OPINION
Plaintiff William Wuliger (the “Receiver”) filed this diversity suit against Defendant Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (USA) (“MLIC”) seeking rescission of three insurance policies and the return of premiums paid on them after they were fraudulently procured for the benefit of a viatical investment company in receivership. MLIC now appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Receiver and denying MLIC’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the district court’s order and REMAND with instructions to grant summary judgment dismissing the action against MLIC.
BACKGROUND
I. The Liberte Fraud
Liberte Capital Group (“Liberte”), an Ohio-based “viatical investment company,” purchased life insurance policies from “via-tors” — policyholders who are terminally ill or who are elderly and in poor health — in exchange for paying the viators an upfront lump sum. Liberte persuaded three elderly individuals to purchase life insurance policies from MLIC and immediately assign the policies to Liberte, which would pay the policies’ premiums. The viators’ purchases of the insurance policies with the intent to re-sell them to Liberte immediately constituted insurance fraud, because the viators never intended to insure their own lives.
Liberte’s collusion with the three viators was part of a larger scheme in which Liberte fraudulently procured viators’ insurance policies and sold them to almost three thousand investors, who collectively invested almost $100 million in Liberte.
Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill,
While Liberte was fraudulently acquiring insurance policies from issuers such as MLIC and was, through its brokers, fraudulently inducing investors to purchase shares of the fraudulently procured policies, VES in turn was defrauding Liberte. Capwill, through an investment vehicle he controlled called Capital Fund Leasing, LLC (“CFL”), diverted the funds that were supposed to be held in VES’ escrow accounts to various securities brokers, who ultimately lost the funds. See id.
*791 In April 1999, Liberte sued VES, CFL and Capwill in the Northern District of Ohio for defrauding Liberte and losing the money that investors had placed in the escrow accounts in exchange for their stakes in the viators’ insurance policies. Id. In July 1999, the district court placed VES and CFL in receivership, and authorized the Receiver 1 to “oversee and to administer the business and assets of VES and CFL ... to take and maintain exclusive and complete custody, control and possession of all the assets belonging to VES and CFL.” 2 Id. (internal quotations omitted). At that time, Liberte was considered a creditor of the received entities, because its own fraud had not yet been discovered, and the escrow accounts that were fraudulently managed by VES, CFL, and Capwill included Liberte’s proceeds from sales of the viatical policies to investors.
Shortly after Liberte filed suit against VES, CFL and Capwill, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) discovered Liberte’s fraud. As a result, the United States charged Liberte’s chief executive, J. Richard Jamieson (“Jamieson”), with buying and re-selling fraudulently obtained insurance policies through Liberte.
See United States v. Jamieson,
With the fraudulent schemes of Liberte and VES unraveling, the premium payments on the three policies that the viators had fraudulently purchased from MLIC in collusion with Liberte — premiums that Liberte had been paying from the funds it had channeled from investors into VES— ceased in 2001.
II. The Receiver’s Suit Against MLIC
On July 30, 2003, the Receiver initiated this suit against MLIC before the same *792 district court presiding over the Liberterelated litigation, seeking rescission of the three fraudulently procured insurance policies and the return of the premiums Liberte had paid through VES before the premium payments lapsed, plus interest. In the complaint, the Receiver sought a declaratory judgment that the policies are void ab initio. The Receiver identified himself in the complaint as; “the Receiver for the investors’ interests” in both the forfeiture action against Liberte and Liberte’s action against the escrow entities. The complaint then referred to the previous orders establishing the receiverships in the United States’ action against Jamie-son and Liberte, as well as Liberte’s action against Capwill, VES and CFL; the complaint “incorporated [the orders] by reference[.]” (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 45.) The Receiver’s complaint against MLIC conceded that Liberte “solicited previously uninsured individuals who were terminally ill and/or senior citizens in poor health to engage in ‘wet ink’ viatical sales,” and described this conduct as “a fraud perpetrated by Liberte[.]” (J.A. at 46, 48.) The Receiver claimed that MLIC “has been unjustly enriched through the premium payments made with funds obtained from the investors because it assumed no risk with regard to the policies].” (J.A. at 52-53. ) The complaint demanded that the insurance premiums already paid to MLIC “be returned to the Receiver for distribution to the Liberte investors.” (J.A. at 53-54. )
On August 23, 2004, MLIC filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the action against it, and on September 10, 2004, the Receiver cross-moved for summary judgment seeking relief pursuant to its rescission claim. On February 11, 2008, approximately three and one-half years after the parties filed their motions, the district court granted summary judgment to the Receiver and denied MLIC’s motion; the court ordered the rescission of the fraudulent policies and the return of the insurance premiums MLIC had received to date, plus interest. In granting summary judgment to the Receiver, the district court first found that the Receiver had standing to sue MLIC, as the representative of “Liberte and the Capwill entities.” (J.A. at 85.) The court noted that Liberte was paying MLIC the insurance premiums of the three fraudulent policies after purchasing the policies from the via-tors, and stated, “[t]o the extent that the [Rjeceiver represents the interests of Liberte and seeks to recover those premiums [from MLIC’s policies] on its behalf, the Plaintiff has alleged an injury in fact.” (J.A. at 85.) After finding that the Receiver had standing to sue, the district court then found that the insurance policies were void ab initio and subject to rescission, because the viators lacked an insurable interest when they procured the policies. The court also found the Receiver was entitled to a return of the premiums under a theory of unjust enrichment, because “[t]he payment of premiums on a void policy and retention of those premiums by [MLIC] is contrary to the notions of fairness.” (J.A. at 93.) MLIC timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,
Similarly, “[wjhether a claimant has standing is a question of law that we review
de novo.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,
II. Standing
Standing includes three constitutional requirements: “a plaintiff must show: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Taft,
In the course of the litigation spawned by Liberte’s fraud, this Court has previously addressed the doctrine of standing as it applies to equity receivers.
Javitch,
MLIC argues that the Receiver lacks standing in this case because he seeks to assert the rights of Liberte’s investors, who are not receivership entities; MLIC contends that because this Court held in Javitch and Liberte that the Receiver lacked standing to sue on behalf of investors of the receivership entities, the Receiver must also lack standing here. Such an argument misapplies the precise holdings of these precedents.
In
Javitch,
the Receiver commenced suits against the securities brokers who
*794
had negligently invested the money that Capwill had diverted from the VES escrow funds to the securities brokers to invest.
Although this Court in Javitch briefly considered a receiver’s standing to bring suits on behalf of the receivership entity, the main question in that case was whether the Receiver was bound by the arbitration agreements into which the receivership entities had entered; this Court did not squarely confront a standing problem then because the Receiver undeniably had standing to claim on behalf of VES, CFL and Capwill that the brokers had defrauded these receivership entities. However, in Liberie, this Court applied the principle set forth in Javitch — that receivers’ legal rights are generally limited to those of the receivership entities' — to address the scope of receivers’ standing to bring suits. In Liberie, the Receiver claimed that under the district court’s order authorizing the receivership, he had the exclusive authority to recoup the lost funds belonging to Liberte’s investors from any entity that may have been liable to them-including the brokers who had identified the investors for Liberte and persuaded the investors to invest in the viatical policies. 248 F.App’x at 652-54. Several of the investors intervened, claiming that the Receiver did not have the right to sue Liberte’s brokers, and that they had the right to sue the brokers independently. Id. This Court held that regardless of the scope of the district court’s authorization, the Receiver only had standing to bring claims belonging to the receivership entities, and not claims belonging to third parties — even if the third parties were meant to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the receivership’s recovered property. Id. at 656-57.
The Receiver’s standing problem in Liberie was that none of the receivership entities — VES, CFL, Capwill or Liberte— would have had standing to sue Liberte’s brokers for the misrepresentations the brokers made to Liberte’s investors, because none of the entities would have been able to claim any tangible injury traceable to the brokers’ misrepresentations to the investors. Because the receivership entities all would have lacked standing, and because of the rule that receivers’ rights are limited to those of the receivership entities, the Receiver also lacked standing. Id.
In contrast to the Receiver’s attempt to sue Liberte’s brokers for their misrepresentations to Liberte’s investors, the Receiver in this case has standing to sue MLIC because at least one of the receivership entities, Liberte, would have standing to bring such an action. First, the Receiver alleges that Liberte suffered an injury in fact: that it paid the premiums on an unenforceable policy, thereby receiving no consideration for its payments. 4 Liberte’s alleged injury is fairly *795 traceable to the actions of MLIC, which was informed of the fraud and refused to pay the premiums back. The injury can be redressed by a court order requiring MLIC to return the payments. With respect to prudential considerations, Liberte would be asserting its own rights to recoup the insurance premiums it paid to MLIC, and as the owner and assignee of the policyholders’ rights under the contract, it is the only entity in privity of contract with MLIC.
MLIC argues that the Receiver conceded in his complaint that he is not attempting to assert the rights of a receivership entity, but rather is asserting the rights of Liberte’s investors. This argument misconstrues the complaint. Although the Receiver stated in his complaint that he is “the Receiver for the investors’ interests,” (J.A. at 45), and demanded the return of the premiums “for distribution to the Liberte investors,” (J.A. at 53-54), the Receiver was only stating that he was taking the action for the ultimate benefit of Liberte’s investors, who had valid claims to the lost assets. Yet that is precisely the purpose of a receiver: to marshal the receivership entities’ assets, to which several parties assert conflicting claims, so that the assets may be distributed to the injured parties in a manner the court deems equitable.
See Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill,
Thus, the district court’s finding of standing was proper because it recognized that one of the receivership entities would have had standing to raise the same claim. The district court did not, as MLIC contends, “amend” the receiver’s complaint in order to find standing; it simply disregarded the Receiver’s statements that his action would serve to benefit Liberte’s investors, since those statements were not directly relevant to the standing inquiry. Although the Receiver did not expressly state that his claim was one that could have been brought by a receivership entity, the.Receiver did incorporate by reference the court’s prior orders establishing *796 the receivership. The court reasonably inferred from the Receiver’s reference to that order that he was claiming to act on behalf of one of the receivership entities, albeit for the ultimate benefit of the receivership entities’ investors. Although the complaint also stated that “the investors, through the Receiver, ... are entitled to rescission” of MLIC’s policies, (J.A. at 52-53), this inartful language does not change the fact that the claims of rescission brought by the Receiver against MLIC are claims that belonged to a receivership entity, and not to the investors.
Finally, MLIC argues that even if the complaint could be construed as bringing a claim belonging to Liberte, Liberte would lack standing because any injuries it could claim were self-inflicted, and therefore not caused in any meaningful way by MLIC. To demonstrate standing, the plaintiff must show “a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiffs injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
Because the district court properly found that the Receiver has standing to sue MLIC, we proceed to the merits of the Receiver’s claim against MLIC.
III. Rescission
A general axiom of insurance law is that a party has no insurable interest in a life insurance policy if, at the time the policy was issued, the policyholder is “directly interested in the early death of the [insured].”
Warnock v. Davis,
The Receiver claimed that because the viators knew at the time they purchased their policies that they were going to assign the policies to an entity that had no direct interest in their continued life, the policies were void
ab initio
and subject to rescission. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to the Receiver. However, under Ohio law, it is well settled that “ ‘a failure by the insured to disclose conditions affecting the risk, of which he is aware, makes the contract voidable
at the insurer’s option.’ ” Buemi v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
The Receiver’s proposed rule— that an insured who commits insurance fraud may announce the fraud and receive a refund on any premiums paid to date— would have the perverse effect of reducing the defrauders’ risk relative to honest policyholders; any defrauder could commit to paying premiums on his fraudulently procured policy knowing that if the premiums ever became unaffordable, he could declare his fraud and receive all of the previously paid premiums back. This Court cannot sanction such an outcome, particularly since Ohio’s courts have already spoken with such clarity on the issue.
However, we note that even if the policies were void
ab initio
due to the policy purchasers’ fraud and subject to rescission by the purchaser, the defense of unclean hands would still preclude the Receiver from gaining relief. Rescission is an equitable remedy, and equitable claims are subject to the defense of unclean hands.
See Bell v. Turner,
The district court found the unclean hands defense inapplicable in this case for two reasons. First, the court found that the unclean hands doctrine is inapplicable where the plaintiffs unclean conduct affected third persons, and not the defendant. The application of the unclean hands defense “depends upon the connection between the complainant’s iniquitous acts and the defendant’s conduct which the complainant relies upon as establishing his cause of action.”
McClanahan v. McClanahan,
The second exception to the unclean hands defense that the district court invoked was the “removed wrongdoer” exception established in
Scholes v. Lehmann,
The district court, citing Scholes, found that because Jamieson had been removed as Liberte’s chief executive, Liberte had been freed of all wrongdoing and was not subject to the unclean hands defense. The district court’s application of the Scholes exception was incorrect. Unlike in Scholes, where the corporation’s culpability could be foisted onto one individual who appeared to have single-handedly created these shell corporations and the ensuing Ponzi scheme, there is no evidence in the record that Liberte’s fraud can be attributed in its entirety to Jamieson. The Receiver’s complaint, in describing Liberte’s fraud, does not even mention Jamieson, stating instead that “[t]he causes of action set forth herein arise from the viatical business that Liberte Capital Group or its agents have transacted in Ohio with various insurance companies including Defendants[.]” (J.A. at 46.) Without any evidence in the record of Jamieson’s role in Liberte’s scheme, or of the degree to which Liberte was a shell controlled entirely by Jamieson, this Court cannot similarly conclude that separating Jamieson from Liberte wiped Liberte’s slate clean. Moreover, once the court in Scholes found that the receiver had standing to act on behalf of the corporations, it analyzed the merits of the receiver’s claims under a state statute, and therefore never considered whether the unclean hands defense would apply to the merits of the receiver’s claims. Accordingly, the exception articulated in Scholes is not applicable here.
Rather, under this Court’s long-recognized “stand-in-the-shoes” doctrine,
Javitch,
In sum, the district court should have granted summary judgment to MLIC with respect to the Receiver’s rescission claim. Liberte’s fraud precluded the Receiver, whose claims were limited to those of Liberte, from using the fraud to gain rescission of the viators’ policies. Yet even if such a claim could have merit under Ohio law, Liberte’s unclean hands would preclude any relief.
IY. Unjust Enrichment
Although the Receiver did not bring an unjust enrichment claim, the district court nevertheless concluded that “the Plaintiff is entitled to the return of premiums under the theory of unjust enrichment.” (J.A. at 93.) While the complaint stated in two different places that MLIC has been “unjustly enriched,” it did so in the context of its rescission claim, and did not raise a separate unjust enrichment claim. (J.A. at 52, 53.) In his motion for summary judgment, the Receiver’s only argument concerning unjust enrichment was that “[b]e-cause the [three viators’] policies were void ab initio, [MLIC] will be unjustly enriched if it is permitted to keep the premiums paid on those policies.” (J.A. at 184.) Thus, to the extent that the Receiver even asserted an unjust enrichment claim, the claim appeared to be predicated on the faulty premise that the policies were void ab initio as a result of their fraudulent procurement. We therefore believe it was improper for the district court to treat the Receiver’s unjust enrichment claim as independent of the rescission claim.
Regardless, any unjust enrichment claim would fail on its merits. To establish unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) a benefit conferred by a plaintiff upon a defendant; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances where it would be unjust to do so without payment[.]”
Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp.,
Because the Receiver’s claim is based upon express contracts — i.e., the insurance policies issued to the three via-tors — and the premiums at issue were paid pursuant to the contracts, the facts of this case cannot support an unjust enrichment claim. The Receiver has not demonstrated any evidence of a benefit conferred; the payment of premiums to MLIC was not a “benefit” conferred on MLIC, but was consideration for MLIC’s commitment to insuring the viators’ lives. Accordingly,
*800
even presuming the Receiver intended to state an unjust enrichment claim, such a claim would be without merit.
See Lehmkuhl,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court REVERSES the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Receiver, and REMANDS to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment dismissing the action against MLIC.
Notes
. Victor M. Javitch was the original receiver in this action. The district court appointed William T. Wuliger to replace him on January 30, 2006. The two receivers in this action are herein collectively referred to as the "Receiver.”
. The receivership was subsequently expanded to include Capwill's assets as well.
Liberte,
. Liberte's action against VES, CFL and Cap-will, and the government’s civil forfeiture action have already led to numerous appeals before this Court.
See Mohnkern v. Prof'l Ins. Co.,
. The complaint alleges that Liberte had assigned its ownership and beneficiary rights to *795 the viatical policies to VES. The complaint does not state whether it was Liberte or VES that actually paid the premiums at issue to MLIC, and the record is devoid of any documentation of the premium payments. However, the complaint makes clear that Liberte established VES for the sole purpose of disguising its identity as the assignee of the insurance policies. Any question about whether the proper entity to sue for rescission would be Liberte or VES is irrelevant for the purposes of standing, since both entities are receivership entities on behalf of which the Receiver may bring claims.
. The parties agree that Ohio law should apply to the substantive claims.