in the discretion of the trial court. Our attention has
II. The next question, and indeed the controlling one in the case is, whether an account not due can be joined in the same action with causes of action that are due ? So far as the claims or demands alleged in the petition are concerned, ther'e can be no question that they could all be joined in the action if all were due. They consist of two promissory notes and an account, and if the account had been due, and separate actions had been instituted on each note, and on the account, they might have been consolidated. The two promissory notes were past due at the time this suit was instituted. The account was not due. They constituted the causes of action as alleged in the petition, and as to two of them there existed a right of action generally; and as to the account, the right of action depended on the existence of the grounds of attachment prescribed by § 230 of the code. The law does not create causes of action — these are created by the acts and contracts of persons; it only gives a right of action under certain conditions and limitations on the cause.
The court is of the opinion that only such claims or demands as are due at the time of the commencement of the suit, can be joined in one and the same action. Ordinarily, an action cannot be instituted on a claim or demand not due; it is only by express statutory authority that such an action can be maintained; and then the right to bring the action is dependent upon the existence of facts entirely disconnected with the contract, claim, or demand. A fraudulent intent, or disposition of property by the debtor’, must exist before an action can be brought on a claim or demand not due. The whole
With this view, it is hardly necessary to consider the question of the attachment bond, as when the cause of action is dismissed, the ancillary proceedings inevitably go with it. If a separate action had to be commenced on the account not due, another attachment bond is imperatively required by § 234 of the code.
By the Court: It is so ordered.