Wright v. District Court in & for the County of Jefferson

Gen., Wallace, Patricia A. Sol. Asst. Atty.

Gen., Denver, for respondent-appellee. Lloyd WRIGHT, Petitioner,

DUBOFSKY, Justice. The DISTRICT COURT In and For the petitioner-appellant, Casler, Donald JEFFERSON, COUNTY OF State of appeals the Arapahoe County district Colorado, Joseph and the Honorable P. discharge court’s petition his for a writ Lewis, Judges thereof, one of the Re of habeas corpus. The district court dis- spondents charged the writ because the warrant and . supporting documents substantially charged No. 82SA371. petitioner with violation of parole his Court of appeal, Florida. On the petitioner claims En Banc. that extradition should be denied because he was longer detained for than days April 18, 1983. arrest, after his in violation of section 16- 19-116, (1978 8).1 Repl.Vol. C.R.S. We

affirm the district court’s discharge of the

petition.

The petitioner was Arapahoe arrested in

County 21, 1981, on December on the

ground that he parole had violated his

Florida. appeared He in court January

25, 1982, days later. Colorado authori

ties served the petitioner with the Colorado

governor’s 21, 1982. warrant on March

petitioner petition filed a seeking a writ of corpus

habeas on March 1982. The dis

trict court discharged the writ on April petitioner appeal contends on

his detention contravenes the mandate of

section 16-19-116 that fugitive awaiting

requisition documents be committed to the

county jail “for such a time exceeding

thirty days.” It is well settled that issues

relating to the fugitive detention of a governor’s

rendered moot once a valid war- Nelson,

rant is issued. Schumm P.2d (Colo.1983); Nelson, Morris v. 659 P.2d (Colo.1983); Caldwell, Michaels v. (Colo.1982); Whittington v. Bray, (1980). Thus, Colo.

petitioner’s argument is without merit.

Judgment affirmed. provides: 1. Section exceeding thirty days specified 16-19-116 time not and as in the warrant as will enable the arrest of the judge “If from the examination before the it accused to be made under a warrant of the appears person person held is the governor requisition on a of the executive au- charged having committed the al- crime thority having jurisdiction of the state and, leged except arising in cases under section offense, gives provid- unless the accused bail as 16-19-107, justice, that he has fled from legally ed in shall, or until he is judge reciting a warrant the accusa- discharged.” tion, county jail commit him to the for such a Supp., provides remedy exclusive workplace injury

for a immunizes Dr. malpractice from Cobb’s action be- Wright Wright’s cause of status as a co-employee. cases, on California Relying County the Jefferson District Court denied motion, finding Wright that Dr. occu- dual of pied co-employee Wright physician and that remained liable any negligence for committed with- Cobb scope relation- ship. Wright brought original proceed- Dr. this Anderson, DeMoulin, Campbell and Lau- the district court exceeded ing alleging that P.C., Black, Campbell, Laird J. Fern

gesen, jurisdiction refusing its to dismiss the Denver, petitioner. for co-employee immunity. on the basis of suit properly We hold that the district court III, George Carpen- J. Nichols William L. Wright’s Dr. status as an concluded that Lakewood, ter, respondents. for operate of Coors does not as a DUBOFSKY, Justice. total actions co-em- bar Wright’s such as Cobb. Dr. original proceeding, In we issued tionship with Cobb was identical to that respondent dis- why rule to show cause private practice patient. a doctor in with a Lloyd denying petitioner trict court’s order relationship is distinct from the em- This mal- to dismiss a medical Wright’s motion relationship; it entails different ployment him should practice against action rights Clearly, private and duties. We now vacated and the case dismissed. malpractice. would be liable to Cobb the rule. discharge logical There is no reason to treat (Coors) em- Company Adolph Coors Thus, the rule physicians differently. medical doc- a licensed ploys petitioner, from suits employees which immunizes to its em- tor, to medical services render co-employees negligence their within October, a full-time basis. ployees on inapplicable the course 1980, Wright Dr. treated Coors here. suffered in an for back Troy Cobb long recognized missed almost a California has on-the-job accident. Cobb Wright may as Dr. recovering from the acci- doctor such month of work operate Cobb’s result- dent. and Cobb settled Coors from mal and is not shielded compensation.

ant claim for worker’s Sev- reason of that status. job, Cobb actions days eral after he returned Angeles, Los brought D’Angona County then reinjured his back. Cobb 613 P.2d 238 Wright, Cal.Rptr. Dr. Cal.3d against action Rogers, Cal.App.3d misdiagnosed inju- his Hoffman alleging Wright (1972); Duprey Cal.Rptr. to work before and advised him to return ry (1952).1 Shane, 249 P.2d 8 moved 39 Cal.2d Wright he had recovered. Dr. fully in addition to Califor jurisdictions ground to dismiss the action on the Several Act, capacity ap dual adopted nia have Colorado Workmen’s Mining Vesel v. Jardine 8-40-101, proach. seq., section C.R.S.1973 employ.” California, permits in the same Cal.Labor Code Like actions Colorado (West 1971) (1981 Supp.) persons by injured employees against authorizes third § tort “any person against damages aggravation other than the em- actions which arise from 8-52-108(1), ployer.” injury. C.R. an industrial Section S.1973 actions “another authorizes tort effects of a workplace injury. Robbins v. Mont. (N.H.1982); Guy v. Seekamp, Supp.; 444 A.2d 537 C.R.S.1973 and 1982 Ill. 48, ¶ 138.8(a) (Smith-Hurd Arthur Thomas 55 Ohio St.2d ch. Ann.Stat. Presbyterian Tatrai v. 1977) (1981 Supp.); Wis.Stat.Ann. 102.- 247, 439 A.2d University Hospital, 497 Pa. 42(1) (West 1979) (1982 Supp.). The Su- (1982). But see McCormick v. Cater Illinois preme Courts of and Wisconsin in- 352, 53 pillar Tractor 85 Ill.2d Ill.Dec. terpret provisions obligating those as an 207, (1981); Trotter v. Lit 423 N.E.2d 876 employer provide to medical services as an Inc., (Miss.1979); ton 370 244 Systems, So.2d and, therefore, incident of con- Iserson, 421, and v. 33 N.Y.2d 353 Garcia compensation act clude 955, (1974). 420 But N.Y.S.2d the sole remedy malpractice by company Sabourin, 309, see also Jenkins v. 104 Wis.2d health v. providers. Caterpillar, McCormick (1981) (refusing adopt to N.W.2d 878; 209, 53 Ill.Dec. at 423 N.E.2d at Jen- in action capacity approach dual Sabourin, kins v. 311 N.W.2d at 604-5. In acknowledging nurse but cases, reasoning of the dissent is both to company physician remains amenable persuasive. more Workmen’s Colorado’s suit in tort outside Wisconsin’s worker’s Compensation require Act does not Coors or Indiana, act). Georgia, and employer operate other to maintain and any ra Texas have followed the dual un- employer voluntarily a clinic. When an tionale in medical permitting treat- directly dertakes to render medical on an inde against company claims doctors injured it assumes a employees, ment to its Greene, Gay contractor v. pendent theory. Act required by function which is not 78, Ga.App. S.E.2d and, which is not significant, what is most (Ind. v. 419 N.E.2d 1322 Sage, McDaniel By moving of its integral part an business. Barber, App.1981); v. 381 S.W.2d McKelvy for medical services to render- paying from (Tex.1964).2 employer generates an ing directly, them are unrelated to the em- obligations which Caterpillar Tractor

Both McCormick relationship, McCormick v. Cater- ployment turn on statu- Co. and Jenkins v. Sabourin 211-12, 53 Ill.Dec. at 423 N.E.2d at pillar, which we find uncon- tory interpretation J., (Simon, dissenting); 880-881 Jenkins v. vincing. Like Illinois and Wis- Sabourin, (Abrahamson, 311 N.W.2d at 613 acts consin have worker’s J., new doc- dissenting), and which create a require employer which an to furnish such tor-patient relationship. metamorpho- to relieve the necessary medical care as is Congress help long- explicitly referring the shoremen, intent of 2. While not to the dual ca- dominant liability pacity distinguish the United States between applied approval longshoremen injured precisely in Reed this test with the same under Yaka, pay 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. circumstances because some draw their Reed, (1963). found shipowner L.Ed.2d 448 the Court directly and others from a from inju- personal that an who defended a stevedoring company doing ship’s service. remedy ry action on the basis of the exclusive protection from unsea- Petitioner’s need for provision Longshoremen’s and Harbor more nor less than that worthiness was neither Compensation Act liable to his Workers’ was stevedoring working longshoreman of a for a employee as a bareboat charterer company. slightly As we said in a different arising char- from the unseaworthiness context, subjected to the same ‘Allwere factual Finding exclusivity provision tered vessel. danger. All were to like treatment entitled ” apply, not to the Court stated: under law.’ superficial “[O]nly omitted) blind adherence (footnotes 83 S.Ct. at 373 U.S. at ignore meaning prompt of a statute could us to Longmire was followed 1353. The Reed rule only was not an em the fact that Pan-Atlantic ployer (5th Drilling Corp., Cir. Sea 610 F.2d v. 1980) longshoremen a bare- but was also Carriers, Transpacific Napoli and and, operator ship boat such, of a as charterer and (2nd 1976). Congress amended F.2d 505 Cir. traditional, charged with the abso was 5(b) Longshoremen’s and Harbor lute, nondelegable obligation of seaworthi provide Compensation Act in 1972 to Workers’ permitted ness which it should not be under the Act were exclusive. that remedies produce avoid.... We think it would a harsh 92-576, November P.L. effective result, keeping incongruous one out and the worker critical, ty proof without fault for while relationships sis “[i]t in- physical to cause of action in tort virtually impossible potential surrenders causes check[,] very possi- by writing a jury schedule of benefits. [i]t for a more limited injury by administer- physical ble to cause have cer- most accidents While ”. patient... to a ing medical treatment justify which tort im- tain characteristics Larson, Compensation Insurer co-employees, munity employers L.J. Third 6 Duke Party, as Suable present are not when these characteristics Larson, But see 2A Work- (1969). Five tortfeasor is a doctor. Law, 72.60, seq. men’s length distinctions are discussed salient Jenkins, York: No-Duty Buie in New York de- Michigan and New Although Be Company Doctors Considered Co- Should capacity approach apply cline to Hofstra L.R. 675-680 employees?, 9 clinics, both company-run the context adoption of the dual (1981), support where followed the doctrine states have approach. public are rendered to a medical services First, compensation scheme the worker’s the which also treats employee hospital at a workplace most on the fact based Harafajee, general public. Fletcher v. in man- without fault or a accidents occur (1980); Volk 440, 299 N.W.2d 53 Mich.App. nearly of fault im- making assignment ner York, 284 N.Y. of New City assumption is not relevant possible. This County of Stevens malpractice, injuries resulting from medical Nassau, 56 A.D.2d 392 N.Y.S.2d compare production Garcia v. Is- (N.Y.App.Div.1977); away occurs from the which erson, drawn is that supra. The distinction judged be area, identify, is easier to and can hospital in a employee the who is treated standards. of ascertainable medical light to the receiving the same services available Second, immunity embodies co-employee seen in a the who is public, while accidents are recognition of clinic is treated as an incident company conduct than a result of unreasonable less a reasoning, the Under employment. highly technological age. concomitant of a a cause of action former is allowed occupational accidents which Unlike the co- by the is barred malpractice but latter with working of consequence an inevitable persuaded are not immunity. We malpractice is equipment, medical complex public It is not the this distinction. is inherent nor a risk that neither inevitable creates a dual of medicine which process. production it is attending physician; for the capacity medicine, spe- with its very practice the of Third, compensation is based which responsibilities, cial duties employer is in the part premise on obligations of the a doctor with all charges co-employee than a position a better doctor-patient arise in the normally which accident. risk of an industrial shoulder the protection need for relationship. One’s professional lia- higher the income But is not affected malpractice from medical physi- coverage company bility insurance configuration of the the average from the co- apart set them cians or the location of treatment. tionship employee. liability physician to exposing A rule not Fourth, physician does company acting as a while committed compromise of the mutual participate ei- doctor is not inconsistent of the worker’s is the essence rights which the Workmen’s policies underlying ther the Because the doctor scheme. compensation rule of general its Compensation Act or area, he or production from the is removed com- The worker’s co-employee immunity. injured unlikely to extremely she a mutual upon based pensation scheme is Thus, the doctor realistically, job. the rights by law compromise of common right to sue law sacrificing a common industrial when an ployers and workers: immunity. exchange for occurs, accepts liabili- employer accident the Fifth, pro- recognition importance of the the worker’s relationship and the sound with an economic incentive employers vides underlying considerations job careful to deter future accidents urged commentators have organization training, supervision, adoption approach. the of that Jen But because a workplace. kins, Doctors, Company supra; Kelly, profession- significant lacks control over Compensation and Li Employer judgment by a com- al acts and exercise Doctrine, ability: Dual-Capacity 5 St. im- extending co-employee pany physician, (1974); Note, Mary’s L.J. 818 The Mal carries little deter- munity practice Liability Company Physicians, company. rent effect Most im- 53 Ind.L.J. 585 “Patients and doc immunity removes portantly, co-employee expectations tors have rooted about deeply negligence by all deterrence to almost system their roles in our of medical care who, doc- among alone company physician, legal aspects of their relation.... tors, would be invulnerable to private attempted If a to disclaim actions. liability malpractice, the law would take agreement.” look at that hard McCor Thus, leaving company physicians open Caterpillar mick v. Tractor 53 Ill.Dec. compensatory satisfies the negligence suits 215, 423 (Simon, J., N.E.2d at 884 dissent without purposes of worker’s ing). basic of a mutual frustrating principle rights. The dual compromise Contrary arguments peti- tioner, Evans, opinion liable under our in Kandt v. approach leaves the (Colo.1982) require rejec- does injuries which Kandt tion of the dual doctrine. employment employee exposed by the is to liable their employees may held that be out of which arise industry injuries— for intentional torts commit- co-employees is employee a risk or hazard to which the employment the scope ted outside the “It job. in exposed performance the implies, As its name dual ca- relationship. legislature these risks which the only is analysis premised principle is on the pacity by be covered the worker’s com- intended to Wright— Dr. that —here Sabourin, supra, act.” Jenkins v. pensation occupy separate the simultaneously may J., (Abrahamson, 311 N.W.2d at 613 dissent- of a employee statuses of an and ing). medicine under the Col- practice licensed to an inherent Medical is not Act, see orado Medical Practice “The brewing risk of the business. medical (1978 Repl.Vol. 5 and seq., C.R.S.1973 and dis- separate treatment of is a allegedly tortious Supp.). Because the not concern tinct function ... which does the course of the place actions here took employ- part the and is not relationship and outside the Tropiano v. operations.” er’s business relationship, the scope of Pa. Travelers Insurance is not barred Cobb’s action Act. There- Compensation does not and A.2d Coors the Workmen’s Instead, fore, capaci- liable in his Wright may it Dr. be practice could not medicine.3 doctor, court cor- and the district ty as a such as Dr. physicians must licensed employ to dismiss. the motion rectly denied of medi- Wright practice to do so. In his Coors, Wright Dr. enters into doc- cine for discharged. Rule employee-employee, tor-patient, J., ROVIRA, HODGES, C.J., dissents, duty and tionships. thereby He assumes in the dissent. every patient. joins by every owed surgery. The See, Mercy Hospital, and e.g., can not medicine 150 Colo. Moon person patient is (1962), and that a relation between doctor which held 373 P.2d (quoting v. Sen negli- Rosane hospital P.2d at 945 liable for the al.” 373 could not found (1944)). ger, employed. gence which it Colo. of a staff doctor to, hospital not be licensed .. . can “[A] leading view scholar- Justice, dissenting: supported by This is HODGES, Chief analysis majority states.2 ly majority The hold- I dissent. respectfully contrary to actual view is ing my is immunity given coemployees The all statute, contrary to our our language of compen- under our workmen’s rational one law, accepted pa- contrary case Compensa- sation statutes. Our Workmen’s because it judicial decision rameters compromising tion Act is based on a judicial legislation. amounts to whereby employer relinquishes rights, automatically and becomes principle It established Col- normal defenses firmly is a cases liable, relinquishes previ- law workmen’s orado and the suing from precluded are coemployees Kandt v. Ev- ous common remedies. causing negligent actions one another for ans, supra. employment. their in the course of injury majority reasons of the The stated enunciating principle many cases immunity doctor from excepting in Kandt v. are set forth and its rationale unconvincing. To that an say (Colo.1982). also Evans, 645 P.2d integral is a doctor is not an who Sports, Empire Mountain Rocky Ellis v. employer’s of his business and thus not part Inc., 166, 602 P.2d 895 Colo.App. Compensation the Workmen’s covered Colo.App. Harding, 29 Nelson v. logic. sig- strains A immunity Act and its Trueblood, 29 Sieck company’s modern percent nificant of a see also 485 P.2d Colo.App. production area function outside Transportation Fe Trail Hamblen v. Santa and distinct separate do work which is (D.Colo.1951). F.Supp. 799 the work done in the so called ordi- from carves out an holding which majority clear, It nary employment. course of case and statu- to the established

exception however, truly majority could doctor, is a coemployee tory law when for oth- view this as the salient distinction new in workmen’s promulgating a the Workmen’s erwise I believe was never compensation law which continuing validity little would have —it Assembly. intended our General company’s employ- too few of a would cover apply the so majority persuaded has been ees. which has capacity” called “dual doctrine cases. point majority in several California made been enunciated liabili- personal This doctrine would extend frequently accidents are work role is to a when his ty coemployee fault, com- increasingly on but on an based work done in from the separate and distinct similarly can be made plex technology, employment.1 course of ordinary Also, rea- majority’s medical accidents. prece- contrary to Colorado This doctrine (or his car- soning that the view. statutory my dent and and thus should be rier) pay can afford to liable, is a denial standard personally When a doctor is full-time protection, principles equal constitutional treat other to care for and of law. by a court and should be shunned sense by common employees clearly, he is Compensation Finally, the Workmen’s all other definition, coemployee fault-based, to reason that and thus is not He is statutory law. under our fault, is judged doctors alone should him as an assigned to acting and to fundamental to the Act employee per- contrary also other employee, just any as fairness. principles was hired. for which he forms the work (1973); Rogers, Cal.App.3d 36 Ohio St.2d 302 N.E.2d 1. See v. Hoffman Pavich, Pa.Super. (1972). 411 A.2d Cal.Rptr. Babich v. Iserson, cf., (1979); 33 N.Y.2d Garcia See, Larson, Compensa- e.g., 2 A Workmen’s N.Y.S.2d Kimmel, Law, 72.61(b) see, e.g., 14-200-14-207 394 N.E.2d tion § but Stevens Hayes Ill.App. Rogers, supra. & (Ind.App.1979); v. Marshall Field Hoffman v. Ford Motor 115 N.E.2d 99 Proctor brief, with reference to the “dual ca- pacity” “the company doctor does capacities. have two He has one: com- Larson,

pany doctor.” A Law, 72.61(b), at 14-203

The majority adopted exception has

on admittedly policy “sound considera- proper

tions." It is more for the General

Assembly decision, to make such a if

it so desires. The defendant’s motion to

dismiss should not have been denied.

I am say authorized to that Justice RO- joins

VIRA in this dissent. Colorado,

The PEOPLE of the State

Appellant, M.H., In the Interest of Child, Concerning J.H.,

And R.H. and

Appellees.

No. 82SA284.

En Banc.

April

Case Details

Case Name: Wright v. District Court in & for the County of Jefferson

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Apr 18, 1983

Citation: 661 P.2d 1167

Docket Number: 82SA371

Court Abbreviation: Colo.