182 Pa. 514 | Pa. | 1897
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
On November 28, 1864, by sealed agreement, Hendrick B. Wright, for himself and as guardian of his minor son, leased to Abel Barker and four others two adjoining tracts of land, one containing 125 acres, and the other 163 acres, in Hanover township, Luzerne county, for the purpose of mining coal thereunder, with privilege to farm the same, and also to cut timber therefrom to be used in thdir coal operations. The term was for ten years, with the right to the lessees to an extension of ninety-nine years at the end thereof. The consideration to be paid by the lessees is expressed in the following clause of the contract.
“ The said party of the second part shall pay the party of the first part the following prices per ton for all coal mined during the said term; the ton in all cases to be twenty-two hundred and forty pounds (2240 lbs.) prepared coal. Chestnut coal to be half price; but coal shipped from the mines, which shall not have been prepared, shall not be subject to abatement because not prepared. For the first fifty thousand tons of coal mined in any one year, fifteen cents (15 cents) per ton; for the next twenty-five thousand tons in the same year, twelve cents (12 cents) per ton, and for any excess over and above seventy-five thousand tons in any one year of the term, ten cents (10 cents) per ton.”
The royalties were to be paid quarterly, commencing with the date of the lease, and a stipulation for a minimum quarterly payment of not less than $1,250; the enforcement of the minimum payment, however, to commence only with the second year. It was further stipulated that in case the term should be extended for ninety-nine years the extended term should be subject to all the conditions and covenants of the ten years’ term, except that, instead of the shifting scale of prices determined by the quantity mined, the price should be “ 15 cents per ton for all quantities mined, chestnut coal, as hereinbefore stated, to be half price, or seven and one half cents per ton.” As a mining cor
The defendant having refused to pay for the pea and buckwheat coal shipped and sold, or for any coal used at the mine for steam purposes, plaintiffs filed this bill. The material complaints are:
1. That defendant has negligently and unskillfully mined the coal, so that the roof at places has fallen, and thereby rendered inaccessible large quantities of coal in place, which are now lost to plaintiffs.
2. That defendant, by changes in machinery and methods of preparing the coal for market, has largelyincreased the quantity of chestnut coal, for which the lower royalty is paid, and further, largely increased the quantity of pea and buckwheat coal, for which it denies its liability to pay any royalty.
3. That defendant has refused to render proper and full accounts of the coal actually produced and sold, on which royalties should be paid under a correct interpretation of the contract.
The prayers are:
1. That defendant account for all coal rebroken for the purpose of increasing the product of chestnut and smaller sizes, and for the coal rendered unavailable by its negligent, unskillful and improper mining, and also account for the whole product of the mines actually mined upon which it ought to have paid the stipulated royalty.
2. That defendant be restrained from further mining operations on the premises until it pays or secures to be paid all sums
The three averments of the bill as stated were denied by defendant, and the issue thus made up was heard by Hon. L.H. Bennett, as examiner and master, and he, before the ending of the hearing having been elected judge of common pleas of Luzerne county, by agreement of the parties in writing, continued both as master and judge of the court until final decree.
As to the first complaint, averring damage from negligent and unskillful mining, the master, on competent evidence, finds the facts against the plaintiffs, and we discover nothing in the evidence to warrant us in disturbing this finding, and further notice will not be taken of it in appeal by plaintiffs from same decree.
As to the averment in the second specification of complaint, the master finds as a fact, that before and at the date of this contract there were “ seven sizes, beginning with ‘ lump ’ coal as the largest and ending with. ‘ chestnut ’ coal as the smallest size. The names of each were, lump, steamboat, broken, egg, stove (number three), stove (number four) and chestnut, respectively, and in that order of gradation as to size. Lump and steamboat coal, — the latter being somewhat smaller than the former, — -were the larger pieces separated from the coal strata by the miner’s blast. These came from the mine in the mine car, mixed with smaller pieces also resulting from the blasting operation. These smaller pieces which came from the mine in the mine car produced the other enumerated sizes, and where a greater quantity of these was desired, some of the lump and steamboat sizes were broken for that purpose. In general, it may be said, that the whole contents of the mine car, as mined and loaded into the car in the mines, and hoisted to the surface, were dumped into a chute leading to a series of iron bars located parallel with one another at the distance of five or six inches apart. The larger sizes of coal in the mine car, which did not drop through, but passed lengthwise over these bars, were lump
This clear and concise statement of the facts by the master relating to the preparation of the coal at the date of the contract is fully borne out by the evidence. He then finds that soon after defendant’s operations commenced the demand for lump and steamboat-coal rapidly fell off, and, within a very few years, practically ceased, while the demand for stove and chestnut coal greatly increased; that, about five years after the date of the contract, pea coal, a much smaller size than chestnut, and which, before that time, was thrown into the dump as worthless, acquired a market value, and defendant commenced and continued shipments and sales of it; that later, buckwheat coal, a still smaller size, became marketable, and defendant shipped and sold large quantities of it. To meet the changed demand, defendant ceased to produce for the market the larger sizes, such as lump and steamboat coal. To that end, it introduced additional rollers, which broke and rebroke the coal; it also introduced screens for the separation of the buckwheat coal; also, increased the size of the meshes through which the chestnut coal dropped, one eighth of an inch. These and other changes in methods and machinery were adopted for the preparation of the
The master, then, by a course of reasoning which amply vindicates his conclusions, thus interprets the contract:
“ In our opinion, nothing smaller than chestnut was to be paid for by the ton, and there was no intention of providing for payment on pea and buckwheat coal. This conclusion derives much strength, in our mind, from the fact that the lease, whether as regards the original or the extended term, expressly provides only half price or seven and one half cents per ton for chestnut coal, the smallest size then known to the trade, and full price, or fifteen cents per ton, for all other kinds of coal to be paid for. A construction whereby pea and buckwheat coal, then unknown to the market by reason of their inferiority even to chestnut coal, should be paid for at double the royalty placed upon chestnut, and at a royalty equal to that fixed for all the larger sizes, would be unreasonable, and, in our judgment, clearly unwarranted.”
As to coal consumed under the boilers, he says :
*524 “ Our further conclusion is that payment was contemplated for only such of these three products of coal mined as should be sold and marketed, and that the terms of the lease, viewed in the light of its subject-matters, do not contemplate any per ton royalty for coal that may be used under the defendant’s boilers. While the terms of the lease in this latter respect are not as clear as they might well have been made, we are nevertheless convinced of the correctness of our conclusions from a consideration of its context, the well known methods of hoisting and preparing the coal from the mines by means of the use of extensive steam power obtained by the incidental consumption of the coal itself, and the general purposes of the lease.”
And this last conclusion, the master shows, from the terms of the lease and invariable custom, to be a correct one.
But, then arises another question, viz: Even if, by the terms of the lease, at the date of it, it was not in contemplation of the parties that any less size than chestnut should be paid for, nevertheless, is not the defendant, under a reasonable interpretation of the contract, answerable for additional royalty on account of the largely increased production of chestnut coal, altogether beyond the intention of the parties at the date of their contract, and because of the excessive production of pea coal, caused by the increased quantity of chestnut? The contract is silent as to what proportion of the whole product shall be chestnut, and be paid for at half price. The plaintiffs argue that the contemporaneous facts and customs of the mining business at the date of the contract must be assumed as having been within the contemplation of the parties, and that on such knowledge they contracted; that when half price was fixed for chestnut coal, they meant half price for such quantity as resulted from mining and preparation in that mining territory at that date. The defendant, in reply, argues that the lease provides for breaking the coal, and that its very silence as to the extent it shall be broken, or the proportion of the sizes, leaves defendant free to adopt such methods for the future as will adapt the coal to the market demand, without thereby increasing its liability for royalty. The master comes to this conclusion :
“ In our opinion, the terms of the lease fairly contemplate the breaking of the whole mine product into the different sizes of*525 what was ‘prepared coal’ in 1864, with their proportionate percentages to one another, by means of the methods and appliances in general use at that time and the manner then employed of operating such appliances, if the demands of the defendant’s market for selling coal reasonably require the breaking and preparation of the product to that extent, and the operation be performed ‘ with as much economy and as little waste as may be; ’ and payment of royalty measured by this standard is all that the contract calls for. To this extent we concur with the position of counsel for the defendant; but we find nothing in the terms of the lease which contemplates the breaking of this mine product to a greater extent than that already indicated, and while new conditions of the market for the sale of the defendant’s coal in competition with other operators has justified it in adopting methods and machinery by which not only all the mine product has been broken to prepared sizes, but to the smaller of these sizes, whereby a great proportionate increase of chestnut and pea coal has occurred, these were not contemplated by the contract, and therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to payments of royalty upon the standard above indicated.”
While it is difficult to demonstrate that such was clearly the intent of the parties, it is very easy to show that the argument of defendant leads to an unreasonable conclusion, and one that works palpable injustice to the landlord; for, if payment under the contract be- measured by the preparation of the coal to any size which defendant thinks may suit the market, then if the market demand is mainly for pea and buckwheat, and nearly all of it be crushed to those sizes, plaintiffs are entitled to almost no royalty. The size of coal the market demands, and will alone accept, will doubtless determine the size which defendant will prepare and ship, but it cannot deprive the lessor of his right of contract payment; that must be determined by what the parties assented to at the date of the contract, and by their contract, and not by something unforeseen by either. It is sufficient to say that, with a somewhat obscure agreement, and evidence vague at best to guide him, the master adopts that view which is most consonant with reason, and in no way conflicts with any of the terms of the written contract. In so doing, he follows the suggestions in Navigation Co. v. Moore, 2 Wharton, 477, Dunham v. Haggerty, 110 Pa. 560, and Lance v. Coal Co., 163 Pa. 91. We affirm his conclusion.
Of the twenty-two assignments of error preferred by appellant, all except the thirteenth are to findings of fact and conclusions of law touching the master’s interpretation of the contract. While we have considered them all, we are unable to sustain any one of them, except the thirteenth, and this we sustain only in part. In this assignment, it is claimed that the knowledge of the lessor’s ancestor of the percentage of production of chestnut coal, and his receipt of the roj^alty prices, fixed the interpretation of the agreement, not only for himself, but for his descendants who now represent him in the contract. There is nothing in the evidence, in this particular, tending to show, that at that early date, there was any question as to the interpretation of the contract by either party. The coal business was, at the date of the accounts from the settlement in 1873 to 1881, in a very depressed condition. The returns during that period showed a production of chestnut coal running from 20 to 30 per cent, or 5 to 15 per cent above the average at the date of the contract. The lessor, on June 3, 1878, had received a return of coal mined, from Davis, sublessee of defend
We are of opinion, therefore, that computation of the excess, on the interpretation of the contract, as adopted by the learned master and judge of the court below, should be made only on returns dated from the last receipt of Hendrick B. Wright, next to, and immediately preceding his death. In all other particulars the master’s very able and clear report is approved, and his decree as herein modified is affirmed. It is ordered that the record be remitted to the court below that computation be made as herein directed. Costs of this appeal to be paid in equal parts by appellant and appellees. ■
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
I would reverse this judgment as making a new contract for the parties in the light of subsequent events, in place of the one they made for themselves.
I do not find anjr basis in the lease for the master’s assumption that it contemplates “ the breaking of the whole mine product into the different sizes of what was prepared coal in 1864, with their proportionate percentages to one another, by means of the methods and appliances in general use at that time.” It is in the highest degree unjust and illogical to suppose that in an agreement made to extend certainly over ten years, and at the lessee’s option for ninety-nine more, the latter cut themselves off from improved methods of mining, and bound themselves to the methods, appliances, and proportions of product, commonly used at that date. On the contrary the lease in my view gave the appellant the clear right to produce the different sizes of prepared coal without restriction as to the proportion of each to the whole. They were to pay the same royalty on all the sizes from the “lump ” to “stove No. 4,” but could produce as much or as little of each as in their judgment would be most profitable and, therefore, could reduce it all to “ stove No. 4,” the smallest prepared size on which the full royalty was payable. This is all that in fact they have done. The market calling for a larger proportion of the small sizes, they have passed the coal through the rollers twice. Incidentally in so doing they have made more of the chestnut size than before, but the production of chestnut
I do not understand the appellant’s argument to claim, as the opinion of the Court states it, that they could prepare the coal “ to any size which the defendant thinks may suit the market,” but only to any of the stipulated sizes paying full royalty. The former claim, if made, is clearly too broad, but with the limitation to sizes paying full royalties, the claim not only avoids entirely the reductio ad absurdum of the court, but is the just and fair interpretation of the contract, and shows that the appellant was at all times within its legal rights, and has accounted fully for all of complainants’ just demands.