149 Ga. 777 | Ga. | 1920
(After stating the foregoing facts.) In the view we take of this case, the answers made by the jury are contrary to
There was iron ore on the land. This fact was undisputed. This ore had some value. According to the recitals in the plaintiff’s deed to H. P. Lumpkin, he received $300 in money for the mineral interest in the land, more than a quarter of a century before the execution of the bond to the defendant. We are forced to the conclusion that the evidence demanded a finding that the land, by reason of the previous conveyance of the mineral interest and rights therein, was less valuable than it would have been if such interest and rights had not been sold. For reasons that are obvious, the land was rendered less valuable by the grant of the permanent easement to the telephone company. Under the bond for title as it stood, the defendant, or his assigns, was entitled to an absolute or fee-simple estate in the land. “An absolute or fee-simple estate is one in which the owner is entitled to the entire property, with unconditional power of disposition during his life, and descending to his heirs and legal representatives upon his death intestate.” Civil Code, § 3657. Under our code, real estate “includes all lands and the buildings thereon, and all things permanently attached to either, or any interest therein or issuing out of or dependent thereon. The right of the owner of lands extends downward and upward indefinitely.” Civil Code, § 3617. A conveyance of the absolute or fee-simple estate in a tract of land would of course carry with it all mines, minerals, and clays in and under the same. An absolute estate in land carries with it the exclusive and unrestricted right to occupy, use, and dispose of the same. The right to possess, use, and to exclude every one else from interfering with a tract of land is not only a right, in all
We have not dealt with other assignments of error madq in the bill of exceptions; and we are not to be understood as holding that the jury might not have been authorized to return a verdict for the plaintiff for the balance of the purchase-money, upon other issues in the case. None of the other issues were passed upon by the jury. We have, however, examined the record for the’purpose of ascertaining whether a judgment or decree for the plaintiff was demanded by the evidence on any of such issues; and while we do not pass upon the questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize a finding for the plaintiff upon any of such issues, we are of the opinion that the evidence on none of the other issues demanded a verdict or judgment for the plaintiff. Since, therefore, the answers to the only questions passed upon by the jury are contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support them, the court erred in overruling the motion for new trial.
Judgment reversed.