Wright v. StateWright v. State
Defendant, Wright, appeals his convictions for burglary and grand theft, an order revoking his probation, and his sentence on revocation of probation. The main focus of the appeal is the trial court‘s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during an allegedly unlawful prior arrest for loitering and prowling.
Having served forty-four months after a conviction and sentence for manslaughter, Wright was released to complete a three-year term of probation. The subsequent offenses ocсurred while he was on probation. The events leading up to his arrest for the later offenses are as follows.
While on patrol in the afternoon of September 12, 1983, Officer Lindahl noticed an automobile parked along the roadside a block from residential homеs near the Biscayne Dog Track. The vehicle appeared to be unoccupied. No races were being run at the track during that hour of the day. The license tag on the rear of the automobile was partially obscured, in violation of the law, by a dirty rag. That observation led
At that point, defendant was no longer free to leave as the officer continued the investigation. In response to further questioning as to his presence at the location, Wright stated that he was waiting for a friend who had gone to a booth in front of the dog track — approximately 300 feet away — to purchase a program. He explained that the jewelry in the stocking belonged to his girlfriend. Another officer who arrived on the scene was dispatched to the program booth to locate the friend so as to verify Wright‘s explanation. Although there were people at the track, the friend could not be located. When the other officer returned with his report, Officer Lindahl placed Wright under arrest for loitering and prowling, and seized the stocking-wrapped jewelry. Several days later, Wright was also charged with burglary and grand theft of the jewelry.1
The claim made by Wright, аs his first point on appeal, is that there was not an articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity which would justify the initial tеmporary detention nor was there probable cause to seize the jewelry. We disagree.
First, we find that Officer Lindahl, as an officer charged with enforcing the motor vehicle laws of this state, had the authority, even the duty, to investigate why an apparently unoccupied vehicle was parked on the roadway with its license tag obscured, in violation of a motor vehicle statute.2 See State v. Williams, 303 So.2d 74, 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), dismissed, 314 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1975) (municipal police officer is specifically authorized to enforce traffic laws within the confines of municipality). Once the officer asсertained that the vehicle was occupied, the de minimis intrusion involved in asking the defendant to exit the vehicle and questioning him as to why the liсense tag was obscured was justified by the totality of the circumstances. See State v. M.N.M., 423 So.2d 987, 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
A slightly more difficult question is whether the officer had probable cаuse to detain Wright and question him about his presence at the location. Again, we find that the totality of the circumstances justified the detention. Officer Lindahl found Wright‘s explanation of why the tag was obscured to be unreasonable. He also at that point had seen, in plain view, the stocking containing jewelry on the front floorboard of the vehicle. On these facts, the officer could legally detain the defendant for further questioning. See generally State v. Outten, 206 So.2d 392, 397 (Fla. 1968) (“When two young men are stopped in a car carrying a license tag issued for another car, and they have nо driver‘s license or logical explanation as to the ownership of the car ... it does not seem unreasonable that they should bе detained until the ownership of the car can be determined.“)
Our holding on this first issue, that defendant‘s motion to suppress wаs properly denied, leaves intact Wright‘s convictions for burglary and grand theft. We thus affirm also on Wright‘s asserted second point on appeal, that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. The court was correct in revoking Wright‘s probation based on a violation of condition 4 of the probation order, which requires that the defendant “live and remain at liberty without violating any law.”
The third point raised by the dеfendant, challenging his sentence on revocation of probation, has merit. The trial court did err in failing to give Wright credit for the three years and eight months he had previously served in prison on the conviction and sentence for manslaughter. We therefore reverse his sеntence on revocation of probation and remand with directions for the trial court to give the defendant credit for the time hе served on the original sentence. See State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1976); Delgado v. State, 423 So.2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Schell v. State, 379 So.2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.