21 N.H. 339 | Superior Court of New Hampshire | 1850
In Dennet v. Cutts, 11 N. H. Rep. 163, it was decided, that an attorney has a hen upon the papers and documents of his client, which have come into his hands in the course of his professional employment, for the general balance due him. In this case no hen attaches, until the chent’s papers come into the attorney’s hands, (St. John v. Diefendorf, 12 Wend. 261,) and in the course of his professional business. Stevenson v. Blakelock, 1 Maule & Selw. 535. And as, hke other common-law hens, it rests upon possession, such hen is lost, whenever the holder voluntarily gives up the possession.
This hen extends to the execution and copy of the judgment, if they are in the attorney’s hands, but does not reach to the judgment itself. Of this there can be no possession. It is but a "decision of a court upon a claim made by one party against another. It exists but in intendment of law. The records of the courts are
The lien of an attorney, upon a judgment for his fees and disbursements in the cause, is established here by the decision in Shapley v. Bellows, 4 N. H. Rep. 347, in conformity to the general principle adopted elsewhere. It is properly denominated a lien in the broad sense of the term, but it has few points of resemblance to the ordinary lien upon tangible property. It does not in any way depend upon possession, but rests on the equity of the attorney’s claim, to be repaid out of the proceeds of a judgment, for his fees and disbursements which ordinarily constitute a part of the judgment itself. This right is limited to the fees and disbursements of the attorney in that cause, and cannot be extended to “ commissions,” or other charges, however proper in themselves. The People v. Hardenburg, 8 Johns. 335; Heart v. Chipman, 2 Aiken, 162; Ocean Insurance Co. v. Rider, 22 Pick. 210.
Auditors, by the Revised Statutes, ch. 189, are to be appointed by the Court, and are to perform certain duties in regard to such actions as may require an investigation of accounts, or an examination of vouchers. Their duty is to state the accounts between the parties. They act under oath, and either party, dissatisfied with the report, may have a trial by jury. For certain purposes, the report is made evidence upon such trial. The matters which may thus be submitted to a jury, are those only which the auditor can examine. If he extends his inquiries further, either with the assent of parties, or without, his report must be set aside, as embracing matters not referred to him, and in regard to which such report is not made evidence.
. It is well settled here, as well as elsewhere, that, during the ¡continuance of a partnership, and while its concerns are unadjusted, there is at common law no implied promise by one partner to pay any thing to the other on a partnership transaction; -and no action lies by either in such case, unless the transaction upon which the right of action is based, has been settled between the parties, and a promise of payment made. Gibson v. Moore, 6 N. H. Rep. 547.
By the Revised Statutes, ch. 180, § 4, any copartner may maintain an action of assumpsit against one or more of his co-partners, to recover his just share of any goods, chattels, choses in action, or the proceeds thereof, received by such copartners, and not accounted for, delivered, paid, or otherwise settled for, on demand. Under an earlier statute, of which this is a revision, it was decided, in Perley v. Brown, 12 N. H. Rep. 493, that to bring the case within the statute, there must be a refusal to account for some specific property belonging to the partnership, and that a claim for the balance of unsettled partnership dealings, could not be supported after a demand of settlement and a refusal. The provision of the former statute, allowing an action for money had and received in such case, is repealed. And we think, that under the revised statutes, not only the demand should be for specific property, but the declaration should be special, setting forth the facts required to maintain the action.
Under the general counts, which give no notice of any partnership claim, which set forth none of' the facts required to