*1 Wright for Children. Crippled v. Shriners Hospital Crippled Hospital for vs. Shriners Anita & another.1 Children 16, 1992. Suffolk. 1991. April October Greanly. Lynch. JJ. O’Connor. & Liacos. C.J. Present: Wilkins. Contract, Policy. Unlaw- Employment. Public Employment, Termination. Nurse. ful Interference. terminating corporation employment hospital the at-will
The action of a not, law, violated registered nurse would as matter of have reprisal shown to been in policy, even if the termination were during with hospital criticism interviews members employee’s of the organization to which the representing team the national J., dissenting. belonged. hospital [472-476] Liacos, discharged by In an a nurse who was from her at-will action was entitled hospital corporation, the administrator in- judgment notwithstanding plaintiffs verdict on the claim of relations, corporation tentional interference with contractual where the legally discharge plaintiff, where there was no entitled discharge effecting purpose evidence that the administrator’s legitimate corporate unrelated to a interest. [476] Depart- Court Superior Civil action commenced in ment on 1988. July Cratsley,
The case was tried before John C. J. for direct granted Judicial Court Supreme request
appellate review. Jr. Smith Joy,
William F. him) (.Benjamin defendants. Powers
Kevin G. the plaintiff. O’Connor, case, direct appel- J. In which is here on review, late evidence sufficiency we consider the of the $100,000 in the plaintiff, warrant a verdict of favor of jury’s 1Salvatore Russo.
Anita Wright, against employer, defendant Shriners *2 Hospital for Crippled Children (Shriners Hospital), Wright’s claim that Shriners Hospital wrongfully terminated her at-will violation of policy. also consider the of sufficiency the evidence to warrant the jury’s $50,000 verdict of against Russo, defendant Salvatore administrator, hospital for tortious interference with Wright’s employment with relationship Shriners Hospital. We hold that the evidence was insufficient to warrant either verdict and that the trial judge should have allowed the de- fendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We reverse the judgments for the and remand plaintiff case to the Court for the Superior of entry judgments for the defendants.
We summarize the evidence in the most light favorable to the plaintiff. v. Superintendent the Walter E. Fernald State Mass. Shriners nurse, hired Hospital Wright, registered in 1976. Subse she quently, became assistant director of nursing-, and she held that position until she was discharged in late February times, of 1987. At all she was an employee at will. Wright received excellent evaluations throughout her employment, December, including evaluation in two months June, 1986, before her discharge. In a former assistant head nurse wrote a letter to the director of clinical affairs Shriners national headquarters detailing concerns about s the medical staff and administration Shriner Hospital. Shriners is a Hospital separate but it is one of corporation, Shriners many facilities that are affiliated with the national letter, As a headquarters. result of the the national head administrator, Russo, notified quarters the defendant hospital that a team would survey visit Shriners Hospital Novem ber, 1986. Russo was He visibly upset. director spoke of nursing about the letter and asked her: “Are behind you this? Is Wright Anita behind this?” The director of nursing denied that she was for the letter. She did not responsible address the question whether was “behind” the Wright letter.
Wright v. Shriners in- in November and the hospital The team visited survey told sur- employees. Wright and other terviewed between there were communication problems team that vey staffs. She detailed nursing problems the medical and gave specific examples pa- the assistant chief staff Wright’s com- survey reported care team tient problems. assistant chief staff. ments his In prepared reports. Two members of the team 22, 1986, C. Dr. Newton McCol- issued on December organiza- affairs for the national director medical lough, tion, nursing between administra- relationships wrote: “The administration, tion, less and chief of staff are much *3 both re- and friction exists satisfactory, significant than and gard relationships nursing/administration nursing/medi- solving and cal staff Communication relationships. problem A efforts in this are to nonexistent.” poor report relationship 5, 1987, Hoard, ad- issued on Jack D. executive January organization, also docu- ministrator for national Shriners mented the between the problematic relationship nursing medical staff. Both recommended a site follow-up reports to survey determine the of this conflict on impact patient interview, McCollough’s care. stated that during report Wright had made severe criticisms of the medical staff and expressed concern over lack of consistent procedures and standards for care. Hoard’s stated that Wright discussed the breakdown in communication between staff, which she nursing attending staff medical leading among said morale nurses. deteriorating again Russo be- reading team’s Upon survey reports, came told it was the upset nursing the director of that an- nursing making fault the team was department’s also at a meet- managers’ other visit. He stated department December, 1986, in are ing spend “It seems there people their time to find fault with trying everything everyone does, and don’t here.” Russo those kinds of need people that, that, referring testified when he said he “possibly” survey to statements made to the team. After the survey November, 1986, visit, team’s speaking Russo stopped Wright or even acknowledging presence. survey 19, 1987, team returned on 18 and February specifically review the problems between the medical and nursing staffs. 26, On after February with the consulting chairman and sev- eral officers of the board of governors Shriners Hospital counsel, with national corporate Russo ordered that Wright’s be employment terminated for “patient care issues that had arisen as a result of the surveys.” contends, and the defendants dispute, that the jury would have been warranted in finding that Shriners Hospital fired her from her at will in employment retaliation for her having criticized the hospital, specifically regard quality care rendered to patients, to the Shriners national team. headquarters survey Wright further asserts that-such a violates retaliatory firing and is therefore ac- tionable. See Hobson McLean Hosp. Corp., Co., 416 (1988); DeRose v. Putnam Management Mass. It is a of law for the question judge to decide whether a retaliatory firing these circumstances Cos., would violate Mello v. & public policy. Stop Shop 561 n.7 (1988). We hold that a termination of Wright’s at will in for her critical re- reprisal marks to the team would not have violated public pol- *4 Therefore, icy. we need not address the matter of disputed the of the evidence to warrant sufficiency finding a that the firing was indeed in retaliation for the criticism.
We begin general with the rule that at will “[ejmployment is terminable either the or the without by employee notice, for almost reason or for no reason at all.” Jack any Dev., Inc., son v. Community Action Boston 9 (1988). recognized We have to that exceptions general rule, however, when is terminated to a contrary Thus, well-defined “[rjedress is available for public policy. who asserting legally guaran are terminated for employees claim), teed for do right (e.g., filing workers’ compensation the or for ing (e.g., serving jury), what law on requires committing to do that which the refusing (e.g., law forbids E. v. Walter perjury).” Superintendent Wright v. for Crippled Shriners Hospital held 149-150. We have also State Fernald who was to an at-will employee was available redress that en- with law for his cooperation retaliation discharged in his Flesner concerning employer. investigation forcement 805, 811 Corp., Technical Communications was not in Flesner (1991). Although required Legislature law to reasoned by cooperate, encouraging cooperation clearly expressed policy providing as indicated statutes investigations criminal in assisting investiga- reimbursement of expenses persons in in- grand for witnesses immunity testifying jury tions and Id. at 810. vestigations. law that public
The trial view of the judge’s policy fired in reprisal was violated if Shriners Hospital in with the sur- having criticized interviews jury, team. As is clear from his instructions vey view based on of doctors and duty “the judge’s part nurses, ethics, their own on sub- report found in code hesitate to declare stantial care issues.” We would patient organization code of professional ethical a private can be a source of need not recognized public policy. however, consider that because no code of ethics question, was introduced evidence in case. judge’s
It is also from view clear his instructions that was based in on state laws of the common “various part wealth, did judge abuse.” requiring reports not the State he had in mind. General Laws c. identify laws 119, 51A ed.), nurses and others make a (1990 requires § of Social Services report Department concerning any child under have eighteen years age who reason they believe is from or or suffering neglect. sexual abuse physical 19A, (a) ed.), G. L. c. nurses Similarly, (1990 requires §15 and others cause eld reasonable to believe that an suffering abuse to it to erly person Depart from ment (d) of Elder Affairs. Subsection of that provision pro *5 an discharge vides that no employer supervisor may or a L. c. 72G filing Finally, G. report. § to (1990 ed.), and others to the De- requires report nurses Public partment of Health (department) when they rea- son to believe that or of any resident a li- facility abused, mistreated, censed by department being or neglected costs, and a of treble provides remedy damages, and fees for attorney’s who is any employee discharged in retaliation a having made such None of these report. stat- situation, however, utes to Wright’s we applies are una- Also, any ware of statute that we does. are unaware of any statute a clearly legislative that to expresses encourage policy nurses to make the of internal involved type in this report fact, case. In Wright testified that she did not consider the abuse, patient care caused her concern to neglect, be or mistreatment to the warranting report nor did department, she feel that there was an issue of physician incompetence to warranting the board report registration medicine as G. L. (1990 c. 5F required ed.). § urges us to recognize regulation by- promulgated of Registration Board as Nursing a source public to policy general sufficient create an rule re- exception garding termination of at-will employment. Title Code (3) 3.02 Regs. (f) (1986) describes the responsibili- § nurse, ties and functions of a registered including respon- “collaborate, communicate and sibility cooperate appro- with other providers health care to ensure quality priate care.” continuity regulation Even if that called Wright or report perceived problems inadequacies team, a we doubtful have never held proposition, regu- lation source governing a is a of well- particular profession general defined at-will sufficient modify rule, Furthermore, we decline do so now. above, Wright’s as we have noted internal matter, matters,” said, have previously “[i]nternal be the to the at- “could not basis of a policy exception the Walter E. will rule.” v. Superintendent Mello & citing Stop Fernald State at supra Cos., 560-561. Shop good medi- with the dissent that the agree provision
cal It does not fol- care is in the interest. by hospitals *6 475 Children. Crippled v. Shriners Hospital however, should be im low, all health care employees that rule simply at-will general employment mune from issues that feel they to be claim they reporting because we supra, health care. In Smith-Pfeffer, are detrimental of a well-established public no violation held that there was discharged who an her employee an policy by. restructuring pro management plan actions in opposing as well as the acting the defendant superintendent posed by position per of the defendant to possible appointment at 147-150. Smith-Pfeffer, manent superintendent. and were plan appointment The opposition employee’s based, would restructuring on her that the in part, perception that it alter the such significantly management relationships and delivery would service residents” “compromise a threat to the institution well-being ] “constitute[ its 151. The defendant conceded that residents.” Id. at could have found that the jury performed “plaintiff in a manner” that “actions were duties superior retarded motivated a sincere commitment to the mentally unit,” in her terminated her residents that defendant maker, “to get regarded rid of an he as trouble get along.” he did not Id. at personally one whom Although pro 149. there is no less of a interest in vision care residents of a good quality public facility good for the retarded than in care for in a hospital, patients ex rejected the that the plaintiffs argument ception to the at-will rule should extend to protect employees desirable duties” socially were performing “appropriate, subject from without cause. Id. at 150. being discharge reasoned, would re argument “Essentially, plaintiffs rule ‘an general us to convert the quire employment-at- will be time for reason any contract terminated any [can] Co., all,’ v. Liberty or no reason at see Mut. Ins. Gram rule requires Mass. 668 n.6 into a 659,] [1981], [384 just pol cause terminate at-will employee. rule is not that icy to the at-will exception case, broad” (footnote omitted). We conclude Id. we did in that the evidence Smith-Pfeffer, did not warrant a verdict for the plaintiff.
We turn to the case-against the defendant admin istrator, Russo. “In an action for intentional *7 interference relations, with contractual the plaintiff must (1) that: prove he had a contract with third a the party; (2) defendant contract; the induced third to break knowingly party (3) interference, the defendant’s intentional, in addition to being means; was in motive or improper (4) the plaintiff Enters., harmed the defendant’s actions.” G.S. Inc. v. Marine, Inc., 262, Falmouth (1991), citing 410 Mass. 272 Geltman, 811, United Truck v. Leasing 406 Mass. Corp. (1990). 812-817 Even if the evidence would have warranted a fired finding Wright Russo in retaliation for hav ing team, matter we are de complained a not ciding, that evidence alone would not warranted a find motive, because, of ing held, improper have' had a corporation right discharge Wright for such a rea son. Wright’s As Russo a to fire supervisor, right Wright i.e., unless he did so a “malevolently, for spiteful, malignant unrelated interest.” Ser purpose, legitimate corporate 428, eni v. 24 Star Mass. Ct. Sportswear Mfg. Corp., App. 432-433 The record is devoid of evidence that Russo’s was unrelated to a le purpose discharging Wright the evidence gitimate corporate interest. conclude that a against insufficient to warrant verdict the defendant Russo.
We reverse the for the and remand to judgments plaintiff Court Superior judgments the entry defendants.
So ordered.
I
court’s con-
(dissenting).
disagree
Liacos,
C.J.
no public policy
clusion that
violates
hospital employer
to matters
when it fires an
employee
alerting supervisors
construed
from
care. The court has
detracting
good patient
477
469
v. Shriners Hospital
doctrine
exception
narrowly
public policy
far too
Moreover,
statutory
ba-
demanding
at will.
Legis-
has relinquished
the court
for public policy,
sis
I
law.
dissent.
the common
in shaping
lature its role
a cause
has
that “an at-will
It is well-established
discharge
contrary
if the
discharge
wrongful
of action for
Co., 398
Management
Putnam
DeRose v.
to public policy.”
clear violations
We have
(1986).1
perceived
210
Mass.
an employee
terminates
when
v. Superin-
see
(1) asserting
legal right,
for:
Mass.
E. Fernald State
tendent
the Walter
workers’
filing
compensation
(1989) (citing example
the law
see Hobson Mc-
claim);
doing
requires,
what
(2)
(1988) (enforcing
Lean
Hosp. Corp.,
forbids,
to do what the law
see
safety laws);
(3) refusing
*8
trial). In
DeRose,
testimony
at 210
false
ad-
(giving
dition,
in
“legal
we have
redress
certain circum-
established
important
stances for
terminated for
employees
performing
deeds,
absolutely require
even
the law does not
though
public
v.
of such deed.” Flesner
Technical Com-
performance
805,
(1991)
munications
410 Mass.
810-811
Corp.,
(cooper-
ating
government investigation).
with ongoing
adopted
exception.
majority
policy
1A
of other States have
See,
654,
Foley
Corp.,
e.g.,
(1988);
Interactive Data
Al Cal.
v.
3d
665
Co.,
124,
(1981);
Palmateer v. International Harvester
2d
128
85 Ill.
58,
Corp.,
Pierce
(1980).
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
84
71
But see
N.J.
293,
Murphy
Corp., 58
(1983)
v. American Home Prods.
300-302
N.Y.2d
(rejecting
public policy exception).
developed
public policy exception,
In addition to the
we have
another
exception
employment-at-will
Employment
contracts con-
doctrine.
good
dealing,
implied
tain an
which limits the
covenant of
faith
fair
See Fortune v.
employment may
conditions under which
be terminated.
Co.,
Register
(1977).
National Cash
373 Mass.
102
We have limited
application
exception
an
fires an
this
to cases in which
bonuses, commissions,
thereby deprives
or
him or
id.;
Co.,
Liberty
wages.
(1981). As
Gram v.
Mut. Ins.
See
“[T]he the definition public policy.” Palmateer v. International Co., Harvester 2d Ill. It is a rolé proper of the courts to construe the boundaries of “public policy” and thereby develop common law remedies available to at- will employees are Merrill, terminated. Cf. Schofield 244, 245, 247-248 (1982) (based on social values customs, consensus, and lack of community court refused to abolish “common law rule is not liable to landowner an adult trespasser injuries resulting from the land owner’s find negligence”). therefore, I it disturbing, that the role, court would relinquish requiring statutory ba sis for public The court policy. reads Flesner too In narrowly. case, relief provided because the was fired plaintiff performing deed, not important public because the plaintiff acting accordance deter legislatively mined public policy. The court also declines whether say public policy arises from such regula sources as nonstatutory tions or the ethical codes of organiza private professional tions. It thus defers unduly Legislature in defining the contours of the public exception. This in the policy deferral realm of law common The court deter inappropriate. must mine the boundaries of public by looking not policy, only law, law, but statutory judicial also administrative opin ions, and even professional (where codes of conduct those interest, codes serve a not the interests merely *9 See v. profession). Pierce Ortho 84 Corp., Pharmaceutical 58, N.J. 72 (1980). case,
In the acknowledg- instant court begin by the should ing good interest in the of undisputable public provision medical care by long recognized We have that hos- hospitals. “conduct with a pitals greatly general affected enterprises Pub. public interest.” Springfield Hosp. Commissioner of 704, Legislature clearly 709 Welfare, shares our hospitals concern with care.2 In patient general, policy statutory public 2The court states that there is no basis for allegedly by only statutes violated the defendant. It reviewed those has 479 412 469 v. Shriners Hospital ed.) See, (1990 L. c. e.g., G. heavily regulated. are § Health). Public of Department of license from (requirement in their “for report have provisions by-laws must Hospitals might . . . be in a health care ing by provider conduct care or good patient safety.” or harmful to consistent with L. c. ed.). Under G. (a) (1990 L. c. G. § § —rights a multitude of ed.), 70E (1990 patients possess re to to right reasonably responses example, prompt and the their background physicians hospi to data on quests, cases, treatment, tal, in some to on their and information care em good treatments —that promote all alternative between health care bargaining Collective patients. powering employees facilities and their nursing nonprofessional control, “in of subject preserv also to the interests statutory of health care ing the continuity improving quality 150A, (1990 ed.). within the G. L. c. In commonwealth.” § addition, administrative rules and are con many regulations See, cerned good e.g., with the of care. provision patient Regs. (f) (1986) Code Mass. 3.02 of (3) (requirement § “collaborate, Board of Registration Nursing that nurses communicate and with other health cooperate appropriate care to ensure providers continuity care”). quality care,
Given it good interest in must be patient if Commonwealth to not en- public policy protect, detri- courage, employees who hospital perceive report ments to care. can patient when are identified Only problems addressed; be an failure they adequately employee’s report detriments to care allow the perceived problems patient may A therefore violates persist. pol- when it fires an icy trying improve qual- Hobson, Cf. ity (violation care. at 416 That enforcing law). terminate employee deter other from employer may employees reporting requiring neglect, and others to I nurses cases abuse and whereas *10 range reflecting refer to a the quality broader statutes concern over patient care. (for fear of
problems losing jobs) their inhibits the provision of good care and patient offends the public interest. plaintiff
The was terminated for reporting problems affect- national, care to ing patient a private, supervisory organiza- her, According tion.3 these problems were causing lowered among morale nurses and conflicts between physicians nurses, in which turn affected the quality care.4 As the plaintiff’s comments concerned issues affecting patient care, the case does not involve a matter internal to the hospi- tal over which the See Mello v. Stop has no concern. public Cos., Shop & Furthermore, 560-561 unlike the situation in Smith-Pfejfer, supra at the plain- tiff raised concerns over employee relationships, not over hos- The pital policy. plaintiff not terminated for contributing to the hospital’s problems, nor for her su- refusing accept pervisor’s method of the addressing problems; she was fired the reporting problems to accreditation au- appropriate thorities. Such termination offends the interest and I actionable. dissent. 3The court not the does address defendants’ contention that there was finding support jury insufficient evidence to of termination in retaliation light for critical comments. A of the review evidence the most favorable plaintiff, following: ante plaintiff the see reveals the received evaluations; supervisor upset excellent a sur when he learned that vey hospital, questioned plaintiff team would visit the whether he the visit; instigated plaintiff hospital criticized defendant; team, and supervi her statements were made known suggesting sor made a comment that the would terminate em criticisms, ployment of those made and he admitted that the comment might supervisor plaintiff; referred to the refused to talk to the plaintiff acknowledge after learned of he her statements refused evidence, presence. clearly Based warranted in con jury were cluding plaintiff’s due termination was to her critical comments. neglect problems did patients 4The not have to amount to abuse or order to raise issue of concern.