146 N.E. 835 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1925
This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a complaint which alleged that appellee, a corporation, by and through a servant and agent acting for and on behalf of appellee, in the hearing of divers persons, falsely and maliciously spoke and uttered certain false and defamatory words concerning appellant. *505
The questions involved in this appeal relate to the right to maintain an action for slander against a corporation, and the necessity of an allegation in the complaint that the agent or servant in uttering the alleged slanderous statement was, in so doing, acting within the scope of his employment.
Appellee's first contention is that the complaint is not sufficient because there is no allegation that the employee making the statement was acting within the scope of his 1. employment. It is to be observed that the complaint, in direct language, alleges that the "defendant company then and there and by and through said agent, servant and employee acting for and on behalf of defendant" falsely and maliciously spoke the alleged false and defamatory words. This is a direct charge that the alleged wrong was committed by the defendant. This is equivalent to an averment that the alleged slander was uttered by the defendant, acting through its agents and servant. That made it a question of evidence as to whether the servant was acting within the scope of his employment at the time when the alleged statement was made. Wabash R. Co. v. Savage (1886),
We now pass to a consideration of appellee's contention that a corporation is not liable for a slander committed by an agent or employee, when not expressly authorized or ratified by it.
Southern Ice Co. v. Black (1916),
The words spoken in that case had a qualified privilege. Not that they were not slanderous per se, and ordinarily actionable, but that under the evidence they were not actionable unless malice was proven.
Republic Iron Steel Co. v. Self (1915),
But the same court in McIntyre v. Cudahy Packing Co.
(1913),
In Duquesne Distributing Co. v. Greenbaum (1909),
In Flaherty v. Maxwell Motor Co. (1915),
But the Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the liability of a corporation for libel, said: "The result of the authorities is, as we think, that in order to hold a corporation liable for the torts of any of its agents, the act in question must be performed in the course and within the scope of the agent's employment in the business of the principal. The corporation can be held responsible for acts which are not strictly within the corporate powers, but which were assumed to be performed for the corporation and by the corporate agents who were competent to employ the corporate powers actually exercised. There need be no written authority under seal or vote of the corporation, constituting the agency or authorizing the act. But in the absence of evidence of this nature there must be evidence of some facts from which the authority of the agent to act upon or in relation to the subject-matter involved may be fairly and legitimately inferred by the court or jury." Washington GasLight Co. v. Lansden (1898),
In Courtney v. American Ry. Exp. Co. (1922),
In Hypes v. Southern R. Co. (1908),
While there are a few cases holding that a corporation cannot be held liable for slander, the great weight of the authorities is that a corporation may be liable for a slander committed 2. by an agent, and that the test of liability depends upon whether the slander was committed by the authority of the corporation, express, or fairly implied from the nature of the employment and duties incident thereto. In addition to authorities hereinbefore cited, see Sawyer v. Norfolk, etc.,R. Co. (1906),
Without entering any further into the discussion of *511 the circumstances under which a corporation can be held liable for slander, we hold the complaint sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
Judgment reversed, with directions to overrule the demurrer to the complaint.