142 Mich. 508 | Mich. | 1905
The plaintiff, in company with another young lady and a Mr. Upton, was riding on the main highway, south of South Frankfort, in a single carriage. Mr. Upton was driving a horse which the testimony tends to show was gentle, and which had been owned by Mr. Upton’s father and used as a family horse for several years. The time was about half past 8 in the evening. It was dark at the time, so that an approaching vehicle could not be seen for a great distance. The plaintiff’s testimony and that of Mr. Upton tended to show that they were keeping a- lookout ahead for teams or vehicles, and that suddenly the defendant’s automobile, which had been running so quietly as not to be heard, and which displayed no headlight, appeared at a distance of about .20 feet ahead of the horse, causing the horse to take fright, turn about, and overturn the carriage, throwing the plaintiff from the carriage against a barbed wire fence. Plaintiff was seriously injured. The declaration counted on defendant’s negligence in running the automobile at a high rate of speed and without headlights. The plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment of $650. Defendant brings error.
Complaint is made of a ruling permitting an amendment to the declaration on the trial making more specific the averment of care on the part of plaintiff. The granting of the amendment was not improper. The question was one resting in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and no abuse of discretion is shown by this record.
The principal question discussed in defendant’s brief is whether a verdict should have been directed for the defendant. The contention that a verdict should have been
Mr. Upton was a witness for the plaintiff, and after testifying that the automobile was but 30 feet from the horse’s head when first discovered, and that the automobile made no noise when approaching heard by him, and that when running at a high rate of speed it makes but little noise, and when running at a low speed it makes much more noise, was permitted, against defendant’s objection, to testify as to the rate of speed of the automobile on the occasion in question. An estimate of speed should have as a basis at least a reasonable opportunity to judge. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich., at page 540. It is so obvious that this witness was not in a position to estimate the speed of this vehicle that we feel
The other questions discussed are not likely to arise on a new trial.
For the error pointed out, the judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.