Fоllowing his convictions for aggravated assault with intent to rape, attempted rape, false imprisonment, simple battery, and simple assault, Cameron W Wright filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. He appeals from that order, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the aggravated аssault and attempted rape convictions, and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a similar transaction because the State failed to provе similarity between the similar transaction and the current offense. Upon our review, and finding the evidence sufficient and the similar transaction admissible, we affirm.
“On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and [Wright] no longer enjoys a presumption of innocencеf.]” (Citations,
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punctuation and footnotes omitted.)
Jackson v. State,
1. We first address Wright’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated assault 1 and attempted rape. 2 Specifically, Wright argues that because there was no evidence of his intent to rape the victim, as the State could not show that he took substantial steps to fulfill the requisite elements of rape. We disagree.
“A person commits the offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he performs аny act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” OCGA § 16-4-1. Here, the evidence shows that Wright knocked the victim down and attempted to pull her into аn isolated vacant lot and
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continued to do so despite the victim’s struggles and attempted escape. Further, the victim was not carrying a purse, and any contention that the motive was robbery is belied by the fact that Wright did not attempt to take the victim’s cell phone or keys even though he could have easily taken both. Whether Wright intended to rape the victim was a matter for the jury to determine.
Butler v. State,
Although Wright maintains that there is no evidence that he touched the victim in a sexual manner,
[i]t is not necessary for the state to show that [Wright] expressed an intent to rape in so many words, or declared a purpose to carry the intent into effect, for the jury to arrive at the cоnclusion he so intended. The intention may be gathered from the circumstances of the case as proved.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Butler,
Here, under the circumstances, the jury was authorized to conclude that Wright’s actions, although circumstantial insofar as intent is concerned, provided sufficient evidence to establish that he attempted to rape the victim. See
Butler,
Thus, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Wright guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Wright also contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce similar transaction evidence of a prior offense involving a nine-year-old victim that occurred when Wright was fourteen. Wright asserts that the State failed to prove similarity between the prior offense and the current case.
In crimes involving sexual offenses, evidence of similar previous transactions is admissible to show the lustful disposition of the defendant and to corroborate the victim’s testimony. There need only be evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of both crimes and sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense [ ] charged.
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(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Condra v. State,
In reviewing whеther there were sufficient similarities to create a connection between the previous crime and the instant crimes such that the former tends to prove the lаtter, we focus on the similarities rather than the dissimilarities. Similar transactions need not be identical to the offense being tried but must show sufficient similarity or connection betweеn the independent incidents and the offense at issue.
(Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.)
Susan v. State,
Here, the State presented evidence that on October 2, 2002, when Wright was fourteen, he tricked the nine-year-old victim into following him into the woods, and threw her to the ground, ripped off her pants and underwear, and attempted to place his penis into her vagina. The victim kicked Wright in the grоin and escaped. Wright’s admission of guilt for the designated offenses of aggravated child molestation and aggravated assault and the juvenile court’s order of delinquency were admitted at trial.
Although Wright contends that the transactions were dissimilar because of the victims’ ages and lack of sexual contact with the present victim,
[t]o hold thаt these cases are too dissimilar to constitute similar transaction evidence based solely on the difference in the victims’ ages would ignore our precedеnt. No Georgia case holds that the difference in age of the victims is alone determinative of similarity. Our precedent consistently holds that it is the totality of the similar faсts surrounding the crimes which are properly considered in a similar transaction analysis.
(Citations omitted.)
Payne v. State,
Here, Wright approached both victims when they were walking alone, isolated or attemрted to isolate them in a deserted area, and attacked them. The fact that the present victim was successful in thwarting Wright before he could sexually assault her doеs not negate the similarity of the crimes. See
Smith v. State,
Based on the similarities, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to admit this evidence was clearly erroneous.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Wright was accused of “an assault upon the person of [the victim] with the intent to rape by pushing the victim to the ground, grabbing her, and attempting to drag the victim into a wooded area.”
Per the indictment, the substantial step toward the commission of the attempted rape was that he “grab[bed] and dragged [the victim] toward a secluded area.”