169 Ga. 354 | Ga. | 1929
Lead Opinion
It is well settled by its decisions that this court will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional and void unless the repugnancy between the act and the constitution is clear and palpable. This court will never set aside a legislative enactment in a doubtful case. This principle is especially applicable in eases where the constitutionality of tax acts is questioned. Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229 (116 S. E. 795).
The county insists that the act of August 24, 1927, which imposes upon each distributor of motor-fuels engaged in such business in this State an occupation tax of 4 cents per gallon for each and every gallon of such fuel imported and sold within this State, or imported and withdrawn for use within this State, or manufactured, refined, produced, or compounded within this State, and sold for use or consumption within this State, or used and consumed within this State by the manufacturer, refiner, producer, or compounder, is unconstitutional and void because it violates article 3, section 7, paragraph 8, of the constitution of Georgia, which declares in part that “No law or ordinance shall pass which . . contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.” The specific contention is that the title of the act imposes a tax of 3-1/2 cents per gallon on motor-fuels, whereas the body of the act imposes a tax of 4 cents on gasoline and 1 cent on kerosene; that the title levies a tax only upon fuel distributors engaged in business, while the body levies a tax upon all fuel distributors whether engaged in business or not; that the title attempts to levy an occupation tax upon all distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this State, while the body in sections 1 and 1(b) attempts to levy a tax upon a political subdivision which is not engaged in business, but which merely withdraws its own fuel for its own use, and that there is nothing in the title of the act to indicate that a political subdivision of the State would be required to pay an occupation tax,
It is next insisted that the caption of the act recites that it is one “providing for an occupation tax upon all distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this State,” and that this provision of the title is not broad enough to cover the imposition of an occupation tax upon political subdivisions of this State. This position is not sound. The caption states that the purpose of this act is to impose an occupation tax upon all distributors engaged in the business of distributing these products. The expression “all distributors” is broad enough to cover political subdivisions of the State. It is true that, if the body of the act had not gone further in its language in imposing the tax than the above language of the caption, the courts woirld not construe the act to embrace political subdivisions of the State. In other words, the act must be broad enough in its terms to show clearly that it was the intention of the legislature to impose a tax on such subdivisions; and if this does not clearly appear from the terms of the act, the courts would not construe it to impose an occupation tax upon such political subdivisions. Where, however, the words of the caption indicate the imposition of an occupation tax upon all distributors engaged in business in this State, and the body of the act defines distributors as including political subdivisions of the' State, and clearly imposes such tax upon subdivisions, the act will not be declared unconstitutional because it contains matter different from what is expressed in the title.
This section of the constitution does not require that the title should contain a synopsis of the law. Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21, 21 (50 Am. D. 306). The general object of the law is all that need be indicated by the title. Howell v. State, 11 Ga. 224, 221 (51 Am. R. 259). Minute details should be omitted, Provisions germane to the general subject-matter embraced in the title of an act, and which are designed to carry into effect the purpose for which it is passed, may be constitutionally enacted therein, though not referred to in the title otherwise than by the use of the words “and for other purposes.” Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15 (52 S. E.
We can see no valid reason why the legislature in the body of an act can not define words or terms used in the caption. This is now very common in legislative practice. So where the legislature in the caption of an act recites that its purpose is to levy an occupation tax on all distributors engaged in business in this State, it could in the body of the act constitutionally define the word “distributors” and the expression “ engaged in business,” without thereby making the act obnoxious to this provision of the constitution. Definitions in the body of the act of words or general terms appearing in the caption do not infringe this constitutional provision. So under the caption of this act it was competent for the legislature in the body of the act to define the expression “all distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this State,” and to declare that this term should embrace political subdivisions of the State, although such subdivisions were not engaged in selling such products to the public for gain, but were merely importing and withdrawing them from the tank-cars or other original containers or packages, in which they weré imported for their own use in this State. In Tarver v. Albany, 160 Ga. 351 (137 S. E. 856), this court held that the caption, “An act providing for the annual registration of motor-vehicles and motorcycles,” etc., was broad enough to cover the registration of all motor-vehicles and motorcycles, including those belonging to and used by municipal corporations. It was held in Lee v. State, 163 Ga. 339 (135 S. E. 913), that the title of this act was broad enough to authorize a provision making penal
This act is further attacked upon the ground that it violates paragraph 2 of section 6 of .article 7 of the constitution of this State, which provides that “The General Assembly shall not have power to delegate to any county the right to levy a tax for any purpose, except for educational purposes; to build and repair the public buildings and bridges; to maintain and support prisoners; to pay jurors and coroners, and for litigation, quarantine, roads, and expenses of courts; to support paupers, and pay debts heretofore existing; to pay the county police, and to provide for necessary sanitation.” 5 Park’s Code, § 6562. It is apparent from a casual reading of this section that it does not impose any limitation upon the power of the State to levy taxes. It imposes only a limitation upon the power of the legislature to authorize the counties of this State to levy taxes. It in no way interferes with the general power of the State to impose taxes. This act does not undertake to authorize the counties of the State to levy any tax. It does not authorize them to levy the occupational tax therein provided for. The State in its sovereign capacity imposes this occupational tax. For this reason the act in no way conflicts with this constitutional provision. But it is insisted that the counties can not expend any of their funds for any purposes except those mentioned in this provision of the constitution. Granting for the sake of the argument that this proposition is correct, the legislature can authorize counties to levy taxes for constructing, improving, and keeping in repair roads and bridges, and for educational purposes. We see no valid reason why the legislature can not require counties to levy taxes for these purposes, where such levies are not otherwise prohibited by the constitution of this State. This being so, there is no constitutional impediment in the way of the legislature imposing a property tax upon the property of counties, and an occupational tax on them based on and measured by units of property acquired and used by them in the conduct of the business of the counties, especially when the proceeds of the tax are applied to some or all of the above purposes. If the counties can use the public funds for purchasing motor-fuels
It is further urged that this act violates paragraph 1 of section 2 of article 7 of the constitution of this State, which declares that “All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” Civil Code (1910), § 6553. The ground upon which this attack upon the constitutionality of this act is put is that the classification for taxation of distributors of motor-fuels, as contained in said act, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unnatural, because it seeks to place in the same class and tax under one head distributors of motor-fuels engaged in business as an occupation and for profit, and a political subdivision of the State not engaged in business, which uses such fuels for a purely governmental purpose. It is conceded that a classification for the purposes of taxation must be reasonable, and not unreasonable or arbitrary. Carroll v. Wright, 131 Ga. 728 (63 S. E. 260); United Cigar Stores Co. v. Stewart, 144 Ga. 724 (87 S. E. 1034); Wright v. Hirsch, supra. This statute declares in its title that it is “An act providing for an occupation tax úpon all distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this State.” The first section -of the act defines the words “distributors” as including “any person, association of persons, firm, corporation, and political subdivision of this State,” that (a) imports or causes to be imported, and sells at wholesale or retail or otherwise within this State, any of the fuels or kerosene specified in said act, (b) imports or causes to be imported and withdraws for use within this State, by himself or others, any of such fuels or kerosene from the tank-car or original container or package in which they are imported into this State, and (c) manufactures, refines, produces, or compounds any of such fuels or kerosene within this State, and sells the same at wholesale or retail or otherwise for use or consumption therein. Acts 1927, p. 104. Here the classification is of all distributors of motor-fuels. Tn its definition of the word “distributors” the act embraces all
This brings us to consider and decide the important question whether this classification is arbitrary or unreasonable because it imposes upon political subdivisions of the State an unlawful tax. In its last analysis the question for decision under the facts is this: Can the State tax the property of counties or impose upon them an occupational tax when they engage in some line of business incidental to their governmental functions? The constitution of this State declares, in paragraph 1 of section 1 of article 4, that “The right of taxation is a sovereign right, inalienable, indestructible, is the life of the State, and rightfully belongs to the people in ail republican governments.” Civil Code (1910), § 6462. As we have seen, the constitution declares that “All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” This court has construed this to mean that all property within the limits of the State is subject to taxation, except such as
Under the above provision of the constitution of this State, the legislature is expressly authorized to exempt public property from taxation, and there is a necessary implication therefrom that the legislature can tax all public property of municipalities and counties. The power to exempt from the burden of taxation necessarily implies the power to impose such taxes. Independently of
By many authorities the State, independently of the above implication arising from the constitutional grant of authority to the legislature to exempt public property from taxation, may expressly impose or authorize such levies upon public property, in the absence of constitutional exemption. Trustees v. Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667, 681; Worcester County v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193 (17 Am. R. 159); Somerville v. Waltham, 170 Mass. 160 (48 N. E. 1092); Newark v. Verona, 59 N. J. L. 94 (34 Atl. 1060); Mayor &c. of Jersey City v. Blum, (N. J.) 127 Atl. 214; State v. Preston, 103
In Dispensary Commissioners v. Thornton, 106 Ga. 106, 108 (31 S. E. 733), this court quoted and approved the principle in 2 Cooley on Taxation, § 621, in which it is stated that “All such property is taxable, if the State shall see fit to .tax it.” This court went further and said that the same principle applies where the tax is one' on business or occupation. So we are of the opinion that this act constitutionally imposed this occupation tax upon political subdivisions of this State engaged in this business. This is so without regard to the profit of the business. Sheffield v. Board of Comm’rs., 111 Ga. 1 (36 S. E. 302). The county can not lawfully conduct this business without paying this tax. If it is without the funds with which to pay this tax, it will have to quit the business.
This act is further attacked upon the ground that it violates the commerce clause of the constitution of the United States. It is unquestionably true that Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce among the several States, and that any attempt by the State to place a burden upon such commerce in the shape of a tax or otherwise is illegal and unconstitutional. City of Atlanta v. York Manufacturing Co., 155 Ga. 33 (116 S. E. 195). A license or occupation tax or any charge for a license to sell goods moving in interstate commerce is in effect a tax on the goods themselves, and violates the above provision of the Federal constitution. Crump v. McCord, 154 Ga. 147 (113 S. E. 534). The tax involved in this case is air excise or occupation tax. It is not a tax upon property. It is levied upon “persons and political subdivisions of this State.” The measure of the tax is the quantity of motor-fuels used or sold. Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466 (42 Sup. Ct. 375); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (41 Sup. Ct. 606);
Applying the above principles, the court below erred in not sustSiining the demurrer and in granting a perpetual injunction.
Judgment reversed.
except
Dissenting Opinion
who dissent, being of the opinion that the body of the act referred to in the second headnote contains matter different from what is expressed in the title. The title shows that the act is to be one “providing for an occupation tax upon all distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this State.” We'can not agree that the expression, “distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business,” indicates that counties which buy oil to be used by them and distributed for the use of the county among its officials and employees, who are under the necessity of using motor-fuels and kerosene in their