Melvin WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Doctor RAO, Health Services Director, Abbasey, M.D., Doctor Carl J. Konigsman, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-4616-pr.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Nov. 23, 2015.
Weinstein has not alleged that the defendants concealed his causes of action, but that he was prevented from accessing certain evidence. Fraudulent concealment doctrine excuses a plaintiff‘s late filing of a complaint if the defendants concealed the cause of action itself. See Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.2004); Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir.2002). Weinstein confuses the “distinction between fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action and fraudulent concealment of facts that, if known, would enhance a plaintiff‘s ability to prevail as to a cause of action of which the plaintiff was previously aware.” See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 84. Therefore, Weinstein‘s excuse for his delay—that the defendants concealed emails that would have provided factual support for his claims—does not constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting tolling. Cf. Brown v. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir.2002) (Sotomayor, J.); Miller v. Int‘l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir.1985).
Weinstein‘s motions to supplement the record on appeal are denied. “Absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court will not enlarge the record on appeal to include evidentiary material not presented to the district court.” Okoi v. El Al Israel Airlines, 378 Fed.Appx. 9, 11 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (citing Int‘l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir.1975)). Weinstein has not alleged any extraordinary circumstance warranting our consideration of the new evidence he seeks to submit.
We have considered Weinstein‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Weinstein‘s motions to supplement the record are DENIED.
Melvin Wright, pro se, Gowanda, N.Y., for Appellant.
Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General (Jonathan D. Hitsous, Andrew B. Ayers, Assistant Solicitors General, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, N.Y., for Appellees.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, REENA RAGGI and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff Melvin Wright, proceeding pro se, appeals from a summary judgment award in favor of defendants on his claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical need under
We review grants of summary judgment de novo and will affirm only if the record, viewed in favor of the non-moving party, shows that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Jackson v. Federal Express, 766 F.3d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir.2014). A plaintiff pursuing an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison medical care must adduce evidence that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). “[T]he deliberate indifference standard embodies both an objective and a subjective prong. Objectively, the alleged deprivation must
The parties do not dispute that Wright‘s neck and back pain was an objectively serious medical condition. Rather, Wright faults the district court‘s determination that he raised no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants’ culpable state of mind. Upon our own record review, we reach the same conclusion as the district court. The record shows that defendants did not ignore Wright‘s condition but, rather, offered various pain relievers and muscle relaxants to manage his pain, which Wright refused because he said they did not help. Further, defendant Rao referred Wright to a specialist. Insofar as defendants denied Wright‘s request for stronger painkillers (including an opioid), the record reflects defendants’ concerns about liver damage, in light of Wright‘s Hepatitis C diagnosis, and Wright‘s history of drug abuse. Wright‘s disagreement with this choice of treatment is not evidence of defendants’ deliberate indifference to his condition. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir.1998) (“It is well-established that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.“); see also Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir.2011) (affirming dismissal where inmate was prescribed Motrin for his nerve condition but sought stronger pain medication and “nerve conduction study“).
Nor does Wright raise a genuine issue as to whether defendants were subjectively indifferent through evidence that doctors at other correctional facilities prescribed stronger painkillers and, eventually, surgery. Even if this evidence indicated medical malpractice by defendants, that would
We have considered Wright‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.