DOUGLAS FRANKLIN WRIGHT, Appellant, v. S. Frank THOMPSON, Respondent.
(CC 96C12851; SC S43564)
In the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon
Argued and submitted September 4, judgment of the circuit court affirmed September 5, 1996
324 Or. 153 | 922 P.2d 1224
Before Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Van Hoomissen, Fadeley, Graber, and Durham, Justices, and De Muniz, Justice pro tempore.
CARSON, C. J.
Fadeley, J., filed a specially concurring opinion.
Counsel does not represent the named “plaintiff,” Wright, who has not appeared in the action. The “petition” seeks “leave to file for post conviction relief for Douglas Franklin Wright.”1 (Emphasis added.)
At a hearing in the circuit court on September 3, 1996, counsel tendered a document titled “Petition for Post Conviction Relief.” That document, which bears the same case number as was assigned to the proceeding initiated by the Petition to File for Post Conviction Relief, is captioned, “In the Matter of the Application of Douglas Franklin Wright, Petitioner, vs. S. Frank Thompson, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary[,] Defendant.” It alleges claims for post-conviction relief, which the parties have stipulated are sufficiently well-pleaded, such that they would not be dismissed immediately as meritless under
Counsel‘s original petition to file for post-conviction relief was accompanied by counsel‘s affidavit setting out some of the circumstances surrounding the decision to proceed in that way. A few days later, counsel tendered a petition for post-conviction relief that counsel wished to file,
The threshold issue in the case, deemed dispositive by the circuit court, is whether counsel has standing to file a claim of post-conviction relief “for” Wright. After the September 3 hearing, the circuit court concluded that Oregon law does not provide for third-party standing to file for post-conviction relief. The court entered judgment for defendant on that day. That same day, counsel filed a notice of appeal from that decision in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this court, and this court accepted certification. See
Counsel‘s claim to a right to third-party standing is predicated principally upon an assertion that the Oregon Constitution mandates that a post-conviction proceeding be fully litigated in every death penalty case, regardless of the mental competence of the convicted criminal defendant to choose to forego such a proceeding. That claim relies upon State v. Martini, 144 NJ 603, 677 A2d 1106 (1996). The circuit court rejected that claim in this case, and we since have rejected it in Bryant v. Thompson, 324 Or 141, 922 P2d 1219 (1996). Our decision in Bryant disposes of counsel‘s claim in this case.
Counsel also asserts that Wright is not mentally competent to decide to forego a claim for post-conviction relief and, therefore, that counsel must be appointed for Wright and should be entitled to proceed, in his behalf, to file a petition for post-conviction relief. The circuit court concluded
We need not decide, in this opinion, whether there are circumstances under which a person, other than a convicted criminal defendant, may file a petition for post-conviction relief in behalf of the convicted criminal defendant. Assuming arguendo that such a step may be taken, and further assuming arguendo that the standards governing the right to file such a proceeding are those applicable to analogous “next-friend” filings in the federal court system, counsel here still was not entitled to prevail. That is so because, upon the basis of our review of the entire record, including the documents provided under seal, we conclude that the record does not disclose even a prima facie case sufficient to place Wright‘s mental competency in this matter at issue. In so concluding, we have afforded to counsel, solely for purposes of argument, the benefit of: (1) the premise that Oregon law may provide third-party standing for a person to file a post-conviction proceeding in behalf of an incompetent convicted criminal defendant; (2) the legal test relied upon by counsel with respect to the standard for determining competence and the nature of the showing that is required to trigger an inquiry into competence;2 and (3) all reasonable inferences from the evidence admitted, submitted as an offer of proof, tendered or otherwise present in the record.
Counsel acknowledges that the circuit court provided a full opportunity to make a record that was aimed at establishing a prima facie case justifying some further judicial inquiry into Wright‘s alleged mental incompetence. The failure of the record to support such a claim, therefore, answers counsel‘s assertion on appeal that the trial court erred by not instituting a competency hearing.
“Execution of a sentence of death shall be automatically stayed for 60 days after the conviction becomes final following direct appellate review and state post-conviction relief proceedings, if any.”
Because neither of counsel‘s two theories was well taken, the trial court did not err in denying counsel‘s petition to file a post-conviction relief petition in behalf of Wright. Because no post-conviction relief petition was filed, no automatic stay of Wright‘s sentence pursuant to
We have considered and rejected all other contentions raised by counsel on appeal.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
FADELEY, J., specially concurring.
I concur specially in this case as stated in Bryant v. Thompson, 324 Or 141, 922 P2d 1219 (1996).