92 N.J. Eq. 508 | New York Court of Chancery | 1921
This bill is for an accounting of the profits made by the defendant in constructing Camp> Merritt (Tenafly, New Jersey), under a contract with the federal government, and to recover one-half thereof.
The contract, like others, let by the government during the war for the building of cantonments, was on a cost plus ten per cent, profit basis, and it yielded the defendant approximately
In Tool Company v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, Norris procured from the United States government a contract for the Tool Company for muskets, through "concentrating influence at the war department”—that is, through letters from persons of supposed influence with the secretary of war, and bjr personal introduction to the secretary by a United States senator. He was promised, if he succeeded in landing a contract, all in excess of $17 per musket the government would pay. The suit was for an accounting, and in holding the promise to be against public policy and void, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the United States supreme court, said: "All contracts for supplies should be made with those, and with those only, who will execute them most faithful^, and at the least expense to the government. Considerations as to the most efficient and economical mode of meeting the public wants should alone control, in this respect, the action of every department of the government. No other consideration can lawfully enter into’ the transaction, so far as the government is concerned. Such is the rule of public policy; and whatever tends to introduce any other, elements into the
‘"The principle which determines the invalidity of the agreement in question has been asserted in a great variety of cases. It has been asserted in cases relating to- agreements for compensation to procure legislation. These have been uniformly declared invalid, and the decisions have not turned upon the question whether improper influences were contemplated or used, but upon the corrupting tendency of the agreements. Legislation should be prompted solely from considerations of the public good and the best means of advancing it. Whatever tends to divert the attention of legislators from their high duties to mislead their judgments, or to substitute other motives for their conduct than the advancement of the public interests, must necessarily and directly tend to impair the integrity of our political institutions. Agreements for compensation contingent upon success, suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil and strikes down the contract from its inception.”
In Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, the Turkish consul-general, in New York, through his personal influence with Rustam Bey, a representative of the Turkish, government, secured for his government a contract for rifles for the Remington Arms Company, for which the Arms company had agreed to pay him a percentage of the total contract price. The agreement was held to be invalid and unenforceable. Mr. Justice Field again spoke the eoiirt’s opinion, saying: “But, independently of the official relation of the plaintiff to his government, the personal influence which he stipulated to exert upon another officer of that government was not the subject of bargain and sale. Personal influence to be exercised over an officer of government in the procurement of contracts, as justly observed by counsel, is not a vendable article in our system of laws and morals, and the courts of the United States will not lend their aid to the vendor to col
In a recent case in England (Montefiore v. Menday Motor Components Co., Ltd. (1918), Eng. L. Rep. 2 K. B. 241), it appeared that the defendant agreed with the plaintiff that if he would procure an advance of capital (war loan) for it from the English government, it would pay him ten per cent, of the amount so. secured and allot him forty shares of its stock. It was shown that the plaintiff was to recommend the defendant, and exercise his influence with servants of tire crown, and it was found that the true consideration of the bargain was that the plaintiff should use his position and the value of his good word in favor of the defendant in getting government assistance. In addressing itself to the illegality of the contract, the court said: “A contract may be against public policy either from the nature of the acts to be performed or from the nature of the consideration. In my judgment, it is contrary to public policy that a person should be hired for money or valuable consideration when he has access to persons of influence to use his position and interest to procure a benefit from the government. This was expressly decided by Lord Eldon in Norman v. Cole (1800), 3 Esp. 253, when he said: ‘I cannot suffer this cause to proceed. I am of opinion this action is not maintainable; where a person interposes his interest and good offices to procure a pardon, it ought to be done gratuitously, and not for money; the doing an act of that description should proceed from pure motives not from pecuniary ones.’. So long ago as the reign of Edward VI. it was provided by the statute of 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16, that it was illegal to bargain for any brokerage or money for the transference of an office, or any part of an office, concerning the .receipt, controllment or payment of any money or revenues of the crown. And a later statute (49 Geo. 3, c. 126) made it a misdemeanor to receive money for any office, place or employment particularly specified in that act. * * * It is well settled that in judging this question one has to look at the tendency of' the acts contení
Other cases which are in denial of the complainants’ right to recover are: Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 13 How. 314; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441; Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U. S. 71; Crocker v. United States, 240 U. S. 74; Hayward v. Nordberg Manufacturing Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 4; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen (Mass.) 152; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; McCallum v. Corn Products Co., 116 N. Y. Supp. 118; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 315; Elkarl County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238; Chippewa Valley & S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & C. Ry. Co., 75 Wis. 224; 44 N. W. Rep. 17; Hare v. Phaup, 23 Okla. 575; 101 Pac. Rep. 1050; Kaufman v. Catzen, 81 F. Va. 1; 94 S. E. Rep. 388; Wood v. M'Cann, 6 Dana (Ky.) 366; Gil v. Williams, 12 La. Ann. 219; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. M’Coy, 8 Kans. 538; M’Bratney v. Chandiler, 22 Kans. 692; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 361.
The cases in New Jersey are Gulick v. Ward, 10 N. J. Law 87; Hope v. Linden Park Blood Horse Association, 58 N. J. Law 627; Slocum v. Wooley, 48 N. J. Eq. 451, and Brooks v. Cooper, 50 N. J. Eq. 761. In Hope v. Linden Park Blood Horse Association, Chancellor McGill, speaking for the court of errors and appeals., said in part: “It is too well established to admit of question that an agreement which controls or restricts, or tends or is calculated to control or restrict, the free exercise of a discretion for the public good, vested in one acting in a public official capacity, is illegal and so reprobated by the courts that no redress will 'be given to a party who sues for himself in respect of it.” In Brooks v. Cooper, Mr. Justice Lipjoincott, for
The bill will be dismissed, with costs.